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I. INTRODUCTION

Fishing rights on the high seas, coastal fisheries management, and
international ocean law have long been of great significance in the
economic and diplomatic relations between Canada, the United States,
and Great Britain.1 Fisheries issues, dating back to the 18th century,
have been complex because they have involved swings and vacillations
between conflict and cooperation in Anglo-North American relationships.
In many respects, it has been a history of persistent economic rivalry,
pitting the interests of Canada's Atlantic and Pacific fishing fleets
against the interests of fishing operators in the United States and Great
Britain, and in more recent times, involving differences stemming from
the divergent policy objectives of North American distant-water fishing
and coastal fishing industries. Nonetheless, at many junctures in this
history there has also been significant identity of national objectives in
regard to fisheries, a particularly important example being the concerns
of the British Columbia and Washington-Alaska salmon fisheries to fend
off foreign competition in offshore waters. Not to be overlooked, too, is
the fact that the Canadian-U.S. relationship in the last eighty years has
involved an active coordination of both scientific fisheries research and
important management efforts in coastal waters.2
1. Acknowledgments: The author is greatly indebted to the officers and staffs of
the American, Canadian, New Zealand, Japanese, and Australian national archives and
of the Public Records Office (Kew) of the United Kingdom; and to the archivists of the
special collections in the Scripps Institution of Oceanography Archives (University of
California, San Diego), the Hoover Institution, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Library, and the University of Washington. He acknowledges with gratitude the counsel
and encouragement in the course of this research of his wife Jane L. Scheiber; Professors
Akio Watanabae (University of Tokyo, emeritus), David D. Caron (UC Berkeley),
William T. Burke (University of Washington), Paul Pickowicz and Robert Edelman
(University of California, San Diego), and Elizabeth Eliot-Meisel (Creighton University); and
the late Hon. William Herrington and the late Prof. Stefan A. Riesenfeld.
2. Although there is no comprehensive history on the subject in its full context,
many of the general themes to which this study relates are given full context in the
treatise by DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: A

FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-ORIENTED INQUIRIES (1965); and in WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND BEYOND (1998), the
authoritative work on the subject. Articles by Anne L. Hollick that are cited in notes
below and Hollick's book, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, are
invaluable for their analysis of the large context of U.S. oceans policy process and
substantive developments, as well as for their analyses of specific issues. See infra note
10. Research for the present Article has built on archival sources relating to policy and
law, especially from the Canadian and other Commonwealth archives that provide much
data beyond what Hollick had obtained from her research in the U.S. DOS records, her
principal source for historical analysis.
The following abbreviations are used in the citations in this Article:
CAN: Canadian National Archives
Documents: Department of External Affairs, Government of Canada, Documents on
Canadian External Relations/DocumentsRelatifs aux Relations Exterieuresdu Canada

[VOL.

6: 27, 2004]

Modern Ocean Law
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

Ocean fisheries issues invariably implicate questions of international
law. In this aspect of the trilateral interrelationship, there is again a
mixed record. Historically, the United States, Britain, and Canada have
often stood together on basic doctrinal matters of international law. This
was true especially insofar as the governments of all three nations were
for many decades strong champions of the "three-mile rule" as the limit
of offshore jurisdiction for coastal states. 3 And yet, in some periods of
the modern era, the three countries have pursued conflicting policies,
sometimes producing critical tensions in their diplomatic relations,
including direct conflicts over maritime boundaries.4
In all these respects, the "fisheries dimension" of the trilateral relationship
has reflected accurately the larger framework of economic, political,
strategic, and ideological relationships that the late J. Bartlet Brebner
depicted brilliantly in his famous book on historic dynamics of change in
the "North Atlantic Triangle." 5 As will be discussed below, the cultural
dimension, especially the manifestations of racism directed against
people of Japanese origin living on the West Coast of Canada and the
DOS: Department of State
FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States
NA:United States National Archives
PRO: Public Records Office (UK), Kew
RG :Records Group
SS for EA: Secretary of State for External Affairs (Canada)
UW: University of Washington
3. The phrase "three-mile rule" refers literally to the three-mile distance from
shore as the formal boundary of national jurisdiction; in fact, prior to the 1940s, even the
maritime nations that most assertively defended that rule-the United States and the
United Kingdom-had in various ways deviated from it in limited contexts (for defense
of security, for policing against pollution of coastal waters, and for interdiction of
smugglers). The phrase is used here with those exceptions taken as granted, and for
which see, inter alia, the classic work by STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF
COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace,

Div. of Int'l Law, Monograph Series, No. 5, 1941); and SAYRE A. SWARZTRAUBER, THE
THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS (1972).
4. See, e.g., Anne M. Hollick, Canadian-AmericanRelations: Law of the Sea, 28
INT'L ORG., Autumn 1974, at 755; Barbara Johnson, Canadian Foreign Policy and
Fisheries, in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 49-99 (Barbara

Johnson & Mark W. Zacher, eds., 1977); DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, CANADA AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1-12, 64-75 et passim (1985); HIROSHI KASAHARA &
WILLIAM T. BURKE, NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 1-27 (Res. for the Future,

Program of Int'l Studies of Fisheries Arrangements, Paper No. 2, 1973); and see generally
DAVID L. VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD: THE U.S. AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE

(1983).
5.
JoHN BARTLET BREBNER, NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE:
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN (1945).

THE INTERPLAY OF

United States, also figured large in the history of fisheries relationships,
and
as the three countries sought to pursue their respective positions
6
protect their individual interests from the 1930s to the 1950s.
During the last half of the twentieth century, the governments and the
fishing industries of the North Atlantic Triangle nations have played
major roles in the shaping of formal international ocean law. The existing
scholarly literature on this subject provides a rich body of data regarding
this record. Most studies focus upon the ocean law reforms that were
pursued under the aegis of the United Nations, that is to say, the process
of reform since 195 1.7 The United Nations, prodded among others by
the United States and Canada, began the work of developing a new
ocean law in the 1950s with a comprehensive study by the International
Law Commission of unsettled legal issues in ocean law, followed by
conferences in Rome (1955) and Geneva (1958), which resulted in new
multilateral agreements on principles to govern the exploitation of living
resources of the seas and on other cognate matters of law.8 There
followed a series of further negotiations in search of agreement on a
comprehensive new Law of the Sea. Shifting alliances among states in
the global community, the vicissitudes of the Cold War, and the
increasing use of new technologies that put unprecedented pressure on
ocean resources complicated and prolonged the negotiating process.
Finally, the continuing talks culminated in 1982 with the signature of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 9 This
6. See infra note 68.
7. See generally, the essays in two recent volumes: THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE
COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES (Harry N. Scheiber, ed., 2000)
[hereinafter LAW OF THE SEA]; AND ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE
CENTURY (Davor Vidas & Willy Ostreng eds., 1999) [hereinafter ORDER FOR THE
OCEANS]. On the institutional and political contexts of the U.N. Law of the Sea meetings
that produced the 1982 Convention, see generally ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING
THE NEW OCEAN REGIME (1993).
8. The most complete historical overview and analysis is contained in LAWRENCE
JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE MANAGEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN

GOVERNANCE (1996). See also D. J. J. ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-13 (1987); and Barbara J. Rosenow, Comment: North Pacific
FisheriesTreaties and InternationalLaw of the Sea, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 223,234-35 (1963).
9. Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261.
Although the 1982 Convention was comprehensive in the light of existing technology in
the late 1970s to 1982, the agreement was unfortunately negotiated just before ocean
diplomats and lawyers began to recognize the enormous potential of genetic resources
and the related imperatives for sustaining biodiversity at all levels. The "ecosystem"
concept was already well known and had been incorporated into the agenda of fisheries
scientists and of oceanographers for more than two decades-even finding its way into
the guiding principles of agenda-writing for fishery investigations, though not as yet
explicitly into the specified missions of fishery management regimes. See Harry N.
Scheiber, The Biodiversity Convention and Access to Marine Genetic Materials in Ocean
Law, in ORDER FOR THE OCEANS, supra note 7, at 187-202; and, for the earlier period
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convention was an ambitious framework document of extraordinary
scope in its subject matter, designed to clarify the boundaries of claims
to control in the world oceans and to set down universally applicable
principles of law to govern the varied uses of marine space and resources.
It is the object of this study to analyze the "pre-history" of those
developments. I seek to establish here the degree to which multilateralism
prevailed in the postwar era, or instead was overcome by unilateralist
objectives and methods in pursuit of national interests. The empirical
basis and special focus in much of my analysis is the discussion of
Canada's role in regard to the diplomacy of the Pacific fisheries and
more generally in regard to the process of developing modem ocean law
as reflected in Canadian-U.S.-Japanese-British relations.' 0 In Section II,
the general record of modem change in ocean law is discussed more
fully. Against that background, we turn in the ensuing Sections to
significant episodes in the ongoing relationships of Canada, the U.K.,
and the United States in dealing with Japan and its fishing industry-in
every case with important implications of the future of ocean law. The
first episode in question (discussed in Sections III and IV) is the "Bristol
Bay incident" of 1937-38, when Japanese factory ships threatened to
"invade" American and Canadian fishing grounds in the Northeast Pacific.
The second episode (treated in Section V and VI) came immediately
after the end of World War II. It was the result of U.S. and Canadian
reaction to the Bristol Bay incident-the American government's
issuance of the Truman Fisheries Proclamation of 1945. This U.S. action
proved to be the trigger of a transformation in ocean law that challenged
the traditional rules of territorial waters and offshore jurisdiction of
coastal states. Of particular interest in this aspect of the history is the
and the introduction of the ecosystem concept into postwar fishery science, revitalizing
ideas that had been essential to early studies in fishery biology going back to the turn of
the century, see Harry N. Scheiber, California Marine Research and the Founding of
Modern Fisheries Oceanography: CalCOFl's Early Years, 1947-1973, 31 Cal. Coop.
Oceanic Fisheries Investigations [CALCOFI] REPORTS 63-83 (1990). On fisheries
oceanography's scientific and organizational history, see ERIC L. MILLS, BIOLOGICAL
AN EARLY HISTORY, 1870-1960 (1989); and MARGARET DEACON,
SCIENTISTS AND THE SEA, 1650-1900: A STUDY OF MARINE SCIENCE (1997).
10. The Canadian dimension of law and policy, in the present study, is based
largely on archival sources not previously discussed in the literature. Studies of
Canadian policy that include consideration of the historical trends of the postwar decade
that were advanced or deflected in the later period include FRANK LANGDOM, THE
OCEANOGRAPHY:

POLITICS OF CANADIAN-JAPANESE

ECONOMIC

RELATIONS,

1952-1983

(1983)

(esp.

Chapter 4); and Johnson, supra note 4. The standard work on U.S. policy history is
ANNE L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1981).

character of the war-period planning that led to the Truman Proclamation,
producing new stresses in the relationships involving Canada, the United
States, and the U.K.-stresses that brought to prominence the key issues
that would dominate global debate of ocean law for several decades to
follow.
Section VII treats the history of the fisheries and whaling policies of
the Occupation authority in postwar Japan, under General Douglas
MacArthur, and how those policies intensified tensions among the Allies
from 1945 to 1952. These tensions were reflected in bitter divisions of
opinion and policy objectives among members of the Far Eastern Council
(FEC), an international body sitting in Washington that nominally was
responsible for basic Occupation policies. The key issues affecting the
future of ocean law, and not only the future of Japan's fishing and
whaling industries, again were at the forefront of debate.
Finally, Section VIII offers an interpretation of the debates over
principles of ocean law, in counterpoint with a set of other formative
influences, that marked the process that led to successful conclusion of
the historic 1952 tripartite Canadian-U.S.-Japanese agreement called the
International North Pacific Fisheries Convention (INPFC). (The INPFC
was initialed after several weeks of talks in Tokyo during November and
December 1951, was signed formally by the three powers in 1952, and
went into force in 1953). By the terms of this agreement, Ottawa and
Washington sought to resolve some of the most intractable, unsettled
issues of fishery management and international law that had carried over
from the earlier episodes discussed here. From the standpoint of the
Japanese government, the agreement not only represented a surrender of
the old principle of freedom of the seas, which was of great importance
to Japanese fishing interests, but it also represented a new opportunity
for Japanese distant water fleets to operate over a wide area of the
globe's ocean waters without legal challenge. 1 Japan won this opportunity
at a time when many within the Commonwealth were hoping to keep
Japanese fishing out of the south-western Pacific Ocean area. Indeed,
there was a striking asymmetry between what Canada won for itself,
through an alliance with Washington in the INPFC, and the way in
which the Convention left Australia and other coastal nations exposed to
renewed Japanese fishing competition, so that a triumph of Canadian2
U.S. diplomacy became a burden for other Allied states to bear.'
11. For full documentation of this interpretation of the Convention and its import,
see Harry N. Scheiber, Origins of the Abstention Doctrine in Ocean Law: Japanese-U.S.
Relations and the Pacific Fisheries,1937-1958, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 23-99 (1989).
12. See, inter alia, the argument and documentation in my recent book: HARRY N.
SCHEMER, INTER-ALLIED CONFLICTS AND OCEAN LAW, 1945-53: THE OCCUPATION
COMMAND'S REVIVAL OF JAPANESE WHALING AND MARINE FISHERIES (2000). Shigeru Oda,
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In each of these episodes, the international policy conflicts at issue
carried far beyond the bounds of fisheries policy alone. And in each
instance, the vital issues of international oceans law that were implicated
actually foreshadowed the major ocean law controversies and trends of
the decades that followed. Indeed, the Canadian-U.S.-Japanese fishery
relations of the Occupation era established the terms of argument and
framework of debate for much of the ocean law reform movement
during the 1960s and 1970s. That movement culminated in the signing
of the UNCLOS in 1982 and thereafter led to modern-day agreements
such as the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, which had enormous potential
of affecting the rights and obligations of fishing nations whose vessels
operate on the high seas.13
II. MODERN OCEAN LAW DEVELOPMENT: AN OVERVIEW

With regard to fisheries, the 1982 U.N. Convention was especially
important in two respects. First, it validated the movement of "ocean
enclosure," already effectively established by the time the convention
was signed, by which coastal states were authorized to extend their
jurisdiction over fishing and other activities out to a distance of 200
miles off their shores. This new rule formally supplanted the long-dominant
three-mile rule, which had still held sway since the 1940s despite various
exceptions, none of the which being even remotely as radical as permitting
a distance of 200 miles for purposes of such control. 14 The concept of a
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) had been championed by its
supporters as a way of strengthening environmental protection. If access by
later Senior Judge of the International Court of Justice and for five decades a major
figure in jurisprudence of ocean law, published his first major work on these very
questions seen from the immediate contemporary perspective and especially from the
standpoint of Japanese policy objectives: See SHIGERU ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

OF SEA RESOURCES (1963); see also Shigeru Oda, Recollections of the 1952 International
North Pacific FisheriesConvention, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 11 (2004).

13. Most important among later agreements is the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks agreement,
on which see William T. Burke, Compatibility and Precaution in the 1995 Straddling
Stock Agreement, in LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 7, at 105-26; and Moritaka Hayashi,
The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Law of the Sea, in ORDER FOR THE OCEANS,
supra note 7, at 37-53. See also GOVERNING HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: THE INTERPLAY OF
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL REGIMES (Olav S. Stokke, ed., 2001) (discussing legal and

implementation problems in the regional management of high seas species generally).
14. The standard work on ocean law in relation to fisheries management and
jurisdiction is BURKE, supra note 2; see also Ellen Hey, Reconceptualizationof the Issues
Involved in International Fisheries Conservation and Management, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW 5 (Ellen Hey, ed., 1999).

foreign-flag vessels could be limited or restricted by the coastal states, it
was argued, then the chances of an effective conservationist management
regime under the coastal state's aegis would be vastly enhanced. The
protectionist aspect of ocean enclosure, however, was never absent in the
consideration of the various reforms of formal norms and doctrine that
were considered in the U.N. debates; the goals of protectionism were an
underlying reality. Indeed, it was obvious that the benefits of jurisdiction
extended to 200 miles would be of great potential profitability to coastal
states. The EEZ would be of crucial importance especially to countries
whose economies were highly dependent on fisheries, such as Iceland, and
it was favored more generally by Third World coastal countries that were
hopeful of developing their own fisheries industries.1 5 But among the big
winners were powerful industrial nations16 with large coastal fisheries, most
notably Canada and the United States.
The second major respect in which the Convention was important for
fisheries was its incorporation of the principle that the signatory states
would recognize formal obligations as to the sustainability of fishery
resources in ocean space under their control and as to the activities of
fishing vessels flying their flags.1 7 Until late in the 19th century, it had
been a widely accepted idea that ocean fishery resources were
"inexhaustible." This belief was not altogether absurd, given the fact
that before the harnessing of steam to bottom trawlers and other
advances in.technology, the scale and intensity of most, though not all,
marine fishing operations did not pose anything like the threat to
resources that the modern fishing fleets and their gear posed in later
times. 18 By 1982, however, this notion had been universally laid to rest.
Of course, specific fishing industry people continued to insist, almost
regardless of evidence to the contrary, that their particular ocean area or
the particular fisheries they were operating in certainly were not in danger
of depletion. "Exhaustibility" had to be defined in terms of such particulars.
It was difficult to prove, just as uncertainty is today (even with modem
scientific methods in use), a continuing problem for fisheries management.
15.

FRIEDHEIM, supra note 7 (analyzing alignments and coalitional behavior at the

conferences). See also EDWARD L. MILES, GLOBAL OCEAN POLITICS: THE DECISION
PROCESS AT THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1973-

1982 (1998).
16. Johnson, supra note 4.
17. Jon Van Dyke, Sharing Ocean Resources-In a Time of Scarcity and
Selfishness, in LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 7, at 3; see generally LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note 7, at 3-36.
18. See generally RIESENFELD, supra note 3; DAVID CUSHING, FISHERIES
RESOURCES OF THE SEA AND THEIR MANAGEMENT (1975); and Lawrence Juda, Changing
Perspectives on the Oceans, in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 17-28 (David D.

Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, eds., 2004).
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To determine whether a specific fishery stock was being depleted requires
scientific investigation, and a sound judgment relies upon the dependability
of data (a rare thing indeed in fisheries management) as well as the accurate
interpretation of trends and potentialities. Uncertainties have sometimes
had tragic consequences. A particularly notorious example was Japan's
denial of the endangerment of the pygmy blue whale, assaulting the
stocks until they were finally destroyed altogether. 19 Similar examples
for pelagic fisheries may be cited. Thus in the 1940s, during the period
that we are concerned with here, the California sardine fishery collapsed.2 °
To cite an example from our own day, Canada, the European fishing
powers, and the United States all bear heavy responsibility for giving the
historic Northwest Atlantic cod fishery entirely inadequate protection. 1
In any event, for the purpose of strengthening the conceptual foundations of
scientific management and identifying the possibilities for principled
legal reform that would embody the idea of voluntary abstention from
coastal fishing under specified circumstances, the 1982 Convention
brought such issues into a much clearer focus, though not a definitive
resolution. 2
As the present study will show, the central issues that would become
the focus of the U.N. debates and that presaged key provisions of the
1982 Convention surfaced dramatically during the 1930s-1952 period in
relations between Japan and the North Atlantic Triangle nations. Intensive
diplomatic efforts looking toward the resolution of these issues were
pursued in different arenas of deliberation and action throughout the
period in question, as the North Atlantic Triangle governments engaged,
both individually and in varying configurations of alliance, in attempts
19. Harry N. Scheiber, HistoricalMemory, Cultural Claims, and Environmental
Ethics in the Jurisprudenceof Whaling Regulation, 38 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT.5-40
(1998); GEORGE L. SMALL, THE BLUE WHALE (1977).

20. Scheiber, CALCOFI REPORTS, supra note 9; and Arthur F. McEvoy & Harry N.
Scheiber, Scientists, Entrepreneurs,and the Policy Process: A Study of the Post-1945
CaliforniaSardineDepletion, 44 J.OF ECON. HIST. 393-406 (1984).
21. Canadian public policy failed to deal effectively with obvious problems and
even exacerbated the crisis, especially after taking full control of its EEZ area. This is
emphatically argued and well documented in Lennox O'Reilly Hinds, Crisis in Canada's
Atlantic Sea Fisheries, 19 MARINE POL'Y 271-83 (1995); see also William E. Schrank,
Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction: Origins of the Current Crisis in Atlantic Canada's
Fisheries, 19 MARINE POL'Y 285-99 (1995).
22. The 1995 Fisheries Stocks Agreement provided highly specific definitions that
were without precedent in U.N. Law of the Sea as to "reference points" as levels of
stocks availability that required conservationist intervention. See Hayashi, supra note
13, at 22, 49-50.

to reform international fisheries management. In a related and derivative
enterprise, these governments also worked toward a reform of the
fundamental principles of international ocean law.
A parallel theme in this history that is of special interest is the way in
which Canadian-U.S.-British relations were affected by the quest for a
consensus on how science should be deployed in marine fisheries
management. There was a parallel quest for embedding the ideal of
sustainability in fishery management-what was known as the concept
of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)-in international law, or, failing
that, at least embedding it in the _prevailing international agreements for
multilateral fishery management. The sustainability concept had come
into prominence in fisheries science early in the century. The theory
was built upon the fisheries investigations of Johan Hjort of Norway and
other pioneering figures in the field working in British and Northern
European laboratories.24 At critical junctures, the evolving scientific
theories of sustainable management became vital to the reconsideration
of inherited doctrines in international law and their revision to accommodate
new realities of the ocean fisheries. This was true especially of the way
in which the concept called "abstention" was incorporated into the
INPFC of 1952, in which Canada and the United States joined with a
reluctant Japanese government to place fisheries management in the
Northeast Pacific on a new conceptual and legal basis.
Finally, the history of the period from the 1930s to 1952 involved both
academic reconsideration and diplomatic initiatives on the vital issue in
international law of "territorial waters," that is, the issue of offshore
limits of coastal states' sovereignty. This issue would prove to be
inseparable from fishery management questions when the U.N. embarked
on its Law of the Sea effort in later years and when the interrelatedness
23. Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J.Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to
Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries
Debates, 1937-1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 10-54 (1998). The troubled history of
MSY as what may be termed the "Holy Grail" of a generation of fishery management
scientists is told in Larry A. Nielsen, The Evolution of Fisheries Management
Philosophy, MARINE FISHERIES REv., Dec. 1976, at 15; and P.A. Larkin, An Epitaphfor
the Concept of Maximum Sustained Yield, 106 TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y 1
(1977).
24. Harry N. Scheiber, Modern U.S. Pacific Oceanography and the Legacy of
British and Northern European Science, MAN AND THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT 36-79

(Stephen Fisher ed., 1994); see generally HELEN M. ROZWADOWSKI, THE SEA KNOWS No
BOUNDARIES: A CENTURY OF MARINE SCIENCE UNDER ICES (2002); MILLS, supra note 9.
25. See infra § VII1. For contemporary expositions on abstention, refer to Richard
Van Cleve's speech during the U.N. Conference on the Law and the Sea, see The
Economic and Scientific Basis of the PrincipleofAbstention (PreparatoryDocument No.
3), U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., at 47-63, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/3 (1957); and William C.
Herrington, ProblemsAffecting North Pacific Fisheries:TripartiteFisheriesConference
at Tokyo, November 4-December 14, 1951, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 340-346 (1952).
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of the two was finally expressed in the adoption of the 200-mile EEZ.26
There were profound differences in the underlying economic and
political factors that influenced the respective policies of the British,
American, and Canadian governments on the territorial-waters question
during the period that concerns us here. Moreover, the role of the
Japanese government and fishing industry before the war, then during
the Occupation era, and finally after the peace treaty went into effect in
1952, proved to be an important catalyst in bringing these questions to
the fore in ocean law diplomacy both within the 27Triangle and in the
larger global arena of ocean politics and law reform.
At issue was whether it was desirable (and, from an environmental
standpoint, whether it was truly essential), to reduce the prerogatives that
sovereign states had long associated with the concept of "freedom of the
seas." This could be accomplished by enhancing the prerogatives of the
coastal states through ocean enclosure, i.e., through extended jurisdiction
in what finally took the form of the EEZs, or through international
agreements to sustain the fisheries while at the same time maintaining
the core validity of the old limitations, especially the three-mile rule.
The disputes of such questions were usually advertised as being pursued
in the name of protection of the fisheries in order to sustain their
productivity for current harvest and profit and for the benefit of future
generations. 8 Proposals for reform of ocean fisheries law were sometimes
candidly advanced, however, not as a noble cause to benefit humankind
but rather on the argument that they were needed in order to protect the
established domestic commercial fishing interests and communities from
the economic threat posed by new foreign competition. I discuss below
how all of the major players in the postwar debate over the Pacific
fisheries and the future of ocean law were keenly attuned to special
fishing interests, even though principled multilateralism and other large
strategic factors in their diplomacy sometimes prevailed.
Moreover, the defenders of the old rule of freedom of fishing on the
high seas and of the three-mile limit of coastal jurisdiction, in some
instances, simply made their arguments on grounds that their own national
food requirements and economic interests were adequate justifications
26.

FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUTRA, THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HIGH

SEAS FISHERIES 3 et seq. (1999).

27.

See infra §§ VI and VII. Japanese fisheries and whaling in the postwar years

28.

See generally Juda, supra note 18, at 19.

are considered in detail in SCHEIBER, supra note 12.

for the continuance of the established legal order. For example, when
the United States unilaterally made a dramatic break with established
doctrine in 1945 with the issuance of the Truman Fisheries Proclamation,
which declared the U.S. intention to create "conservation zones" for
fisheries beyond the traditional three-mile offshore boundary of jurisdiction,
the State Department's Legal Adviser counseled the Secretary that the
new policy was "designed to improve the economic conditions of the
United States and its nationals., 29 But the official posture of the United
States was quite different, of course, justifying the policy to world30
opinion on grounds of conservationist aims and equitable considerations.
As I have suggested here already, in all these respects the controversies
and confrontations of the 1930-1952 period foreshadowed essential
features of the developments that would later result in the transformation
of ocean law.
III. THE BRISTOL BAY INCIDENT
When Britain, Canada, and the United States were initially confronted
with these issues, the challenge was triggered not by an incident in the
familiar North Atlantic fishing grounds but rather by a situation involving
Japan's fishing operations in the Pacific coastal waters of North America.
This was a portent of future directions in ocean diplomacy. The challenge
came in the late 1930s, but it had been presaged by the emergence of
Japan in that decade as the world's leading marine fisheries power. 31 In
its pelagic fishing and whaling operations alike, Japan made an
unenviable reputation as being not only expansionist, but also ruthless in
hunting and harvesting and scornful of scientific management principles
except within the limits of its own coastal waters. Virtually no concessions
were made by Tokyo or the Japanese fleets to the objectives of
sustainability or conservation, and the fishing grounds of several of the
colonies of the expanding militarist empire in Asia were stripped of their
resources, as exemplified by Japanese fishing methods in Korean offshore
waters. References to Japanese fishing operators' "ruthless disregard of
29. Green Hackworth, Conversation between Hackworth and James F. Bymes, in
FOREIGN REL. U.S. [FRUS], 1945, at 2:1521.
30. See HOLLICK, supra note 10, at 26-27. Japan was consistently the foremost
champion of older free-seas doctrines on this candidly self-interested basis. Even during
the Occupation period, the Japanese government assertively couched its policy on
international fisheries law in terms linking the principled view of inherited doctrine to
the contention that Japan's essential national interest was involved. See infra text at
notes 233-36, 265. Arguments of Japan on this line expressed years later in the U.N.
debates are discussed in Haruihiro Fukui, How Japan Handled UNCLOS Issues: Does
Japan Have an Ocean Policy?, in ROBERT FRIEDHEIM ET AL., JAPAN AND THE NEW
OCEAN REGIME 21, 44-46 (1984).
31. EDWARD A. ACKERMAN, JAPAN'S NATURAL RESOURCES 109 (1953).
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conservation" 32 abounded in the fisheries trade press outside Japan and
are frequently encountered in internal reports and correspondence in
governmental archives for the 1930s period. In the salmon waters north of
Hokkaido, off Kamchatka Peninsula, Japan had introduced factory ships
and initiated an unprecedented level of intensity of fishing-a development
that was thought to have severely depleted the salmon stocks of that
region, raising fears that Japan might one day similarly "wreck the salmon
fishery" in Canadian and American offshore waters. 34 "If the Japanese are
able to cork up our Alaska fisheries as they have the Siberian fisheries,"
Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach of Washington State said in Congress,
"the supply [of salmon] will soon be depleted and we will face the same
35
situation [as] faced by the shore fisheries on the coast of Kamchatka."
In addition, there was widespread criticism in Europe and North
America during the 1930s directed against the Japanese government and
industry for refusal to enter into the whaling conventions of the period
that were designed to limit the Antarctic season, establish quotas, and
protect endangered species. To be sure, the Antarctic whaling regulatory
regime in question was little more than a tight club of established
European whaling nations, mainly interested in maintaining a profitable
oligopoly. Nonetheless, the whaling conventions represented the only hope
for conserving anything of the whale stocks and, in the long run, saving
the industry itself.36 Japan also was notorious for the way it pulled out
of the 1911 Fur Sealing Agreement, thereby undermining the oldeststanding international agreement of its kind and effectively removing the
protection of the fur seal populations in the North Pacific.
32. Letter from A. W. Neill, M.C., to Hon. Joseph-Enoil Michaud, Minister of
Fisheries (June 14, 1937) (on file with Canadian Records Group [RG] 25, f. 7212-19-12).
33. See, e.g., Memorandum from Mr. Flory to Mr. Hilldring (June 4, 1947) (on file
with Int'l Resources / Fisheries & Wildlife, DOS Records) (commenting on Japan's
prewar fishing record having "accumulated much international ill-will by her ruthless
exploitation of high seas fisheries off other-than-Japanese coasts"). See generally
HOMER E. GREGORY & KATHLEEN BARNES, NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES (1939).
34. Confidential letter from Eugene Dooman, U.S. DOS official, Canadian Embassy,
Washington, to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (on file with RG 23, Cypher No. 1189).
35. Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Statement to Congress (Aug. 1937), in "Fishery
Raids Alaskan Issue," VANCOUVER DAILY PROVINCE, Aug. 25, 1937.
36. See generally J. N. Tonneson & A.O. Johnsen, THE HISTORY OF MODERN
WHALING (1982).
37. Japan withdrew in 1940 from participation in the 1911 Fur Seal Agreement. This
action, together with Japan's refusal to cooperate in whaling regulation, became a prime item
in evidence for critics of the Japanese record who saw them as enemies of conservation and
rational management. See L. LARRY LEONARD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FISHERIES

All the foregoing aspects of Japan's fisheries and whaling served as
ominous indicators of trouble for the Canadian and U.S. West Coast
fisheries. Initially, the focus of concern for the fisheries was the need to
protect the rich salmon stocks and the salmon fishing and canning
industries of Alaska, British Columbia, and Washington State-one of
the world's most valuable fisheries, the largest producer of income from
marine fishing for the United States, and a rich source of a major export
product for Canada. If Japan's newly expanded fleet of modem, dieseldriven factory vessels should be shifted across the Pacific to the North
American salmon waters, an ocean area that until then had been fished
only by the Canadian and U.S. fleets (along with some inshore native Indian
artisanal fishing), it would mean devastating economic competition.
Such a Japanese incursion would also pose a vital threat to the highly
fragile regime of hatcheries, subsidies, and regulations that Canada and
the United States had long been developing both separately and jointly.
For example, an essential element in the Alaska salmon regime was the
requirement that only hand or sail power be used in fishing for salmon.
Motor power, let alone the use of giant factory ships, was forbidden, an
example of imposing an inefficient technology as a way of reducing
pressure on the resource, and perhaps of assuring the welfare of smallerscale individual operators against the possibility of heavily capitalized
corporate competitors.38
As seen by fishing leaders in British Columbia, Alaska, and Washington
State, once Japanese fleets came into the fishing grounds and intercepted
the salmon migrations, the entire coastal fishing industry, the welfare of
coastal communities from the Aleutians to Seattle, and ultimately (as
they argued), the very survival of the salmon stocks and, perhaps, other
commercial fish species would be fatally damaged. Moreover, both
industry leaders and some government experts argued that once Japan
was permitted to establish a presence in the salmon grounds, it was a
virtual certainty that the Japanese fleets would move southward into the
halibut fishery area.3 9 The halibut stocks off the coast of British Columbia
92-93, 98-109 (Johnson Reprint 1971) (1944); and Edward W. Allen, The North Pacific
Fisheries, 10 PAC. AFFAIRS 136 (1937).

See also ALBERT W. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL

REGULATION OF MARINE FISHERIES: A STUDY OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS

(1973) (providing brief histories and full legal citations to the fishery conventions and
treaties of the twentieth century).
38.

See GREGORY & BARNES, supra note 33. Other forms of control that were then

or later imposed on the North American salmon fishermen at various times included
outlawing or regulation of such gear as seiner nets, fish wheels, traps, weirs, and in recent
times, monofilament gill nets. Until 1953, even the use of engine power for salmon fishing
in Bristol Bay was prohibited. A concise history of salmon regulation in the Northeast
Pacific is provided in James L. McHugh, Fishery Management,in 10 LECTURE NOTES ON
COASTAL AND ESTUARINE STUDIES 113-124 (Richard T. Barber et al., ed.).
39. Confidential Memorandum No. 371 from the Dept. of Fisheries to External
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and the Unitd States were then being managed under an elaborate
research program and scientific regime jointly administered under a
bilateral commission established by Canada and the United States by
treaties in the 1920s and in 193 1.4 The threat of Japanese factory-ship
operations was felt in waters to the south as well, for in mid-1936,
Japanese fishing interests sounded out the Canadian government as to
what attitude it would take if they were to send a 10,000-ton factory ship
to the Pacific Coast. They planned that the ship, with catcher boats, would
engage in operations "starting off the coast of Mexico working on tuna
and pilchards[,] and gradually working up the coast to British Columbia
to process salmon and herring in the autumn season."4 ' Unsurprisingly,
Affairs (Nov. 16, 1936) (on file with RG 23, f, 721-19-12).
40. Thus the Canadian Department of Fisheries advised External Affairs that if
Japanese fishing were established in Bristol Bay, "it does not seem unlikely.., that
similar fishing and canning operations would be extended in the course of time to the
British Columbia coast" and that while the Japanese were known to be interested in
taking halibut, still other species would later become the targets of their expanding
operations. Dispatch from External Affairs, Canadian Minister, to the United States
(Nov. 16, 1936) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-13-2) (quoting the Dept. of Fisheries).
Other expressions of concern on this line included: Letter from A. L. Hager, President,
New England Fish Company, Vancouver, Canada, to Ray Lyman Wilbur (May 28, 1937)
(on file as part of the Ray Lyman Wilbur Papers, The Hoover Institution Archives,
Stanford University); Letter from A. L. Hager, President, New England Fish Company,
Vancouver, Canada, to W. A. Found, Minister of Fisheries (May 3, 1938) (on file with
RG 23, f. 721-19-12); "Alien Menace Discussed by Canadian Fishermen," PAC.
FISHERMAN, May 1937, p. 22; and "Japanese Activity in North Pacific Fisheries: Surveys
are Made Off Alaska and B.C. Coast," THE DAILY NEWS (Prince Rupert, British Columbia,
Canada), Dec. 16, 1936.
The "Halibut Commission," as it was popularly known, was formally the International
Fisheries Commission established under the Convention for the Preservation of the
Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific, Including Bering Sea, Oct. 21, 1924, U.S.-Can.,
32 L.N.T.S. 93, and later agreements. The Commission was regarded widely as a model
of how scientific management could be successfully pursued in a fishery when access
could be limited through unilateral action or international agreement and where scientific
data on the condition of the stocks was systematically used for setting season limits and
other methods of limiting harvests. See F. Hewerd Bell, Economic Effects ofRegulation
of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, in BIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF FISHERY
MANAGEMENT (James Crutchfield ed., 1959); and Edward Allen, "The North Pacific
Fisheries," reprinted in the 18 CONG. REC. 7296, 7298, app. (1937). The chief biologist
and director of research for the Commission, Prof. William Thompson of UW, once
boasted that the Commission's success resulted from the fact that in his research "the
laws governing the population of fish were discovered..." in a program of studies that
led to application of the theory and restoration of the halibut stocks to commercially
harvestable levels. Thompson, "The Hand of Industry in Conservation Research," PAC.
FISHERMAN, March 1947, p. 24.
41. Letter from G. J. Langley, Charge d'Affaires, Canadian Legation, Tokyo,
Japan, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, [hereinafter SS for EA] (No.

that such a venture
the Canadians, in reply, informed the Japanese
"would be regarded with the greatest disfavour. ''42
Meanwhile, Canada and the United States were moving, albeit slowly
and uncertainly, toward approval of a bilateral international commission
that would conduct scientific studies of the salmon, looking toward active
cooperation in conservationist management for the international Fraser
River salmon industry.4 3 Hence Ottawa closely monitored developments
in 1936-37 that portended a Japanese move eastward to fish for salmon
of any American
and also sought full information from Washington
44
diplomatic moves in reaction to that possibility.

The fisheries agency in Tokyo already had authorized experimental
fishing operations in Central and South America, with shrimp vessels
operating for cod off the Pacific coast of Mexico and trawlers working
the waters off the Argentine coast. Other distant-water Japanese expeditions
had operated in the coastal areas of Australia. 45 Japanese distant-water
salmon fishing increasingly used large factory ships, and reports of the
declining salmon yields in the Northwest Pacific intensified the concern
in North America that Japan's fleets might also move eastward in order
249, July 17, 1936) (on file with RG 23, v. 1098, f. 721-19-12-1).
42. Id.
43. Extended debates in the United States, both in the U.S. Senate and in the State
of Washington, over whether to ratify any of several agreements drafted in the 1920s
finally came to a resolution in 1930 with signature of the Convention for the Protection,
Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery in the Fraser River, May 26,
1930, U.S.-Can., 50 Stat. 1355. Even then, pmtracted resistance from a faction of Washington
State's salmon fishermen delayed entry into force until 1937. For discussion of the politics
in Washington State, see Proceedings of the Special Committee on Sealing and Fisheries
in Pacific Waters, Can. Senate, 17th Pan. 110-11, 124, et passim (Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada 1934); and Wilbert M. Chapman, The Theory and Practiceof InternationalFishery
Development/Management, 7 SAN DIEGO LAW REvIEw 408-54 (1970). The intra-industry
conflicts that made this such a vexed history typified the layers of complexity and
tension in fishery relations between Canada and the United States and were at many
times corrosive of trust between the fishing communities on the two sides of the border.
44. Letter from William A. Found, Deputy Minister for Fisheries, to Chargd
d'Affairs, Canadian Legation, Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 30, 1936) (on file with RG 23, v. 109,
f. 7-11-28); Letter from Herbert Marler to SS for EA (Nov. 4, 1936) (on file with RG 23,
f. 7-21-19(12)).
45. Letter from Canadian Legation, Tokyo, Japan, to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
(No. 50, Feb. 12, 1937) (on file with RG 23, f.721-19-8). A trawler expedition to
Australian waters was in addition to the long-established Japanese pearl-fishing industry
on the Australian continental shelf, an activity that Japan sought to revive after World
War II over the vigorous opposition of the Australian industry and of the government in
Canberra. Letter from Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, to Under Secretary EA (Oct. 6,
1953) (on file with RG 25, in 32 Ministry of Fisheries Records 2622-40) (discussing
Japanese fisheries problem).
For an overview (with maps) of Japanese fishing activities in the context of prewar
fisheries expansion and a discussion of Japanese fishing activities on the eve of
America's entry into the Pacific war, see Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
[SCAP], JAPANESE NATURAL RESOURCES: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY (1949).
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to find fresh sources of supply. This concern was well based, for Canadian
diplomatic reports from Tokyo revealed that the Soviet Union and Japan
were re-negotiating the rents paid by the Japanese to operate on-shore
stations on Kamchatka Peninsula. If the leasing costs came down, it would
place the factory ships at a cost disadvantage,46 requiring that they seek
other fishing grounds in order to be profitable.
No wonder, then, that the West Coast fishing interests had a rising fear
of a Japanese "incursion" into "their" Canadian-American salmon waters.
Japan had already been successful in establishing a crab fishing industry
in the Bering Sea area of the Pacific, although it had done so without
substantial controversy because neither Canadian nor U.S. operators were
then much involved in fishing for crab.47 But salmon and halibut were a
very different matter. 48
46. Letter from Canadian Legation, Tokyo, Japan, to External Affairs (No. 81,
March 1, 1937) (on file with RG 23, vol. 1098, f. 721-19-12-2). American diplomatic
officials had earlier been of the opinion that whatever the situation in regard to the
Soviet-Japanese arrangements for Kamchatka, "large-scale transfer" of Japanese factory
ship operations to Alaskan and other North American waters "was not likely to take
place for some years." Letter from Herbert Marler to SS for EA, Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada (No. 1189, Dec. 29, 1936) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-12) (discussing the
views of Eugene Dooman).
47. Japanese crab production from Alaskan offshore waters, out to 150 miles,
reportedly came to between three and four percent of total Japanese crab harvest from
1932 to 1940, but the Alaska crab were an important export commodity for Japan in that
period. Memorandum by E. W. Doherty (May 10, 1950) (on file with the United States
National Archives [hereinafter NA], Dept. of State Rec., f. 611.946/5-1050) (discussing
the effective area restrictions on Japanese fisheries). There were some very small crab
fishery operations conducted out of Washington State and Alaska in the 1930s, and in
1940 and 1941, the U.S. Tariff Commission held hearings to consider a protective tariff
in order to protect the tiny American industry from the competition of crab exported
from Japan. The American operators claimed that Japanese labor costs were so low that
their crab could be sold profitably in the U.S. market at far lower prices than the
American crab fishermen could profitably charge. Statement to U.S. Tariff Commission
on the Status of the Dungeness Crab (Cancer Magister) Fishery in the State of
Washington, 76th Cong. (1940) (on file with UW Library, Henry M. Jackson Papers)
(statement of J. B. Lincoln, Dept. of Fisheries, State of Wash., to Rep. H. M. Jackson
asking for a high tariff or even an embargo). Congressman Jackson, who received
considerable pressure from his home constituents on the issue, pressed the Tariff
Commission to impose "the highest possible tariff' on imported crab and stated that he
"hope[d] that we can prevent the Japanese from selling either their fish or crab meat on
the American market." Letter from Rep. H.M. Jackson to C. Koerber, Secretary, United
Fishermen's Union of the Pacific (Jan. 28, 1941) (on file with UW Library, Henry M.
Jackson Papers).
48. Letter from A. L. Hager to Ray Lyman Wilbur (May 28, 1937) (on file with
Hoover Institution Library, Wilbur Papers) (discussing special character of the halibut
and salmon fisheries); Memorandum from Herbert Marler, Canadian Legation, Wash., to

Meanwhile, as early as 1931, the State Department had explored with
the Japanese government the idea of a bilateral agreement by which
Japan, in exchange for some valuable trade concessions, would cease to
authorize any salmon fishing by Japanese vessels in the Northeast Pacific.
Nothing came of this, however, and for the time the issue rested as a
matter of active diplomacy. 49 Both American and Canadian diplomats
were convinced that the chances of easing tensions over potential
fisheries expansion by Japan would be better if the United States alone
dealt with Tokyo, while Canada remained formally uninvolved. It was
feared that any "joint action" or "common front" in diplomatic relations
would probably serve only to stiffen the backs of the Japanese.5 °
It was actions by the Japanese, however, that generated heightened
tensions. Leaders of Japan's salmon fishing industry made public statements
in 1936 declaring forthrightly their interest in shifting operations to the
Northeast Pacific; and predictably these announcements further agitated
public opinion in the Canadian and American coastal region. One Japanese
trade organization was so bold, or foolish, as to circulate a pamphlet
endorsing the idea of salmon expeditions to Alaskan waters in which it
declared that Bristol Bay should be regarded, in light of modem
maritime innovations, as merely "an extension of the Bay of Tokyo!" 51
The leading English-language newspaper in Japan editorialized that there
was every reason to resent the Canadian and American references to
Japanese fleets having "invaded" the northeastern Pacific waters-fish
were like migratory birds, belonging to no-one until captured, and it was
"childish" to base claims to salmon or halibut on notions of proprietorship
or special rights.52 The president of Japan's leading fisheries trade
association issued a public statement stoutly defending the right, under
international law, of Japanese fleets to fish in Bristol Bay waters; but he
added a gratuitous explanation of why the reaction in North America
SS for EA, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (Dispatch No. 1189, Dec. 29, 1936) (on file with
RG 23, f. 721-19-12) (addressing crab fishery).
49. Information of this initiative, said to have been undertaken in 1931, is reported
in Memorandum from Herbert Marler to SS for EA, supra note 48. Dooman told the
Canadians that although the State Department had been eager to pursue the scheme for a
deal on salmon and tariffs, the U.S. fisheries management experts were not interested
and allowed the initiative "to peter out." By 1936, however, the American fishery
agency experts had changed their minds and were "alarmed," hence revising their views
as to the Japanese threat to the salmon industry. Id.
50. Memorandum from Herbert Marler to SS for EA, supra note 48.
51. Kaiyo Gyogyo Shinko Kyokai [The Society of Oceanic Fishing Promotion],
CONCERNING FISHING IN EASTERN NORTH PACIFIC 4 (1937). The publication was widely
reported and commented upon on the Pacific Coast; see, e.g., the reprinted pamphlet and
editorial commentary in PAC. FISHERMAN, May 1937, at 19-22.
52. "Fishing on the High Seas," JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 25, 1937. See infra notes 69-71,
for views of the prominent American scientist and director of the Halibut Commission,
W.F. Thompson, claiming precisely such proprietary rights.
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was so hostile: "White men," he wrote, "jealous of the skill of the Japanese
and unable to compete with them, are resentful and seek to bar them"
from competition in the Northeast Pacific Ocean fisheries.53
It is hard to imagine how more provocative rhetoric could have been
conjured up, whatever the degree of truth in the interpretation of North
American responses to Japanese competition being tinged with racism.
The widely read American magazine Reader's Digest featured a story
given the fetching title "Japanese Poaching in Alaska Waters," 54 and the
fishing industry trade newspapers on the Pacific Coast in both countries
expressed outrage at what was seen as the wanton arrogance of the
Japanese fishery leaders. 55 In British Columbia, various fishing and maritime
organizations, including the powerful labor unions, immediately demanded
that Ottawa take cognizance of the danger and issue a strong response.
The Province of British Columbia's provincial legislative assembly
passed a resolution in November 1936 sounding the alarm against "the
threatened invasion of the fisheries ... by alien interests operating in waters
off the coast" for the purpose of intercepting salmon on the runs to the
spawning grounds. 56 Vigilance was urged, too, by officials in the Canadian
Department of Fisheries, who predicted that although Alaska's Bristol
Bay salmon area was the immediate stated target of Japanese interests,
waters off British Columbia, and ultimately the halibut fishery as well as
salmon found in those Canadian waters, would inevitably be the next
area of Japanese expansion.57
At the same time as the commotion over the Japanese threat was in
progress, another wave of worried anticipation and considerable anger
swept through British Columbia fishing circles that was typical of the
ambiguities and occasional contradictions in Canadian-U.S. fishery relations.
The new subject of discussion was a proposed expedition by United
States flag factory ships to waters off the Canadian coast to engage in
the processing of sardines for fish meal and oil. Known as "floating

53.

Kaju Nakamura, quoted in JAPAN

ADVERTISER,

June 29, 1937.

54. READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 1937, at 97-103.
55. See, e.g., the coverage and the editorials in the PAC. FISHERMAN, June 1937,
and others throughout 1937 and 1938; and discussion in Homer E. Gregory, Alaska
Salmon in World Politics, in 7 FAR EASTERN SURVEY, No. 5 47-53 (1938); and in
GREGORY & BARNES, supra note 33.

56.

Quoted in Report to the Executive Council and Lieutenant-Governor, Committee

of Council, Canada (1936) (on file with RG 25, f. 13699).
57. Letter from C.B. Skelton, on behalf of the SS for EA, to the Canadian Minister
to the US (No. 371, Nov. 16, 1936) (on file with RG 23, f. 35760).

reduction plants," these vessels had been the subject of animated
criticism from on-shore factory operators and labor unions in California;
and their operations had been attacked in a series of court suits that
upheld laws enacted by the California legislature which prohibited the
landing in its ports of any product of the offshore operations. 58 The
British Columbia on-shore processors were no less opposed to the
factory ships than were their counterparts in California, and they were
quick to point out to the Canadian government that the American plan to
bring reduction ships to offshore waters beyond three miles would serve
as a convenient excuse for the Japanese to act in a similar manner in the
salmon grounds to the north. The plan to move the American ships
coming to their coastal waters, they declared, should thus be opposed by
Ottawa "on the grounds that it endangers the welfare of Canadian
workers and Canadian plants as well as setting a precedent for other59
nationalities to invade the fisheries of both Canada and the United States."
George Pearson, British Columbia's Commissioner of Fisheries, demanded
that Ottawa make a "strenuous protest in Washington," lest the door be
left "wide open" to other foreign distant water fleets. 60 The need for
action was endorsed by the federal fishery department's deputy minister,
but he advised that the External Affairs Department seek help on the
matter from the State Department, as probably, "inview of the whole
situation, ... the U.S. 61authorities would not wish to see a precedent of
this kind established.",
As it turned out, the American "menace" proved to be a paper tiger
because the expedition project was abandoned, probably for financial
reasons. Still, this scare heightened the general alarm in British Columbia
about potential factory ship incursions. The episode also indicated the
presence of abiding tensions between fishing interests on either side of
the border; the Canadian and American operators were in competition
with one another, no matter how important their common interests in the
On California's policies and the complex legal-economic history of the
ARTHUR M. McEvoY, THE FISHERMAN'S
PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980, at 178-83
(1986).
59. Letter from G. R. Clark, Secretary of the Meal, Oil and Salt Fish Section,
Canadian Manufacturers Association, to Hon. Joseph-Enoil Michaud, Minister of
Fisheries, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (May 25, 1937) (on file with RG 23, f.721-19-12).
58.

reduction industry on the Pacific coast, see

See also "B[ritish] C[olumbia] Files Protest of U.S. 'Invasion,"'

MONTREAL GAZETTE,
VANCOUVER

May 28, 1937; "B.C. Asks Canada for Help to End U.S. Fish Menace,"
DAILY PROVINCE,

May 27, 1937.

60. Telegram from George Pearson, Commissioner of Fisheries, Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada, to Hon. Joseph-Enoil Michaud, Minister of Fisheries, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
(May 27, 1937) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-12).
61. Letter from William A. Found to Mr. MacDonald, acting under SS of EA (May
29, 1937) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-12).
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protection of "their" coastal waters. 62 The competitive dimension became
evident when Canadian legation in Washington approached the State
Department on the matter. The American officials responded that whereas
salmon and halibut were under conservationist management regimes, the
sardine fishery was not; and there was no international convention in
effect that warranted intervention by the U.S. government. These views
of the U.S. government, "while they may be technically correct," the
legation declared, "seem to give evidence of a rather non-cooperative
spirit in this matter. 63
Yet the two nations merged their diplomatic forces swiftly and
effectively when a similar threat to introduce factory ships came from a
third source, namely, a plan by Norwegian and British investors to send
a steam-trawler expedition to the halibut grounds off the British
Columbia-Washington State coast. 64 This plan had the potential for
scraping the ocean bottom clean of the halibut stocks that had been
rebuilt at the expense of the regulatory regime administered by the joint
Canadian-U.S. Halibut Commission.6 Both the State Department and
62. In June, the sardine industry's trade association, The Pacific Fisheries Institute
(San Francisco), denied that the reduction ships actually planned to work the waters near
British Columbia's coast; rather, the proposed expedition would be targeting an area
more than 100 miles from Vancouver Island. Letter from Louis Hicks to Hon. JosephEnoil Michaud, Minister of Fisheries, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (June 3, 1937) (on file
with RG 23, f. 721-19-12).
63. Letter from Herbert Marler to MacDonald (June 14, 1937) (on file with RG 23,
F 19711, f.721-19-12).
64. In addition, there were rumors that German interests were seeking to organize
expeditions of factory ships and catcher boats to go to the salmon grounds. Draft of
Proposed Telegram from A. L. Hager to Hon. Joseph-Enoil Michaud, Minister of
Fisheries, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (May 21, 1937) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-10)
(stating that "obviously establishment of floaters (factory ships) beyond territorial waters
conducting unrestricted fishing would render futile any conservation efforts by our
government").
65. Philip Jessup, The Pacific Coast Fisheries, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 29, 33 (1939);
Letter from Canadian Legation, Washington, to SS for EA (Feb. 12, 1937) (on file with
RG 23, f. 72 19). In an address to the Commonwealth Club in 1939, Edward Allen
spoke at length of the Norwegian-British plans for sending trawlers to the Pacific Coast.
Edward W. Allen, Bristol Bay Presents Issue between American System of Fishery
Conservation and Foreign System of Unrestricted Exploitation, (1939) (unpublished
manuscript, University of Washington) (on file with UW Library, Edward W. Allen
Papers). There was a later dispute, well aired among scientists, as to whether the claim
of the Halibut Commission to have been responsible for restoring halibut stock levels
was a valid one (some biologists arguing that natural causes had produced both the
decline of the 1916-20s period and the revival in the 1930s). Martin Burkenroad, Some
Principles of Marine Fishery Biology, 2 U. TEX. MARINE SCI. PUB. 177 (1951). For an
economist's critique of the regulatory regime, see James Crutchfield, Regulation of the

the Canadian government dispatched strenuous protests to the U.K. Foreign
Office, which agreed to use its influence in the matter. Subsequently,
the British government successfully squelched the plan.
In the 1937 fishing season, the Japanese threat became palpable and
immediate as a fleet of three large factory vessels, flying the Flag of the
Rising Sun, appeared in Bristol Bay salmon waters together with 18
catcher boats. Japan was in fact now there-in the heart of the North
American salmon grounds. On both sides of the Canadian-American
border, salmon fishermen and canning industry leaders, together with
their political and business allies, immediately raised an alarm. The
economic rivalries and border disputes, such as regarding the Hecate
Straits area boundary, that had troubled relations were put aside in the
common cause. A few of the industry spokesmen called for an immediate
suspension of the regulations of gear and vessel power that made the
American salmon fishing such a puny operation in comparison with the
giant steel ships that had "invaded" (as the favorite phrase went) the
traditional U.S. fishing grounds. This demand for suspension of the fishing
rules inspired the U.S. federal fisheries commissioner to publish his
opinion that "the large fishing interests of this country have been very
anxious to throw a scare into the Bureau of Fisheries as to the Japanese
depleting the Bristol Bay run. No doubt this was a scheme to frighten
the Bureau into relaxing the fishing regulations. ... I am getting so used
to these bugaboos that I refuse to get excited until credible information is
received. ' ' 6
Miller Freeman, a long-time Japanophobe and influential editor of the
Seattle-based publication Pacific Fisherman, demanded that the United
States declare all of the Alaskan salmon waters a "strategic military
area" and thereby close the area to all foreign vessels.67 Freeman addressed
Pacific Coast Halibut Fishery, in U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF

FISHERY REGULATION at 354-59 (Fisheries Reports, No. 5, 1962). Cf. WILLIAM A.
CARROTHERS, THE BRITISH COLUMBIA FISHERIES (1941); and F. Heward Bell,
Management of the Pacific Halibut, in A CENTURY OF FISHERIES IN NORTH AMERICA

209-12 (Norman G. Benson ed., Special Pub. No. 7, 1970).
66. Letter from Frank T. Bell to Sen. Homer T. Bone (June 18, 1937), reprintedin
PAC. FISHERMAN, July 1937, at 25. The fishermen's union immediately responded by
denouncing the charge as entirely unfounded. Marine E. Olsen, Agent for the Alaska
Fishermen's Union, Portland, Oregon, to Miller Freeman (June 28, 1937), reprinted in
id. at 26.
67. "Fishing Ban Urged in U.S.," VANCOUVER DAILY PROVINCE, Sept. 21, 1936.
Freeman's animus against the residents and citizens of Japanese descent in the American
Pacific Northwest and in British Columbia was manifest in various demands that he
made for investigation of alleged spying, sabotage of the economy, and the like in
wartime correspondence with the U.S. government. See generally Letters from Miller
Freeman (1942-44) (on file with UW, Miller Freeman Papers, Special Collections).
Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington described Miller as a leader in advocating
economic development for the U.S. Pacific Northwest region and Alaska "as a buffer
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mainly an American audience, but he was supported by many fishing
industry spokesmen and politicians in British Columbia. Indeed, these
Canadians struck a sensitive and all-too-familiar note when denouncing
Japanese competition and the Bristol Bay "invasion." Suspicion of Japan as
a security threat and racism directed at their own fellow-residents of
Japanese ancestry (many of them North American-born citizens) were
deeply rooted. 68 The immediate response to the Bristol Bay situation
was a stream of demands from the West Coast calling upon the Canadian
and U.S. governments to use diplomatic muscle to force the Japanese
fleet to withdraw and to obtain from Tokyo an agreement that the
government would license no further expeditions to the Northeast Pacific.
The previous year, Dr. William F. Thompson, research director of the
Halibut Commission and the leading fisheries management scientist in
the North American Pacific Ocean fisheries, had endorsed a study of
possibilities for joint or unilateral action to bar foreign fishing of salmon
or halibut. What ought to be considered, Thompson had declared, was
"a Monroe Doctrine for our fisheries. ' 69 For the United States and
Canada to resist foreign incursions into protected fisheries such as the
salmon grounds would be "no greater a violation of 'international law,"'
he insisted, "than is the prevention of their seizure of American territory
in helpless minor American (i.e., Latin American) nations. The whole
legalistic argument over the 'three mile limit' might be swept out of
consideration." 70 Alternatively, Thompson suggested, the coastal fisheries
jurisdiction
might be protected by simply extending the territorial waters
71
"to a greater distance offshore, as Norway has attempted.",
and a mailed fist in the face of Japan." CONG. REC., (July 1, 1943) (on file with RG
23, f. 721-19-13).

68. Indeed, as one contemporary commentator observed, "the use of the term
'Japanese' to describe Canadians of Japanese race" in the British Columbia fisheries
trade press articles in 1937-38 on the Bristol Bay situation "made it appear as if an
invasion of territorial waters had actually taken place." CAN. FISHERMAN, No. 12, 1939,
at 27, quoted in HENRY F. ANGUS, CANADA AND THE FAR EAST 74 (1953). On attitudes
toward the Japanese, see generally KEN ADACHI, THE ENEMY THAT NEVER WAS: A
HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE CANADIANS (1976); and W. PETER WARD, WHITE CANADA
FOREVER: POPULAR ATTITUDES AND PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD ORIENTALS IN BRITISH

COLUMBIA (1978). It should be recalled that not until after World War II was the voting
franchise extended by British Columbia to Japanese-Canadians.
69. Memorandum by William F. Thompson to Miller Freeman (June 26, 1936) (on
file with RG 23, f. 721-19-12).

70.

Id.

71. Id. Thompson was consistent in his views as time went on, and after the war
he urged that the United States and Canada declare full control over access to the salmon

Thompson's view of these matters may appear at first blush to have
been a fishery scientist's shoot-from-the-hip approach and a cavalier
rejection of the entire "freedom of the seas" tradition in international
law, but in fact, Thompson was saying nothing very different from what
some highly prominent international lawyers had already advocated.
Most notable among the nationalistic lawyers was Edward W. Allen, the
salmon industry counsel and prominent Seattle lawyer, well known as a
Pacific affairs expert. Allen sounded the message that it was time to
consider that anadromous fish such as the North American salmon,
regulated under a conservationist management regime, ought to be
"[made] immune from the assaults of all despoilers,, 72 and that "if
international law, as conceived on the Atlantic, is ineffective for the
purpose, it may be desirable for the Pacific... to evolve some new rules
of international law relating to fisheries based
73 upon ethics and principle,
not upon compromise and blind precedent.,
By 1938, Allen's views had been endorsed by some highly respected
"legal realists" in the academic world; they included the young GermanAmerican scholar Stefan Riesenfeld of Boalt Hall at the University of
California at Berkeley and Riesenfeld's mentor at Stanford Law School,
Walter Bingham. Riesenfeld and Bigham denounced the formalistic
philosophy that made the three-mile rule holy writ, and they called for a
law to meet the new realities of
thoroughgoing reform of international
74
distant-water fishing technology.
No one in the salmon industry from 1936-38 regarded the Japanese
government's claim that the fleets were merely engaging in feasibility
studies and scientific analysis of the salmon stocks as plausible. However,
leading diplomatic officials in both the North American capitals were
initially inclined to accept Tokyo's reassurances and hoped to avoid a
confrontation. But before long, many of the diplomatic bureaucrats had
begun to acknowledge that a massive Japanese incursion into the salmon
and halibut of the Northeast Pacific. "These... resources belong to and [are] cared for
by the American and Canadian people," he wrote. "They belong to them in the same
sense as do earth and water yielding wheat and corn.... [O]ur rights in our fishery
resources must be protected against foreign encroachments, however far this protection
must be extended to sea." William F. Thompson, "The Hand of Industry in Conservation
Research," PAC. FISHERMAN, March 1947, at 23, 24.

72. Quoted in CONG. REC., Appendix, 7295-96 (June 10, 1937) (statement of
Allen Feb. 1937).
73. Id.
74. Riesenfeld and Bingham both presented their exclusionist views (in favor of
extended jurisdiction) in a panel on the issues at the American Society for International
Law meetings in 1940. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 54-63, 69-71 (1940). See also JOSEPH
W. BiNGHAM, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PACIFIC COASTAL FISHERIES

(1938). On Riesenfeld's role in challenging received doctrine, see Scheiber & Carr,
supra note 23, at 10-14.
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fishing grounds was a serious possibility. An investigation on the scene at
sea by Leo Sturgeon (a special State Department agent then on special
assignment to deal with international fisheries questions) in September
1937 confirmed that the Japanese vessels were catching salmon at
"commercial levels" and said it was only diplomatic camouflage to
characterize the expedition as "scientific. 76 He advised that "new ground
in the field of international economic relations would have to be
broken," arguing that there was
77 a growing need for reconsideration of
the traditional three-mile limit.
Sturgeon's position was echoed in advice tendered to President Roosevelt
a few weeks later by the State Department's legal counselor, Walton
Moore. If the problem of defending imperiled offshore fisheries were to
be solved, in light of what he termed "poaching" by other countries,
Moore asserted the American position on legal doctrine must become
more realistic. It would be necessary to reject the stultifying premise of
those who still held to "the idea that that government can be conducted
on the strict basis of precedent., 78 This boldness of view on matters of
law was entirely congenial to FDR. Indeed, less than a week before, the
President had asserted that some kind of extension of U.S. jurisdiction
beyond three miles was "indispensable" in order to safeguard the Bristol
79
Bay salmon fisheries and, at least potentially, other American fisheries.
IV. THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE AND THE CANADIAN ROLE:
RECONSIDERING A BASIC TENET OF TERRITORIAL
WATERS LAW

The White House had already become directly involved; and when
President Roosevelt intervened in the policy discussions, he did so on
the premise that: "Every nation has a right to protect its own food supply
75. Letter from Canadian Legation, Washington, to SS for EA (Message No. 1311,
Dec. 2, 1937) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-12).
76. Leo Sturgeon, "Report and Recommendations dealing with the Threat of
Japanese Salmon Fishing in Bristol Bay" (Sept. 28, 1937) (on file with NA, DOS Rec.,
North Pac. Files).
77. Id.
78. Confidential letter from R. Walton Moore, Counselor of the DOS, to Franklin
D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S. (Nov. 26, 1937) (on file with Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidential Library, FDR Papers, Box 42, "Japan" file).
79. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., to R. Walton Moore,
Counselor of the Dept. of State (Nov. 21, 1937), in MARJORIE M. WHrrEMAN, DIG. INT'L
L. 768-69 (1963).

in waters adjacent to its coast." He asked Secretary of State Cordell Hull
to comment on the idea of protecting the U.S. fishery by declaring the
waters off the coast of Alaska "a kind of marine refuge." 80 Hull quickly
initiated talks between the American Ambassador in Tokyo and the
Japanese government, seeking agreement by Japan to halt the licensing
of further expeditions.8 1 West Coast congressional members meanwhile
introduced measures to extend American jurisdiction out beyond the
traditional three-mile limit and to declare the salmon to be the "property" of
the United States, with ownership rights of control over its protection
throughout the area of its migrations at sea. 2 Even though Secretary
Hull was taking a strong line in dealing with the Japanese, there were
reportedly many diplomatic planners in the State Department who were
worried by these congressional initiatives. "They are afraid," the Canadian
mission in Washington informed the Department of External Affairs,
that "extravagant claims for United States proprietary rights in deep sea
fishery resources" that were being voiced in the Senate might not only
make trouble with the Japanese but "might also alarm the U.K. and
Canada by advancing a doctrine of international law on the matter of the
limit to which neither of these two latter countries could
three-mile
83
adhere."
The Japanese foreign ministry was worried about such provocations of
American public opinion at a time when its nation's military adventures
in Asia were already inviting counter-moves by Washington. 84 Therefore,
after a second effort at fishing for salmon in Bristol Bay in 1938, the
Japanese government-despite the continuing demands from their
salmon industry and the government's own fisheries officials for further
expeditions-pledged to halt licensing of such operations for an indefinite
period. At the same time, Japan formally reserved its right to change
policy in the future under terms of the "freedom of the seas" concept in

80. Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., to R. Walton
Moore, Counselor of the Dept. of State (Nov. 21, 1937), in FRUS, 1937, at 4:768-69;
see also WHITEMAN, supra note 79, 945.
81. HOLLICK, supra note 10, at 19-28.
82. Id. at 29. Jessup, supra note 65.
83. Letter from Walter A. Riddell, on behalf of Minister, Canadian Legation,
Washington, to SS for EA (April 6, 1936) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-12).
84. Letter from Canadian Legation, Tokyo, Japan, to SS for EA (No. 81, March 1,
1937) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-12). In Hull's 1937 note to Japan, moreover, he
emphasized that a threatened boycott of Japanese ships and goods by the West Coast
maritime industry unions, and the general mood of anger and unrest in the coastal region,
meant that Japan should be aware that possibly serious incidents could occur if the
Japanese fleets continued fishing Bristol Bay waters. Reported in Letter from Canadian
Legation, Washington, to SS for EA (No. 1311, Dec. 2, 1937) (on file with RG 23, f.
721-19-12 (32)).
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international law.85 This reservation of course warranted fishing anywhere
on the high seas that lay outside the three-mile or other territorial water
limits of the coastal nations, using any kind of vessel or gear, for any
species of fish, and without limit on quantity.8 6 Nonetheless, the Japanese
pledge did defuse the immediate crisis. The incident had not been without
danger for Pacific relations, for as the American Ambassador in Tokyo,
Joseph Grew, commented: with the U.S. and Japanese governments both
"faced with ...powerful pressures from the fisheries interests at home,"
the issues had been "full of dynamite.' 8 7
The U.S. government's position, as articulated in its notes to Japan and
instructions to the American Embassy in Tokyo during the negotiations
that led to withdrawal of the Japanese fleets, left no doubt that the
Roosevelt administration was entirely receptive to the idea of making
some fundamental changes to the traditional three-mile doctrine. Thus
Secretary Hull, in his note to Japan, referred to considerations of equity
and justice in recent statements by American fishery leaders and legal
scholars who wanted Japan to withdraw from Bristol Bay. These
considerations required protection, it was contended, for fisheries that
had been built up by the efforts and expenditure of a coastal state.
Japan's critics argued the American fishing industry had accepted selfdenying measures in a regulatory regime so that the resource itself could
be preserved. According to the official U.S. position, such a situation
ought to vest historic rights in the coastal state's claims. It was also
made clear that U.S. recognition of freedom of the seas would not be
interpreted in an absolute way that would invite destructive new foreign
competition in its coastal fisheries. 8
The Canadian government did not participate directly in the diplomatic
correspondence with Japan during this crisis, but Ottawa was hardly
85. See LEONARD, supra note 37, at 133, on the Japanese note.
86. On this classic concept and the actual deviations from it, historically, because
of the special claims to jurisdiction beyond three miles advanced by many nations for
purposes of defense, anti-smuggling, sanitary measures, and even fisheries and other
resources protection, see RIESENFELD, supra note 3. Additional commentary by a leading
scholar who served in the State Department as a key figure in development of the
Truman Fisheries Proclamation is in a 1949 address: William W. Bishop, Jr., The
Exercise ofJurisdictionfor Special Purposes in High Seas Areas beyond the Outer Limit
of TerritorialWaters, in INTER-AM. BAR ASS'N PROC. (1952).

87. Diary of Joseph Grew, United States Ambassador, Tokyo, Japan, 3717-18
(March 1938) (on file at Stanford University, Stanley Hombeck Papers, Hoover Institution).
88. FRUS, 1945, at 4:768. See also Anne L. Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy: The
Truman Proclamations,17 VIR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1976).

disinterested nor an entirely passive bystander in the drama. The State
Department kept Canadian officials fully apprised of the progress of the
exchanges with the Japanese; and the two North American governments
even discussed in explicit terms the possibility of cooperation in hammering
out a comprehensive treaty with Japan that would be designed to protect
the salmon and halibut fisheries. Such a treaty might also include the
Soviet Union, according to archival documents, so that it might thus
provide a solid framework for the protection being sought.8 9 In the war
crisis, though, other issues of diplomacy became far more pressing; and
with the Japanese disposed to back off, the project apparently was placed
on the back burner.
But even so, the doctrinal and diplomatic issue had been joined, except
that there now was a stalemate on the matter of extended jurisdiction.
Although the crisis had eased in that sense, neither in British Columbia
nor in Alaska and Washington State did industry leaders or politicians
lose sight of their objective to assure against any future threat of foreign
incursions. There was continuing discussion of Canadian-U.S. cooperation
to deal with such threats, and in late 1937, preliminary consideration was
given to negotiating a comprehensive fisheries treaty to be signed by the
two nations, covering Atlantic, Pacific, and Great Lakes fisheries issues.
Such a treaty would settle all outstanding questions between them, U.S.
planners suggested, and it would thus strengthen the hand of the North
American powers by presenting a "united front" in dealing with Japan
and other countries that might want to send distant-water fleets to North
American waters for large-scale commercial fishing. 90 Leo Sturgeon, then on
special assignment in the State Department to deal with international
fisheries questions, urged Ottawa that the moment was propitious; because
of the Bristol Bay situation, he asserted, fisheries questions had been
"brought to the forefront" and, with the Secretary of State and other
governmental officers now "thoroughly aware" of fisheries issues and
their importance, "advantage should be taken of the impetus thus given
to interest in these problems. . ,,91Similarly, the State Department had
shown the Canadian ambassador a tentative draft for a four-party agreement
89. Letter from Herbert Marler, Canadian Legation, Washington, to SS for EA
(No. 1311, Dec. 2, 1937) (on file with RG 23).
90. Walter A. Riddell, on behalf of the Minister, Canadian Legation, Washington,
to SS for EA (No. 468, April 6, 1938) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-1912).
91.
Sturgeon cited William F. Thompson's opinion that such a general treaty
would be a useful way of addressing the varied problems of fisheries management on the
two coasts and the Great Lakes. Hoping for a "united front," in light of heightened interest
in the Bristol Bay issues in Ottawa as well as Washington, Sturgeon indicated that
coordination of scientific information and expertise would be needed before a bilateral
treaty could be drafted, and he asked whether Canada had undertaken any relevant research
in connection with such an idea. Id. On Thompson, see also supra notes 69-71.
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(with Canada, Japan, and the Soviet Union) that would address the problem
of fishery conflicts over salmon in the North Pacific; but this too was
laid aside, as the Americans decided instead to approach Japan directly
to achieve a92 suspension of Japanese licensing of further Bristol Bay
expeditions.

The ambitious idea of achieving a united front between Ottawa and
Washington did not receive further attention once the European conflict
broke out in 1939. In fact, it would not be until a decade later, in 1949,
that the idea would be broached afresh in a bilateral conference in Ottawa
on an initiative by Wilbert M. Chapman, then the State Department's
chief fisheries officer. At that meeting, Chapman raised the question of
how the two countries might cooperate to keep Japanese fishing vessels
out of North American waters, and he presented the Canadians with a
negotiation of the 1952
treaty draft that became the first step toward the 93
International North Pacific Fisheries Convention.
As of 1938 and well into the war years, it remained an unanswered
question whether there might be set in motion some basic revisions of
U.S. and Canadian policies on fishing and territorial waters-or even a
more sweeping effort to reform the basic tenets of accepted international
ocean law for offshore fisheries. The Canadian legation in Washington had
alerted Ottawa as early as December 1936 that some officials in the State
Department were inclined to favor a stiffening of the American position.
These officials were "clearly anxious to avoid at this juncture ...any
novel unilateral interpretation of International Law," he wrote, hence the
United States was not prepared as yet to renounce outright the three-mile
doctrine. "If on the other hand," his report continued, "the Japanese
persist in maintaining their right to fish in these waters as and when they
please, it is likely that the U.S. authorities will be obliged to advance a
legal doctrine in defence [sic] of the94 fisheries and to take whatever
action may be necessary to enforce it."
92.

Marler, supra note 89.

93. See infra text at notes 203-4, for a discussion of this meeting. Chapman was
the first State Department officer since Sturgeon's departure during the late war period to
have a special competence in fishing and fisheries. On the circumstances of his
appointment, upon the creation of the new position he held as Special Assistant for
Fisheries and Wildlife, reporting to the Under Secretary, see Harry N. Scheiber, Pacific
Ocean Resources, Science, and Law of the Sea: Wilbert M. Chapman and the Pacific
Fisheries, 1945-70, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 383,427-30 (1986).
94. Letter from Canadian Legation, Washington, to SS for EA (No. 1189, Dec. 29, 1936)
(on file with RG 23, f 721-19-12); Marler, supra note 89; Letter from Herbert Marler Canadian
(on file with RG 23).
Legation, Washington, to SS for EA (No. 276, March 3, 1938), id.

The war situation cast in an entirely different light the degree to which
Japan's sensibilities should be taken into account, and it gave a new
context to the longer-run question of what should be done about the
protection of the salmon fisheries of North America. The spokesmen for
the North American fisheries industries described the attack on Pearl
Harbor and the Pacific war as a vindication of their views of Japan as a
menace to the "civilized" world, and throughout the war they kept up a
drumfire of demands for keeping Japan out of "their" waters as one of
the objectives of an Allied victory. No longer could conservative jurists
or timid diplomats dismiss the proponents of strong action to protect the
fisheries as "just a bunch of calamity howlers," a salmon industry
lobbyist wrote in 1942, because they had proven "right all the way in
warning against [Japan]" 95 and condemning the Japanese government as
"ruthless" in its disregard of equitable principles and rule of law. 96 In
the U.S. Congress, too, the concerns of prosecuting total war did not
mean any loss of interest in protecting fisheries on the part of senators
and representatives from the Pacific Northwest. Thus, well-publicized
committee hearings were held in Congress in 1944 that gave spokesmen
from Alaska and Washington State such as Edward Allen the opportunity to
argue for an immediate extension of American jurisdiction out to sea
beyond three miles. It should be done jointly with the Canadian
government, he contended, being "an opportunity for Canada and the
95. Letter from Ernest Clark to Miller Freeman (April 30, 1942) (on file with UW
Library, Miller Freeman Papers). It should be noted that a year before the United States
entered the war, the salmon interests in Washington State and Alaska mounted a
determined campaign to obtain an increase in the tariff on imported salmon, warning that
the domestic industry would be "driven from the market by Japanese, Korean, and
Letter from Senator Schuyler
Russian products produced by cheap Oriental labor ....
0. Bland to Rep. Henry M. Jackson (Jan. 16, 1941) (on file with UW Library, Jackson
Papers); see also "Low Cost Aids Sales; Tariff May be Boosted," SEATTLE TIMEs, Jan.
25, 1941 (reporting an economic analysis by Prof Homer Gregory warning that even an
increase of the salmon tariff to the maximum allowable level, under existing law, of 371/2 percent ad valorem, would likely not stem the flow of imports from Japan). A
Japanese fisheries delegation in December 1940 proposed in Seattle that if American
wholesalers cooperated with them, they would regulate the flow of their export salmon in
such a way as to protect the market price (which of course would have been illegal under
American antitrust law); the Seattle-based fishing trade group immediately protested and
called for measures to exclude Japanese salmon. Letter from the Jt. Cmte. for the Protection
of Pac. Coast Fisheries to Cordell Hull, Secretary of the State Dept. (Dec. 26, 1940) (on
file with UW Library, Jackson Papers) (recounting Japanese delegation's views).
96. Edward Allen, in his writings and speeches of the period, had regularly
characterized Japanese fishing strategies as "piracy" and as being "ruthless" in disregard of
principles of equity. Edward W. Allen, Bristol Bay Presents Issue between American System
of Fishery Conservation and Foreign System of Unrestricted Exploitation (March 3, 1939) (on
file with UW Library, Edward W. Allen Papers); and Edward W. Allen, InternationalLaw,
War, and Fish, 18 TuL. L. REv. 118-29 (1943). Professor Stefan Riesenfeld, in his academic
treatise, similarly referred to "piratical techniques [used] by distant nations" on coastal
nations' offshore fishing grounds. RIESENFELD, supra note 3, at 282.
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U.S. [to work] together as they are doing in such close friendship...
while we are at war with Japan, rather than wait until the war is over
97
when it may be far more difficult to settle a problem of this character.,
At the same hearings, American union leaders called for extended
jurisdiction to protect fisheries fifty to sixty miles offshore, and other
political and industry leaders joined in the demand for a permanent
solution to the problem of potentially destructive competition for the
industry in the salmon grounds. The British Columbia interests also
remained active in keeping the issue alive in Ottawa during this
period. 99
Throughout the war period, State Department policy planners continued
to consider measures that might give the salmon region permanent
protection against foreign threats such as the Japanese fleets had posed.
Out of these deliberations, which involved intensive consultation with
the Canadian government during 1944-45, came the famous Truman
Fisheries Proclamation of September 1945.1°°
The Fisheries Proclamation stated that the United States was prepared
to declare "conservation zones" on the high seas, contiguous to its coastal
areas (out to sea to indeterminate distances), and that in these zones,
either unilateral U.S. control or joint control with other nations, by
agreement, would be exercised over fishing activity. Whether the U.S.
Government under President Truman truly contemplated unilateral U.S.
action against a new entrant, such as Japan, or instead merely was setting
the stage for cooperative agreements in case a new entrant came in, was
a vital question ambiguous at the time and remains a matter of speculation

97. Edward W. Allen, Remarks regarding S. 930, Alaskan Fisheries Bill, quoted in
Memorandum by U.S. State Dept. (March 8, 1944) (on file with NA, Dept. of State Rec.,
f. 811.0145/8-1944).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Memorandum by Stewart Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, Under
Secretary of State for External Affairs (Nov. 12, 1947) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-21-4(2)).
100. Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. § 68 (1943-48). During the same period, and
in tandem with the planning for the Fisheries Proclamation, the State Department and
Interior Department worked on what became the Proclamation on the Continental Shelf,
issued on the same day in September 1945 and declaring U.S. ownership of the seabed
resources of the Shelf. This was the basis for U.S. control and the federal government's
proprietorship claim for the offshore oil resources. For full discussion, see ERNEST R.
BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
(1953); see also Hollick, supra note 88; and Donald C. Watt, FirstSteps in the Enclosure
of the Oceans: The Origins of Truman's Proclamation on the Resources of the

ContinentalShelf 28 September 1945, 3 MARINE POL'Y 211 (1979).

and debate among scholars today.1°' What was unquestioned then and
now, however, was the fact that the Proclamation's language represented
a distinct departure from the long-standing U.S. policy, long associated
principally with the United Kingdom as the world's leading maritime
power, which had0 2held the three-mile limit of offshore sovereignty to be
a fixed principle.'
Thus, Pandora's box was opened. The Latin American nations leapt on
the Proclamation's appearance as an invitation to declare extended
offshore jurisdiction themselves, not only over fisheries, but in some
instances on a wholesale basis going so far as to claim full sovereignty
over the extension to 200 miles. 0 3 "The race was on," as Professor
Friedheim writes, "not to match the United States, but to surpass it in
unilateral claims."' 1 4 And thus, famously, was set in motion the movement
for "ocean enclosure," which would culminate thirty-five years later in
validation of the EEZ concept in the U.N. Convention.
V. TOWARD NEW PRINCIPLES OF LAW: THE
1945 TRUMAN PROCLAMATION AND
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE
A. Scientific Research, Diplomacy, and the Marine Fisheries
The Pacific salmon and halibut fisheries that came under the Japanese
threat in 1937-38 were under regular scientific study and had long been
managed for purposes of sustainability under regulatory regimes of
Canada and the United States-jointly managed, in the case of the
halibut. 10 5 These two were not, however, the only fisheries in the global
oceans picture that were seemingly endangered in the 1930s. Excessive

101. The present author has in progress a full study reexamining the policy process
that led to the Truman Fisheries Proclamation.
102. Of course there had been exceptions to the three-mile rule even for the nations,
such as the U.K., that adhered most strictly to it in their diplomatic stance. Control of
smuggling, regulation for sanitary purposes (against pollution), and military security
considerations were among the factors that justified extension of jurisdiction for special
purposes beyond three miles. For a full analysis, see generally RIESENFELD, supra note 3.
103. Jos6 A. de Yturriaga, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF FISHERIES: FROM
UNCLOS 1982 TO THE PRESENTIAL SEA 3-9 (1997); HOLLICK, Supra note 10, at 67-95.
104.
FRIEDHEIM, supra note 7, at 21.
105. This is not to say that the American or Canadian studies of salmon were
adequate to the full needs of a regulatory regime since the investigations were almost
exclusively concentrated on the near-coastal areas and inland streams. The Japanese, by
contrast, had aggressively pursued scientific work on the migrations out at sea. Letter
from A. J. Whitmore, Chief Supervisor of Fisheries, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, to
Deputy Minister, Dept. of Fisheries (Oct. 31, 1947) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-21-4);
and Letter from Neal M. Carter to A. J. Whitmore, Chief Supervisor of Fisheries,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada (Oct. 18, 1947) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-21-4).
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intensity of fishing effort, the result of continuing technological
innovation in methods and in ship design, was a problem that had been
the cause of concern for scientists and most governments in Europe at
least since the turn of the century. World War I had given the fish stocks
in the Northeast Atlantic, the North Sea, and the Baltic a respite, so that
when fishing operations resumed after the Armistice, yields were high.
Within only a few years, however, rising tonnage of the fleets, the
introduction of heavy trawling and other gear, and modernization of
meant excessive pressure once again on
vessels (ever larger and faster)
1 6
many of the target species. 0
Fishery scientists, mobilizing their expertise and data not only in
national biological stations but also in the well-organized investigations
conducted by International Council for the Exploration of the Seas
(ICES), warned of impending disaster if conservationist-minded
measures were not imposed. Led by Norway, which extended its
claims to offshore jurisdiction well out beyond three miles, and by
Denmark, some of the coastal states sought to protect their fisheries
by creating larger offshore zones in which they would either regulate
or altogether exclude the trawlers and other distant-water vessels that
came to their waters. As the leading nation in trawling fisheries, the
United Kingdom energetically led resistance to such measures, and
British diplomacy adhered unflinchingly to defense of the three-mile
principle. In addition, however, the United Kingdom sought to develop
cooperative international alternatives to the movement for unilaterally
created offshore zones, most notably by crafting international conventions
for the limitation of net-mesh size so that juvenile fish would be
protected from the depredations of the era's intensive fishing. Agreements
were concluded in 1937 and 1938 and though they never went into
enforced their terms
effect formally, most fishing nations in Europe
10 7
in the operations of their own flag vessels.
For the British, agreements to place limits on gear or seasons, based
on the data from impartial investigations of ICES and national science
establishments, was the instrument of choice for achieving fishery
sustainability. Such agreements would effectively work to leave untouched
the three-mile doctrine-a doctrine that was vital to assuring unhindered
106.

EDWARD S. RUSSELL, THE OVERFISHING PROBLEM (1942), is the classic

contemporary work on these developments.
107. Anne L. Hollick, The Roots of U.S. FisheriesPolicy, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.
61-64 (1978).

passage of the Royal Navy's combat vessels around the world, as well as
to maintaining maximum freedom in distant waters for the British
trawler fleets and to the merchant marine. As a great naval and
merchant-shipping power itself, the United States had long seconded
10 8
Great Britain in the diplomacy for protection of the three-mile rule.
Hence the departure from the American position, seemingly signaled by
the Hull note to Japan in 1937, was a strikingly new factor in the
international situation.
World War II brought heavy fishing activity in the North Atlantic to a
virtual halt. This was perceived by the British Foreign Office as an
opportunity to advance the project of a long-term solution to the fishery
problem through an international agreement that would pose no threat to
the three-mile doctrine. Both the diplomatic planners and the fisheries
experts in the British government were hopeful that the trawler industry
and the Lords of the Admiralty might be willing to show enough
flexibility that some concessions could be made to foreign coastal
nations--enough to gain the main purpose, protection of the three-mile
principle, while also advancing fisheries conservation.10 9 International
meetings were held in London in 1943 and 1944, and a draft convention
that would cover the Northeast Atlantic region was circulated in 1944.110
The draft featured provisions for gear regulation, but the British meanwhile
contemplated opening talks after the war to negotiate on the offshore
claims of Norway, the Soviet Union, and other nations that did not
adhere to the three-mile rule. The Scottish Trawlers' Federation announced
its unyielding opposition to any commitments for such negotiation on
offshore limits, rejecting any compromise on freedom of the seas for
108. Again, however, with significant exceptions for special jurisdictional purposes
such as defense against smuggling, especially in the 1920s period, when the United States
had a national liquor prohibition in effect. See, interalia, RIESENFELD, supra note 3.
109. This is based upon my study of Admiralty and Ministry of Fisheries and
Agriculture minutes and related correspondence for the period, archived in the files of
those ministries in the PRO, Kew, UK. A related major issue for the Admiralty was the
recommendation of a special blue ribbon scientific commission that in 1944 advocated
reduction in the size of the trawler fleet under a proposed agreement in which all the
major fishing nations would undertake to limit the intensity of fishing by cuts in their
fleet tonnage. The Admiralty opposed this proposal unalterably, concerned that it would
undermine the traditional reliance of the Royal Navy on large civilian vessels and their
crews for combat and logistic operations at sea in wartime. This was quite apart from
the Royal Navy's insistence on the need for narrow territorial seas in order to give
maximum room for their operations at sea. Id. (containing correspondence).
110. FINAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES CONFERENCE (London, Oct. 22,
1943), Cmd. 6496 (1943). The Canadian view of the proposed convention was that it
should cover much of the Northwest Atlantic as well, to give the Canadian fleets some
leverage over their U.S. competitors in the Grand Banks and other areas. But the British,
supported by the United States, which was only an observer at the talks, believed it was
too inefficient to go beyond areas of the size that the convention covered. These
diplomatic movements are discussed in Hollick, supra note 107.
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fishing. In the teeth of this opposition, the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries forthrightly responded, declaring:
It is regarded as essential to put an end to uncertainties and disputes as to the
precise extent of the exclusive fishery limits of countries whose vessels operate
in the same waters as our own. While it is intended to obtain as wide a
recognition as possible of the principle of the three-mile limit, it is quite obvious
that some provision must be made for meeting any exceptional cases where a
country seeks to establish a valid claim on historical or other grounds to
something more than the three-mile exclusive fishery limits in any particular
area [of the sea].' 1

More specifically, the Ministry warned the trawlers' organization that
talks with Norway over its claims to an exclusive fishing zone beyond
three miles might well prove absolutely necessary as a way of bringing
Norway into agreement on the comprehensive conservationist measures
for limiting gear that was a major objective of current British planning
for the postwar era. 1 2 A broader view of postwar relations among the
Allied nations was also at stake: "The kind of international order which
is likely to emerge" from the war, the Ministry declared, would feature
multilateralism and international cooperation and would be hostile to
any kind of overbearing insistence by Whitehall on having the British
view prevail against all competing claims. "In the view of the services
which these nations have rendered during the great world war," the UK
could not possibly justify seeking to enforce its will in ocean fishery
matters on the Allied countries, "which would certainly never voluntarily
accept [the three-mile] principle."'" 13 Commenting on the controversy,
one British policy planner supported the view that "any effort to
bludgeon the Norwegians would certainly produce deplorable results,"
while another Foreign Office planning staff member scornfully observed
in a memorandum that "the Trawling Interests are playing their
traditional role of obstructing any attempt to regulate fishing on rational

lines." 114

111. Letter from A.T.A. Dobson, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, United
Kingdom, to the Secretary, British Trawlers' Federation, Ltd. (June 13, 1944) (on file
with the Public Records Office [hereinafter PRO], Kew, England, FO 371/4058, f. 140520).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Memorandum regarding Treaty Formalities: Final Act of International Fisheries
Conference: Protest by British Trawler's Federation Ltd. (on file with PRO, N. Dept. &
Reconstruction Dept., FO 311/4058, f. 1405-20) (including an individual officer's comments
and minutes inscribed on the document).

Given the direction of British objectives, the Foreign Office viewed
with great apprehension the emerging alignment of the United States and
Canada that was indicated by the news of bilateral fisheries talks in
Ottawa in 1944, for it was obvious they were coordinating efforts to
shape a new policy. Most troubling of all to the British, the North American
powers were working to shape a new legal principle that would protect
their Pacific coast salmon fisheries. The British understandably feared
that such an initiative by Canada and the United States would encourage
Norway and other European coastal nations that sought to abandon the
three-mile rule in favor of an exclusionist doctrine for offshore waters.
Whitehall thus deplored the prospect of any formal move by Britain's
allies in North America to bar offshore waters to the distant-water fleets
of Japan or other countries. At a minimum, Foreign Office planners
believed such moves would give further impetus to Norway's efforts to
expand its claims to extended offshore jurisdiction; and in the worst
case, the result might be a complete collapse of the three-mile rule
the United
internationally, regardless of the minor compromises that
5
Kingdom was prepared to make in postwar negotiations.'"
Both then and for many years afterward, the lodestone of British
policy remained the principle that "all nations have the right of free
access to fisheries on the high seas outside territorial waters" ' 6 But
how could the Foreign Office hold the line on the key matter of the
maximum distance from shore at which the outer boundary of "territorial
waters" might legitimately be claimed? This question remained unresolved
in relations with Norway, among other nations, after the war, and it was
a question that would later go before the International Court of Justice in
Case that challenged the
the famous 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
7
very foundations of the three-mile rule." 1
115. Memoranda of various Foreign Office planning staff (on file with PRO, f.
1415-20, FO 371/4058).
116. Memorandum regarding Points to be Put Forward by the British Delegation,
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conference, Appendix (1949) (on file with PRO, Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries Records, f. 594, MAF 41/1320). This was precisely the view,
of course, that the United States government itself had long maintained and that
internationalists in the American scholarly community (for example, Philip Jessup)
believed the United States should continue to hold. It was precisely the view of ocean
law that the Japanese, too, had staunchly reiterated in their responses to U.S. and
Canadian pressures against their fishing incursions in the Bering Sea in 1937-38. "The
high seas are the common property of the peoples of the world and not to be confined
to private ownership," a Japanese industry group declared in 1937, arguing that
"[ejverybody has a right to use of the high seas or of utilizing their natural resources."
Society of Oceanic Fishing Promotion, quoted in Charge of 'Invasion' in Fisheries

Denied, JAPAN ADVERTISER, March 21, 1937 (on file with RG 23, f. 721-19-12-13).

117. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116. In this
case, the ICJ addressed in the context of maritime boundary-drawing the legitimacy
of historic claims, the special needs of coastal states highly dependent on their
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B. Canadian-U.S.Planningand the Truman Proclamation
Already preoccupied with the continuing uncertainties concerning
the issues presented by Norway and other states for the British
fisheries in the North Sea, the Foreign Office soon had solid reasons
to despair of the trend of policy on the other side of the Atlantic. The
planning and consultative process that would result in the Truman
Fisheries Proclamation was already well advanced by late 1943. The
State Department was engaged at that time in intensive work on a text
that could serve either as the basis for an exchange of notes with
Canada or (as actually would be done in the end) as the basis for a
unilateral proclamation by the United States Government, proclaiming
the creation of "conservation zones" out beyond the three-mile line. It
was unambiguous from the start that the object was to protect Bristol
Bay and the other salmon and halibut waters that had been at issue in
the 1937-38 exchange with Japan.' 8 (Thus Sturgeon was on record, in
the early talks in Ottawa, as referring to the objective he had in view
of "the exclusive right of fisheries which Canada and the United States
are trying to establish on the West Coast."" l9) Indeed, when the
Truman Fisheries Proclamation was finally issued in Washington in
September 1945, an accompanying formal statement was published
concerning implementation that referred specifically to fish20stocks in
Bristol Bay and surrounding waters of the Northeast Pacific.
Despite the fact that the British expected an unfavorable result from
the developing initiative in Washington, when the early drafts of the
Truman Proclamation were finally shown to the Foreign Office planners
they were taken aback by the undisguised unilateralism expressed in the
draft version. The British also were dismayed by the degree to which the
Canadians apparently were buying into the strong exclusionist position
fisheries, and the technical, but crucial, issue of baselines for demarcating maritime
boundaries.
118. This was evident in the first full-scale discussion with Canadian officials of a
draft text, in a meeting held in Ottawa in January 1944. Memorandum ofa Meeting on
the North-western Atlantic FisheriesProblems, East Block, CAN. DEPT. EXTERNAL AFF.,
DOCUMENTS CAN.ExTERNAL RELATIONS [hereinafter DOCuMENTS], No. 1062, Jan. 27,

1944, at 1724.
119. Id. at 1727.
120. The course of negotiations is traced in Hollick, supra note 107. As noted
previously, the present author has in progress a book-length study that seeks to revise the
prevailing interpretation of the Truman Fisheries Proclamation and to cast new light on
why it was so ambiguous with respect to the power to bar unilaterally new entrants from
the proposed conservation zones.

favored by Washington. That there was a new balance of power emerging
in the North Atlantic Triangle was already painfully evident to the
British government.12 ' Now it seemed evident that Canada and the United
States were poised to challenge the traditional precepts of ocean law and,
in particular, to abandon the inherited three-mile rule for offshore
jurisdiction. From the standpoint of a worried British22 Foreign Office,
the three-mile doctrine appeared to be "a failing asset.'
Whitehall sought to make the best of the situation by containing the
damage. Their best hope, the British decided, was to seek to have the
proposed new doctrine confined by the North American powers to their
offshore fisheries area on the Pacific Coast. Thus, though admitting that
it was absurd to contemplate "one rule of International Law for Europe
and another for America," British officials urged the U.S. Government
to make an explicit statement that its new doctrine of conservation zones
beyond three miles would be applied only to the specific fisheries (viz.
salmon and halibut) that were under well-established conservationist
regimes of research and/or management. 123 The British had no doubt that if
Washington issued the proclamation in the form they had seen, Canada
would follow suit. "It looks as if the U.S.-Canadian tail were beginning
to wag the dog," one British planning officer wrote in May 1944, "but
we can't do anything about it except to' 24see whether the American
proposals can be turned to our advantage."'
In fact, the Canadian government's support for the U.S. initiative was
not entirely unqualified, for the Department of External Affairs had been
rather uneasy from the start with the unilateralist tone of the declaration.
Mindful of the need to advance conservationist aims in their Atlantic
fisheries as well as on the Pacific Coast, Canadian officials were on the
whole favorable to the British multilateral approach in the Atlantic
fishing waters. And so Canada feared that a general statement of principle
on international law, such as the State Department was proposing in
early 1944, would be interpreted by London and other European fishing
powers as a first step toward the North American states' making similar
claims on the Atlantic coast. The Canadians did not plan application of
the extended-jurisdiction doctrine off their Atlantic coast, at least not at
that time; External Affairs officers believed that any such move would
121.

For analysis of changing Canadian foreign policy and the relationship to Great

Britain in this period, see generally JOHN W. HOLMES, 2 THE SHAPING OF THE PEACE:
CANADA AND THE SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER, 1943-1957 (1982).

122.
Draft Brief for the Foreign Office Representative (Oct. 12, 1944) (on file with
PRO, T 18458, FO 371/4058).
123.
R. Dunbar to A.T.A. Dobson, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, United
Kingdom (June 20, 1944) (on file with PRO, T 18458, FO 371/4058).
124.
Memorandum by R. Carr (May 18, 1944) (on file with PRO, Foreign Office
Rec., T 6179/92/381).
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be an unfair violation of long-established fishing rights, in any event12also
5
complicating Canadian diplomatic relations with the European powers.
A meeting of U.S. and Canadian officials from the diplomatic offices
and the fisheries agencies of both countries was held in Washington in
February 1944. In the face of the Canadians' reservations, described above,
the American delegation pushed hard for immediate action on the kind
of general statement justifying extended jurisdiction on the "conservation
zones" basis that would be expressed in the Truman Proclamation. Changing
realities in fishing technology and the prospects of fleet expansion after
the war "made necessary certain advances in international law," the U.S.
officials insisted. Recognizing that they might encounter "difficulty in
obtaining universal acceptance of the necessary changes," the Americans
believed "we should be prepared to use whatever forces were necessary
[sic] to put them in effect.', 126 The Canadians responded that Atlantic
problems ought to be dealt with on their merits before issuing a general
proclamation that would undermine the United Kingdom's initiatives for
conservationist measures in the Atlantic. In the American delegation's
view, however, the West Coast fisheries problem should receive first
priority because
the United States could not agree to European states participating in the
regulation of fishery off the Atlantic coast [under the London Agreement's
terms] without reassuring the people of the western states that trans-Pacific
states would not have the right to participate in fisheries off the Pacific coast,
and that therefore a general statement of
127 principle was desirable before
attempting to regulate the Atlantic Fisheries.

The Canadian delegation further challenged the unilateralist thrust of
American intentions with an additional argument that would be voiced
often in later years-in opposition to the exclusionist objectives of the
State Department's extended-jurisdiction advocates. This was the argument
that the Atlantic Charter had committed the Allies to freedom of access
to resources for all nations after the war, so that any exclusionist coastal
fisheries policy would violate a solemn wartime commitment. Consistent
with that commitment, the Canadian diplomats contended, an international
consensus should be sought on such a momentous change in international
law as abandonment of the three-mile rule would entail. The American
125. Report: Meeting on Fisheries Problems Held in Washington, D.C., DOCUMENTS,
No. 1731, Feb. 19, 1944, at 1733-34.
126. Id. at 1731 (emphasis added).
127. Memorandum by Eugene Dooman, Dept. of State, reportedin id. at 1732.

delegation, in a rather serendipitous reading of the Charter, declined to
accept this view, on grounds that "it was understood [sic] that the
Atlantic Charter assured
128access to natural resources by trade rather than
rights of exploitation.
With significant divergences of opinion thus having surfaced at this
Washington meeting, the State Department planners lost their enthusiasm
for the idea of an exchange of notes with Canada as the best way of
announcing the new principles they had in mind. Instead, the State
Department developed the draft statement internally as a proposed
unilateral U.S. proclamation. Canada and Newfoundland were kept well
informed, indeed much more thoroughly than any other Allied capital
except London, and they were among the governments to which the next
draft was circulated for comment. 129 But when the United States issued
the Truman Fisheries Proclamation in September 1945, it was done
without clearing the final draft language with the Canadians-a distinct
departure from the pattern of close consultation that had marked the
origins of the new policy earlier in the process.
The British government meanwhile tried to head off the worst potential
consequences of U.S. action. In commenting on the last draft of the
fisheries proclamation, sent to them in July, they appealed to the State
Department to make clear "that the principles enunciated are only
intended to apply to fisheries off the North American Continent" and
also to delete any reference to possible unilateral action by the United
States that would exclude foreign vessels from offshore waters in the
proposed "conservation zones. ' 130 The State Department rejected the latter
appeal, responding that "it would be wholly unrealistic if this Government,
in seeking to establish new principles for the conservation of our fishery
resources, were to give foreigners the impression that it would not assert
preemptive control over such fisheries." 1 3' As to the limiting application
of the new doctrine to North American coastal fisheries, the State
Department did agree to draft a press release to be issued along with the
proclamation indicating that protection of the Pacific salmon fishery was
128. Id. at 1732-33 (emphasis added). Hollick's articles provide further analysis of
Canadian-U.S. differences on the matter of the London Conference and the draft
agreement on Atlantic fisheries regulation. Hollick, supra note 88; Hollick, supra note
107. (None of this is to say that the fisheries experts in the Canadian government shared
the reservations of the External Affairs diplomats; in fact, they were much more
sympathetic to the U.S. position than the diplomatic officers.)
129. Newfoundland was then governed independently of Canada, and it did not
accept provincial status as part of Canada until later.
130. Letter from Wright, Counselor of the British Embassy, to Eugene Dooman,
Asst. Secy. of State (July 4, 1945) in FRUS, 1945, at 2:1517.
131. Letter from Eugene Dooman, Asst, Secy. of State, to Wright, Counselor of the
British Embassy (July 6, 1945), in FRUS, 1945, at 2:1522-23.
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the immediate intention.
Once the Proclamation was issued, the diplomatic community expected
Canada to follow quickly with its own parallel declaration. Surprisingly,
however, the Canadians instead decided to hold back and wait to see
how the United States would actually implement the conservation-zone
concept. When no moves toward implementation came from Washington,
the Canadian government informed the U.S. government in November
that a continuing review of the proclamation was going forward in
Ottawa, but added that this "does not indicate that the proposals... are
regarded with any disfavour by the Canadian Government."' 33
In the immediate aftermath of the war, Prime Minister Mackenzie
King's government was pursuing its newly formulated "functionalist"
policy, by which Canadian diplomacy sought to encourage a multilateral
134
approach to international policy issues on a problem-by-problem basis.
Linked with functionalism was Canada's quest, at that time, to carve out
for itself a creative "middle power" role. This effort at providing a basic
autonomous orientation for Canadian policy had the effect of distancing
Ottawa somewhat from Washington, even as the sweeping influence of
the Pax Americana was reaching its height. 135 To be sure, the Canadian
government, both under Mackenzie King and his postwar successor,
Louis St. Laurent, never doubted the necessity of the closest possible
cooperation with the Americans. They engaged in this special diplomatic
relationship without abandoning, however, two other basic principles of
Canadian foreign policy. The first was the maintenance of Canada's
132. Id. at 2: 1522. In fact such a press release was issued, reprintedin id. at 1528,
but it did not offset the impression abroad that the Proclamation set forth a principle of
more general application; and the Latin American nations quickly followed with
extended jurisdiction claims of their own, citing the general language of the
Proclamation as precedent and taking no official note of the press release as representing
a substantive qualification or limitation of the new doctrine. Harry N. Scheiber, U.S.
Policy, the Pacific Tuna Economy, and Ocean Law Innovation: The Post-World War II
Era, 1945-1970, in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS, supra note 18, at 33-37.

133. Quoted in Memorandum by Legal Division: Coastal Waters, DOCUMENTS, No.
1731, DEA/12015-40, March 27, 1946, at 1529, 1530.
134. Postwar internationalism, as the Canadian government developed its basic
posture on international affairs, involved "a belief in cooperative endeavours through
international institutions to preserve the peace ...and in 'functionalism,' a concept which
was based on the belief that representation in those institutions should be directly linked
to members' contributions to their work." Margaret Doxey, Canadaand the Evolution of
the Modern Commonwealth, 40 BEHIND THE HEADLINES 1, 3-4 (1982).

For acerbic and

incisive commentary on the tension between the pragmatics of functionalism, utopianism, and
collective-security imperatives, see HOLMES, supra note 121, at 4-5, 40-56, 37-75.
135. HOLMES, supra note 121, at 37-75.

own national unity, and the other was cooperating with Great Britain and
other Commonwealth states in a regular course of "abundant and
intimate consultation.. 36. , [but] without commitments and on the basis
of national autonomy.'
It was not surprising, then, that some political leaders and governments
questioned the wisdom of Canada's wholesale acceptance of the
American example in regard to a unilateral mode of announcing a new
policy on international ocean law as expressed in the Truman Fisheries
Proclamation. To many experts in the Canadian government, there seemed
a better way to introduce a new position on so momentous an issue-a
different way that would be better for Canada's own interest and, at the
same time, better for the cause of comity in the world community. Thus,
the Legal Division of the External Affairs Department advised the
department in March 1946 that even if the United States actually moved
to implement the Proclamation by declaring "conservation zones"
beyond the three-mile line, "any such extension [by Canada] should be
accomplished by agreement rather than by unilateral declaration." The
Legal Division further suggested that, although Canada actually favored
the substantive modification of international law embodied in the
proclamation, it might be best to bring the matter before the newly
approved United Nations Organization, "where the formulation of a suitable
multilateral convention could be considered by its Legal Committee.' 37
Similarly, a leading Canadian fisheries scientist, Dr. R. S. Foerster, was
writing privately to a colleague in California who was then campaigning
for an aggressive implementation of the Truman Proclamation: "If the
United States is going to be the leader and major influence for peaceful
accord in the Pacific, should she not endeavour to stimulate international
co-operation... rather than at least [be] giving the impression that a
wild rush is being made to grasp the whole area and its resources for
138
American use?"'
136.

Brady, "Canada and the Commonwealth," 203, quoted in ROBERT A.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, FROM UN TO NATO

SPENCER,

1946-1949 366 (1959). The Secretary

for External Affairs in the St. Laurent government, Lester B. Pearson, described the
partnership with the United States as one that made the central principle of Canadian
diplomacy to make "'restrained, responsible, and constructive' expressions of Canada's
views" in the capitals of the great powers, "above all, in Washington." Lester B.
Pearson, The Development of CanadianForeign Policy, 30 FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. 1, at 26
(1951), quoted in SPENCER, id. at 290. See also FREDERICK H. SOWARD, CANADA IN
WORLD AFFAIRS: FROM NORMANDY TO PARIS 1944-46 at 338ff (1950).
137. Memorandum by Legal Division: Coastal Waters, DOCUMENTS, DEA/1201540, March 27, 1946, at 1529-30.
138. Letter from RS. Foerster to Wilbert M. Chapman, July 29, 1946 (on file with UW
Library, Chapman Papers) (criticizing his friends in American fisheries management and
science when they invoked the Truman Proclamation as an instrument for the exploitation
of vast fishery resources of the high seas exclusively by the U.S. industry).
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The months went by, and the U.S. government continued to be
hesitant about undertaking implementation as factions within the State
Department were divided as to the wisdom of unilateral action and as to
the merits of the Proclamation's terms. 139 In this situation, the Prime
Minister informed the Canadian Parliament that his government's
position on the Proclamation was still being studied and that no policy
announcement from Ottawa should be expected until further notice.
Prime Minister St. Laurent told the House during questions on July 4,
1947, that his government had expected earlier "to introduce a resolution
to assert a policy that would in fact be in accord with that announced by
the President of the United States ... to make sure that there would be a
uniform policy for the western hemisphere."'' 40 St. Laurent continued:
The terms of the resolution were discussed with our United States friends. So
far it has not appeared that we had reached the point where we were both agreed
as to the best form of language to be used.... I should like to give honorable
members the assurance that as far as the government is concerned, the general
policy is in accord with [the Truman Proclamation] .... There has not yet been
full agreement as to what is the best way of laying the foundation for an effort
to get international agreement14 to
1 the implementation of proper conservation
methods for offshore fisheries.

Asked whether there had been consultation with other governments, or
whether instead St. Laurent had talked only with Washington on this
issue, the Prime Minister replied evasively, saying: "The answer would
depend upon the meaning one gives to the word 'consultation."' The
issue had been "brought to the knowledge of others," he stated, but the
real question for him was how to advance the Truman Proclamation's
substance in a mode that would achieve not only immediate objectives,
but also general reform of international law. "The objective we are
pursuing," he declared, "is to try to get a policy which will ultimately
become world wide [sic] and which can be implemented to the benefit of
'
the whole of humanity."142
This overarching objective of achieving a basic change in law through
a process that would evoke consent by the community of nations remained a
hopeful objective of Canadian policy. Fostering the multilateralist approach
139. See Scheiber, supra note 93, at 453-54.
140. Quoted in Memorandum regarding Japanese Peace Settlement: Canadian
Interest in Regulation of Japanese Fishing (October 1947) (on file with RG, vol. 3,
f. 50051-40).
141. Id.
142. Id.

was a goal of Canadian policy not only in 1947 but throughout the
ensuing period until the signing of the tripartite convention with Japan in
1952. This was a very difficult objective to attain and was indeed
doomed to failure given the transparently self-interested motive of the
proclamation and its most ardent adherents in the United States and
Canada. The proclamation embodied, moreover, a manifest abandonment
of that core principle of international law-the three-mile rule-which
was then under attack by the Latin American states and in Norwegian
and other North European waters. In response to this attack, paradoxically,
the United States, along with the British government, was at the same
period in the forefront of resistance to other countries' declarations of
43
extended offshore jurisdiction and abandonment of the three-mile rule. 1 .
Throughout 1946 and into early 1947, departments of the Canadian
government continued to analyze the Proclamation and to prepare
Canada's response. The underlying premise of discussion was that at the
end of the day, Canada must go along with Washington and espouse the
document's principles, something the fishing interests and politicians of
British Columbia were insistently demanding. The obvious dilemma for
the legal officers and diplomats remained, however, that it was "not
clear" (as an External Affairs Department memorandum put it) "that these
principles are recognized by customary international law."' 144 Except for
the Department of Fisheries, all the Cabinet departments that were consulted
agreed that the unilateral procedure that had been followed by the United
States was undesirable. "Broad acceptance" in the community of nations,
45
the legal officers declared, was clearly "preferable to unilateral action.'
The reluctance in Ottawa to endorse the unilateral style of the Truman
Proclamation might have made for severe tensions with Washington, had
the U.S. Government actually moved to implement the document's terms.
But the danger of such tension arising was removed by the fact that
neither then nor later would the United States make such a move. When
the Department of External Affairs first presented to the Cabinet its
comprehensive position on the issues in March 1946, it recalled that
when consulted by Washington in 1944, the Canadian government had
143. Scheiber, supra note 132; HOLLICK, supra note 10,passim.
144. Letter from Under-Secretary of State for EA to Deputy Minister of Transport,
DOCUMENTS, No. 900, June 24, 1946, at 1533. The language quoted in the text pertained
to the Continental Shelf proclamation, but in the same memorandum and others
exchanged in interdepartmental discussions at this time it was clear that observations as
to both procedure and appropriateness of substance were meant to apply to both
proclamations. See, e.g., id. at 1534; Memorandum from the Legal Division, DOCUMENTS,
No. 901, Sept. 13, 1946, at 1535.
145. Memorandum from Legal Division regarding U.S. Presidential Proclamation
on the Continental Shelf and on Coastal Fisheries, DOCUMENTS, No. 901, Sept. 13, 1946,
at 1535.
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decided to withhold responding until the Cabinet departments had been
consulted. "It was felt that acceptance of the principle of fisheries
conservation zones in the High Seas would mark a new development in
international law," but it was also recognized that policies adopted under
146
the new principle might well prove to be "discriminatory or exclusive.
The Department of External Affairs recommended "conditional agreement
with United States policy" as expressed in the Proclamation, as doubtless
"the long-term interests of Canadian fishermen would be best served by
the adoption of a policy of conservation." The condition that the Department
recommended, however, was that "no State or states establishing a
conservation zone in the High Seas should have the right to exclude or
otherwise discriminate against the nationals of foreign states who are
prepared to abide by the regulations.' 4 7 (This, it should be noted, was a
non-trivial "condition" of acceptance, one arguably at odds fundamentally
with the precise terms of the Proclamation, depending on how one reads
what its language implied about possible exclusion of new entrants.1 48)
Both "the interests of Canada" and, explicitly, "the general interest,"
External Affairs argued, would best be advanced by an orderly process
"to support the development of international law by agreement between
1 49
States rather than by unilateral declaration on the part of any one State."
In December 1946, some fifteen months after the Truman Proclamation
had been issued, the conversation among the Cabinet departments in
Ottawa still had not reached a conclusion. A policy meeting involving
External Affairs and Department of Fisheries officers was called
specifically to make recommendations to the Cabinet on whether Canada
should finally take action on the conservation-zone question. Despite the
previous reaffirmations from many sides in favor of a multilateral approach,
the consensus that came out of the meeting was in favor of strong action
through a unilateral declaration. The U.S. example and the actions of
the Latin American states in extending their offshore jurisdictions by
proclamation were cited in support of that view. There was no effort to
obscure the degree to which a policy reversal for Canada was being
146. Revised Draft Memorandum for the Dept. of EA to Cabinet regarding
Conservation of Fisheries in the High Seas, DOCUMENTS, No. 1064, March 14, 1946, at
1805.
147. Id. at 1806.
148. On the issue of new entrants and potential exclusivity, see MYRES S.
McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMIoRARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 966-67, 1103-04 (1962).
149. Revised Draft Memorandum, supra note 146.

advocated-the report of the meeting admitted that its recommendation
for a unilateral move involved "discrimination and exclusion," a policy
"inconsistent with the broad principles" to which the Canadian government
had previously been committed. 150 A candid admission followed, indicating
that both the avoidance of an embarrassment, on the one hand, and the
attractiveness of a self-interested policy, on the other, were at stake:
It would not look particularly impressive if we were to say publicly that it had
taken a year and a half to discover a principle in the Presidential Proclamation
[viz. its unilateralism] to which we objected. Moreover, it might be found
preferable to support the present and future interests of the Canadian fishing
the more shadowy concept of the development of
industry rather than
151
international law.

Nonetheless, when Prime Minister St. Laurent presented the issue to
Parliament in July 1947, he would eschew unilateralism and stay his
had as yet been made as
hand, asserting only that no final determination
52
how his government would act on the issue)
For the British government, meanwhile, there must have been
considerable puzzlement as to what direction American policy actually
would take. Whitehall's officials long had been irritated by the spectacle
tail! 153
of His Majesty's dog being wagged by the "Canadian-American
As the months went on, however, with no American implementation of
the conservation zone policy forthcoming, it seemed, on the one hand,
that the effort at full cooperation between Canada and the United States
had broken down on the three-mile issues and that the Truman Proclamation
might be a bold statement with no real clout, despite the mischief it had
caused in prompting other coastal states to make extended claims of
exclusive offshore jurisdiction. On the other hand, the United States was
demonstrating a remarkable readiness to throw its weight around in
largely pushing aside the other Allied governments in determining
policies for the governance of occupied Japan. The emerging intention
of the Truman Administration and of General Douglas MacArthur as the
Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan to oversee
Japanese economic recovery on whatever basis the United States deemed
proper extended-ominously for the Allies, as events would prove-to
and the
establishing policy for the revival of Japanese Antarctic
54 whaling
restoration of Japanese distant-water fishing capacity.1
The arena of Anglo-Canadian-American fishery relations broadened
immediately after the war to include the Far Eastern Council (FEC), a
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.at 1812.
Id.
See supra notes 140-42.
Carr Memorandum, supranote 124.
For analysis of this episode, see following section of this article.
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multilateral Allied agency that was established to set policy for the
Occupation. General MacArthur generally ignored or undermined FEC
directives so far as his fisheries and whaling policies were concerned.
This scornful posture became a source of bitter frustration to the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, whose FEC representatives led a
strong but entirely unsuccessful effort to block and reverse MacArthur's
efforts to quickly rebuild Japan's whaling and fishing industries. 155 This
1 56
element of the history has received full attention in earlier scholarship.
What needs to be noted for our purposes here, however, is that these
bitter confrontations in the FEC created a dilemma for Canadian diplomats
and fisheries experts. For Canada, the protection of its Pacific salmon
industry from renewed Japanese competition continued to be a major
policy goal; the political pressure from the West Coast members of
Parliament and from the fishing industry left little choice. This objective
aligned Canada with New Zealand and Australia, but only to a degree,
because Ottawa's protectionist concerns on the fisheries issue were
tempered by the more general commitment of the Canadian government
approach in its diplomacy, both globally and as to
to the 1"functional"
57
Japan.

Hence Canada walked a thin line in its oceans diplomacy. To achieve
protection for its salmon industry, Ottawa had to work closely with the
155.

At first, the U.S. government used the technique of issuing "interim directives"

to MacArthur in support of his policies when those policies contravened the positions
approved by the FEC; but by August 1948, the U.S. government's support of MacArthur's
authority, in the face of FEC opposition on various issues, became explicit: "The
decisions of the Far Eastern Commission do not have the force and effect of law," the
Legal Adviser of the State Department ruled, stating that FEC decisions were "simply
formulations [of policy] which have still to be cast in the form of directives by the U.S.

Government." Memorandum by Legal Adviser's Office to Division of Occupied Areas,
Economic Affairs (Aug. 13, 1948) (on file with NA, Dept. of State Rec., International
Resources/Fisheries and Wildlife files). Even as early as October 1947, the United
States had informed the Allied nations represented on the FEC that it could not support
any resolutions in the Council that would serve to compromise "the Supreme
Commander's freedom of action," in this instance with respect to the policy on whaling.
Aide mdmoire of Oct. 8, 1947, in 6 FRUS, 1974, at 303; reaffd in Aide mdmoire from U.S.
to Australia (June 12, 1948), quoted in Ambassador W. H. Wrong to SS for EA (June 26,
1948) (on file with RG 43, f. 722-21-4) (commenting that MacArthur "[must] have broad
discretionary powers with regard to problems arising in Japan").
156. See GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION: A STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, 1945 To 1952 passim (DEPT. OF STATE, 60 FAR EASTERN

SERIES, 1953); and SCHEMER, supra note 12, at 141-74.

157. Memorandum to Staff regarding Japanese Peace Settlement: Canadian Interest
in Regulation of Japanese Fishing 12-13 (Oct. 1947) (on file with RG 23), vol. 3, f.
50051-40). On the functional or functionalist approach, see supra notes 133-34.

United States and follow the American lead in regard to Japan. The
Canadians attempted to do so, however, without poisoning relations with
Great Britain on this issue, mindful that the British were still entirely
committed to preserving the three-mile rule on offshore limits. As postwar
inter-Allied diplomacy progressed, the possibility opened up for Canada
of achieving its fishery-protection objectives either through the general
peace treaty or else through a special agreement with Japan. These
alternatives might take the Canadian government off the hook, so far as
its own reservations about unilateral announcement of extended jurisdiction
and its sensitivities to the British position on the three-mile rule were
concerned-an advantage not overlooked in Ottawa. The attractiveness
of the alternative courses was thus reflected in a Department of External
Affairs staff memorandum in 1947, declaring: "[C]onsideration must be
given to whether the Japanese Peace Treaty can be used to eliminate or
curtail Japanese competition with Canadian Pacific fishing interests.... ,,58
As for the United States, the question of Japan's future role in the
North Pacific would increasingly be pursued by American diplomacy,
not through the FEC. Indeed, diplomatic talks concerning a proposed
tripartite Canadian-U.S.-Japanese fisheries agreement resulted in the
1952 North Pacific International Fisheries Convention.15 9 The terms of
the 1952 Convention would resolve for some fifteen years central questions
that had been on the agenda of Canadian-U.S. fisheries diplomacy in
1946. As will be shown in the following pages, the way that the convention
addressed those issues was influenced by the experience in the FEC.
Looking back on the contemporary context of that agreement, moreover,
it is clear that the 1952 Convention was destined to have a major impact
on the future direction of the ocean law reform movement and the
United Nations debates from the mid-1950s to 1982.
VI. OUTSTANDING ISSUES, 1946

The unresolved issues of ocean law in 1946 included the question of
what types of measures might be taken to protect coastal fisheries (and
what innovations in international law might be required), given the terms
of the Truman Proclamation and the confusion that its non-implementation
had created.
First, could the three-mile rule be salvaged, as the British hoped, either
with or without some compromises as to the law on offshore limits to
accommodate nations such as Norway (and, of course, Japan), whose
158. Id. ("It is suggested that Canada and the US should consult together prior to
the Japanese Peace Conference regarding objectives to be pursued in dealing with the
future of the Japanese fishing industry .. ")
159. On the Convention, see supra notes 11-12 and infra note 264.
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national economies were highly dependent on the fisheries? Approaches
to an accommodation could be worked out either through international
agreements, such as the halibut and salmon treaties between Canada and
the United States, or through a broader multilateralist approach, such as
what the British were promoting for the North Atlantic.
Second, would the United States, presumably with Canadian support
in the end, instead assert unilateral authority aggressively through an
implementation of its Truman Fisheries Proclamation? As noted earlier,
the terms of the Proclamation called for creation of "conservation zones"
to protect specific fishery stocks that were already under exploitation,
especially when the coastal state had expended great effort to support
sustainability. As the Canadians had pointed out in the 1944 bilateral talks,
however, key questions remained unanswered: Would the proposed
zones be administered under a principle that admitted new entrants but
required them to obey conservationist regulations imposed by the coastal
state? Or did the Proclamation set the stage for an "exclusionist" option,
barring new entrants altogether? The Proclamation's text as issued contained
ambiguous language on this crucial point. 60 Whether or not exclusionist
implications were to be controlling, the Proclamation did inject into the
emerging debate the basic concept that an existing regulatory regime
informed by scientific research should legitimate exceptions to the
traditional rules of territorial waters and offshore fishery jurisdiction.
During 1945-47, Latin American states were proclaiming extended
jurisdiction for their offshore waters. None of their proclamations restricted
their new claims to conserved fisheries under scientific management or
to fisheries endangered by possible depletion; indeed, some of the Latin
American states were moving toward assertion of extraordinary claims
of full territorial sovereignty (not just control of fisheries) over offshore
waters as far as 200 miles from their coastlines. The meaning of "territorial
seas" was thus changing rapidly in the real world of ocean affairs, although
the legitimacy of extended claims under international law remained a
contested matter. Lack of decisiveness on the part of the United States
government was contributing in16a1 uniquely important way to perpetuating
confusion on this crucial issue.
Third, several alternative approaches to the drawing of geographic
boundaries at sea for jurisdictional and/or functional purposes were

160.
161.

See JOHNSTON, supra note 2; BURKE, supra note 2, at 6-8.
Scheiber, supra note 93, at 457-64; see also ATTARD, supra note 8.

being advocated. One approach was to simply identify an area of the
high seas, as the London Conference agreements did in regard to net
mesh sizes, as the space in which an international agreement on regulation
would be applied. Another was a species-oriented approach, implicit in
the rationale, if not the specific language, of the Truman Proclamation.
In this approach, the area in which specifically named species were
found was the area in which an international agreement would apply.
The Latin American states were pursuing yet another approach, which
was simply to extend their claims out beyond three miles to arbitrarily
designated distances. In later years, this approach would be known as
"creeping jurisdiction," part of a larger process of "ocean enclosure" by
which many coastal nations adopted six-mile or twelve-mile extended
fishing zones, declared control of waters over the continental shelf, or
zone that eventually would be adopted in the
moved to the 200-mile
62
1982 UNCLOS. 1
The consideration of these various alternatives was not something
entirely new in international affairs. Well before 1946, precedents and
models for each of the variations for protection of coastal fisheries had
of
been discussed or, in specific areas, actually put into effect; and 163
course, the three-mile doctrine had never been universally accepted.
For example, in the 1930s, Secretary Hull suggested to Japan an
agreement on offshore zones in which Japan, Canada, the Soviet Union,
and the United States would mutually agree to abstain from fishing.,
This "defined zone" concept, however, was abandoned in favor of the
64
1938 Japanese commitment to suspend fishing in Bristol Bay waters. 1
An earlier variant of species-based regulation by agreement was the
1911 Sealing Convention, which had provided for sharing of the harvest
among the signatory nations. 65 Meanwhile, by the 1940s, the famous
Halibut Commission regulatory regime under joint Canadian and
American authority had become widely recognized as an exemplary
program for the scientifically determined, species-based, and processoriented approach; the two countries were moving toward implementation

162. BURKE, supra note 2, at 14-24, 320-21.
163. See supra note 4. In the Bering Sea Seal arbitration, The United States itself
had sought to claim jurisdiction well beyond three miles. See D.P. O'CONNELL, 1 THE
INT'L LAW OF THE SEA 522-23 (1982).

164.

Letter from Cordell Hull to Joseph Grew, Ambassador to Japan (June 5, 1937),

in 4 FRUS, 1937, at 740-48.

Also in the 1930s, the British Foreign Office (as noted earlier, supra text at notes 11011) had been leading vigorously to fashion international agreements on mesh-size
limitations in order to promote conservation-minded methods in the North Atlantic
Ocean region.
165. LEONARD, supra note 37, at 55-95.
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of a similar regime for Fraser River salmon. 166 For fisheries scientists
who were striving during the immediate postwar years to advance the
cause of fisheries research as an integral part of national and international
fishery management, it was crucial to establish the MSY of regulated
species as the central concept by which conservationist management
could obtain legitimacy and political support. For these scientists and
managers, the Halibut Commission record was the gold
many agency
67
standard. 1

The dual objectives of advancing multilateral agreements in a species
approach to management, on the one hand, and invocation of scientific
research on sustainability, on the other, were advanced in 1946 when the
International Whaling Convention was adopted by the principal states
(except Japan) engaged in Antarctic whaling. The debates in the 1946
Washington meeting that negotiated this agreement involved the whole
range of complex legal, scientific, and political issues that typically
came into play when an international agreement on ocean fisheries was
attempted. The result in this instance was a compromise under which a
process of scientific advising was provided for, but without complete
surrender of each signatory nation's sovereign authority either to accept
or to "opt out" of the agreed regulations. 168 Moreover, the Washington
talks were marked by a classic clash between the industrial interests,
concerned to protect the profitability of their operations, and the champions
protection of endangered
of a conservationist ethic, whose objective was the 69
whale species for the sake of future generations. 1
166. Roy I. JACKSON & WILLIAM F. ROYCE, OCEAN FORUM: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES COMMISSION 42-44, 45, 48
("The conservation success of the Halibut Commission... undoubtedly led to more
rapid acceptance of other conservation conventions based on fishery science. Its
achievements and its credibility led the United States and Canada to attach great
importance to its principles .. "). See also supra note 41.
167. Scheiber & Carr, supra note 23, at 22 and accompanying notes; Scheiber,
supra note 132, at 42-44 (discussing how, in 1949, the U.S. State Department invoked
the Halibut Commission model in proposing an international tuna commission for the
Eastern Tropical Pacific).
168. T6NNESON & JOHNSEN, supra note 36.
169. Prof. Kurk Dorsey of the University of New Hampshire has forthcoming a
study of the Washington conference on whaling, showing that the United States was the
principal source of concerns expressing a conservationist ethic. Prof. Dorsey's research
shows that the American position prevailed over a tendency, even in the British
government, to give a large measure of freedom to their industrial interests in setting
whaling policy for the international regime. I have offered some analysis of the
International Whaling Commission and its original objectives, in light of present-day
controversy over the IWC's 1986 moratorium, in Scheiber, supra note 19, at 4, 8-11, 13

What role Japan would be permitted to play in the global fisheries and
whaling economy was the most prominent controversial issue in oceans
diplomacy that remained entirely unresolved at the end of World War II.
The vessels of the vaunted Japanese distant-water fleets, including all
the factory ships, had been largely destroyed during the war, and Japan's
domestic economy was devastated; there was considerable human
suffering, despite the firm commitment of the Occupation authority to
restore food supply and public health.1 70 If, as became evident in 1946,
the American-dominated Occupation command, under General MacArthur
as SCAP, would seek the speedy reconstruction of Japan's fishing
sector, then would such a policy also place new limitations on Japan's
distant-water operation? Or would Japan be permitted to regain the
position it had held in the 1930s as the leading marine fishing power,
posing a competitive threat to other fishing nations throughout the
Pacific Basin, including North America?
VII. OCCUPATION-ERA CONTROVERSIES171
When the occupation of Japan began in 1945, MacArthur's headquarters
made reconstruction of the coastal and marine fisheries one of its highest
priorities as a way of providing the Japanese population with protein
requirements at a time of global crisis in food supply. Even when that
crisis was met in early 1947, SCAP did not cease to press forward in a
policy designed to restore Japan's fisheries and allied fisheries industries
to their prewar levels and beyond. In addition to supplying the home
market, the fisheries and whaling activities were a welcome source of
export earnings that would boost overall living levels and relieve the
American taxpayers of occupation costs. 172 The fishing revival offered
the additional advantage, from General MacArthur's standpoint, of justifying
his decision to rehabilitate the country's shipyards, head off their
dismantling as war reparations, and revive the shipbuilding industry
as
173
an engine of growth for the Japanese economy more generally.
(quoting Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson on how the whaling nations had a
responsibility for treating the stocks as a "trust for mankind").
170. SCAP, supra note 45.
171. Full detail of events and documentation of the Occupation-era fishery policies
and diplomatic conflicts that are discussed in brief compass in this Section may be found
in SOHE1BER, supra note 12. What follows here has a focus on Canadian policy and the
North Atlantic Triangle relationships during the Occupation period, an essential part of

the background of Canadian-U.S.-Commonwealth relations in the negotiations that led to
the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention of 1952.
172. Both these objectives were given a leading place in American strategic policy,
especially after the collapse of the Nationalist government and victory of the Communist
regime in China in 1949. SCHEMER, supra note 12, at 90-92, 163.
173. Harry N. Scheiber & Akio Watanabe, Occupation Policy and Economic Planning
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The other Allied governments were deeply concerned from the outset
about the implications of the SCAP policies for the restoration of
Japanese fishing operations. Especially worrisome to the Asian-Pacific
countries (Australia, New Zealand, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines)
was the prospect that SCAP's zealous expansionist design for Japan's
fishing industries would mean that Japanese vessels would soon again be
operating close to their coastlines. In light of how such operations had
been used for military intelligence by Japan in the 1930s, the AsiaPacific Allies believed that
a revival of Japan's fishing capacity posed a
74
serious security threat.

Within the Commonwealth bloc, there were some decisive differences
on the security issue, exemplified by a New Zealand policy paper written
for a Commonwealth conference on peace treaty planning. "New Zealand's75
primary interest in the Japanese Peace Settlement is security," it stated.
Yet the authors were fully aware that their security concern was closer to
the objectives of China, the Philippines, and even to those of the Soviet
Union on this point than to other Commonwealth nations. "Only Australia
is likely to join us in insisting that security must be the overriding
consideration," the New Zealand paper conceded. "Canada and the United
Kingdom do not feel the menacing nearness of Japan as we do. 176
in PostwarJapan, in ECONOMIC PLANNING INTHE POST- 1945 PERIOD 102-106 (Eric Aerts
& Alan S. Milward eds., 1990). The Australians inparticular were concerned that the SCAP
policies on shipyard reconstruction and other economic rebuilding could harm the chances of
ultimately supporting reparations to the Allies, especially themselves, and sought in vain
to speed up the reparations negotiations. For example, they sent out instructions to press
for early allocation of reparations. Dispatch from the Dept. of External Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, to the Australian Mission, Tokyo, Japan, and Australian Embassy, Washington,
D.C. (May 7, 1947) (on file with Australian National Archives, M8605/1, f. M15/4/7).
174. Security considerations were foremost in the analyses evident in, for example,
Dispatch from Australian Head of Mission, Tokyo, Japan, to Prime Minister's Department,
Canberra, Australia (Nov. 11, 1947) (on file with New Zealand National Archives, EA 2
f. 02/9/33); Dispatch from Australian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to Canberra,
Australia (Sept. 26, 1947) (on file with Australian National Archives, A-1068, f. ER
47/31/2); and a series of notes from Australia to the United States government, with the
Americans replying that SCAP was taking adequate measures to assure Allied nations'
security (see e.g., Letter from U.S. to Australian Embassy (July 9, 1947), in 6 FRUS,
1947, at 252-53).
175. Memorandum regarding Japanese Peace Settlement, Part I: General Attitude to
Japanese Peace Settlement (May 12, 1947) (on file with New Zealand National Archives,
f. EA I 102/9/38).
176. Id. Also, New Zealand was uncomfortable with, though it finally did support,
Australia's unsuccessful demands in 1946 that it, not SCAP, have control of the Japanbased whaling expeditions. That Canada would decline to support Australia on this issue
became evident early in the FEC controversy over whaling policy. Memoranda from

Once the Korean War broke out in 1950, U.S. policy toward Japan, in
a shift popularly termed "reverse course," was directed at the restoration
of Japanese sovereignty, the swift conclusion of a peace treaty on nonpunitive terms, and, of course, at the formal alignment of Japan with the
Allies in the anti-Soviet camp through a security treaty to be signed
immediately after general peace terms were settled.177 As events proved,
the New Zealand planners were right in their expectations, as both the
United Kingdom and Canada aligned themselves with the Americans in
giving these objectives priority over any concern with restrictions on
Japan's expansion of its fishing and whaling fleets in the western
Pacific. 178
The Allied countries also feared in 1946 that SCAP-led restoration of
Japan's fisheries capacity would mean either direct competition with
their own fishing fleets or, at a minimum, a Japanese preemption of
fishing opportunities in areas where the Allied fishing industries were
contemplating expansion once the necessary capital and ships became
available.1 79 Just as the Canadians and Americans had argued in 193738 that a depletion of stocks would occur in Bristol Bay under pressure
of unrestrained Japanese fishing techniques, these Asian-Pacific countries
predicted disaster for their fishing resources if Japan were given complete
freedom of the seas such as they had enjoyed in the prewar era. Similar
opposition to SCAP policy emerged in a heated Allied campaign to
obtain reversal of MacArthur's decision to permit a revival of Japanese
factory-ship whaling operations in the Antarctic in 1946.180
Also motivating the Allied governments in their concern regarding
MacArthur's policies for fisheries and general economic recovery was
the enduring memory of Japan's atrocities against civilians in Asia during
the period of militarist-imperialist expansion and the Second World War.
Indeed, at least until late 1949, most of the Allied nations advocated an
New Zealand Legation, Washington, D.C., to External Affairs, Wellington, Australia
(Aug. 29, 1946) (on file with New Zealand National Archives, EA 1, pt. 1, f. 268/5/15).
177. On "reverse course," see GEORGE C. ALLEN, JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EXPANSION
32, 251 (1965); WILLIAM S. BORDEN, THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE 63-88 (1984); and essays
in DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION 206 (Robert E. Ward & Sakamoto
Yoshikazu eds., 1987).
178. See, inter alia, ROGER BUCKLEY, OCCUPATION DIPLOMACY: BRITAIN, THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1945-1952 (1982); RICHARD N. ROSECRANCE, AUSTRALIAN
DIPLOMACY AND JAPAN 1945-1951 (1962); SCHEIBER, supra note 12; and MICHAEL
SCHALLER, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN

ASIA

(1985).

179. Thus, New Zealand and Australia opposed resumption of Japanese whaling,
authorized by SCAP, not only because of its immediate importance to the Antarctic
whaling industry (in which neither of them participated), but also because private
investors in both countries were contemplating entry into the industry at a later time. See
ROSECRANCE, supra note 178.
180. SCHEIMER, supra note 12, at 109-41.
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array of severely punitive occupation measures, including trials and purges
for war criminals, large reparations payments to the Allied government
and to individuals who had suffered at the hands of Japan, the permanent
dismantling of Japan's capacity for producing heavy military goods, and
limits on Japan's economy and trade more generally.18 1 Not least
important, some of the Allies were hopeful of writing into the Peace
Treaty, when it was negotiated, clearly defined geographical or 182
other
limitations on Japanese operations in marine fisheries and whaling.
The conflict between SCAP and the Allies concerning Japan's fisheries
revival became a source of bitter antagonism between the United States
and the other Allies. In particular, the other Allies were entirely united
against the SCAP policy of permitting Japan to send whaling factoryship expeditions to the Antarctic. Moreover, they were united not only
on the substance of SCAP policy but also on the procedure that SCAP
had followed to re-authorize whaling. Australia, New Zealand, China,
and the Philippines led the attack on SCAP policies, as the fisheries and
whaling policies were debated almost continuously in the FEC throughout
the 1946-50 period. 183 The U.S. government, although it was divided in
its internal councils on fishery questions, in every instance gave SCAP
policies its full support against repeated Allied demands84 that the
Occupation constrain Japan's fisheries activities more rigidly.
In 1946, when General MacArthur authorized an expanded marine
fishing zone, extending into the north-central Pacific, the Allied nations
(led by Australia) denounced the action both because they had not been
181.
BORDEN, supra note 177, at 81-82; cf BUCKLEY, supra note 178, at 126-27
(discussing that initially the United States contemplated reparations so large that the
British Government believed it to be too harsh a plan, though later the Foreign Office
complained that a ten percent share of reparations for the U.K. was too small! In any
event, the U.S. policy went through several phases, and at least momentarily in 1945
seemed to be strongly for a punitive settlement, then changed direction moderately, then
after 1948 moved radically toward a non-vindictive treaty.) President Truman's approval of
NSC 13/3 in May 1949 (stating that SCAP should halt any reparations shipments or
plans) definitively decided the issue. BORDEN, supra note 177, at 82.
182. Thus, in 1946, the Australian policy paper for basic peace treaty planning
included a proposed treaty provision for Japan to be excluded permanently from whaling
in the Antarctic, to be excluded from Australian pearl-bed waters (which reached out to
the limit of the continental shelf, some 150-200 miles beyond the three-mile limit), and
to be required to adhere to the terms of the 1911 Convention for the Protection of Fur
Seals (which Japan had renounced in 1940) and the 1946 international whaling agreement.
Draft Australian Policy Paper (Sept. 9, 1946) (on file with New Zealand National
Archives, f. EA 1 102/.9/40).
183. SCHEIBER, supra note 12, at 42-47, 54-58, 101 ff.
184. Id. at 109-74.

consulted and because they believed the SCAP policies were far too
generous. Meanwhile, MacArthur also authorized annual Antarctic whaling
expeditions for Japanese factory ships, even though Japan was not a
signatory of the 1946 whaling convention and even though the Allies
(especially Britain and Norway, the leading whaling nations) were ardently
opposed. In this respect, too, the American resistance to any meaningful
consultation was a source of deep resentment and often angry exchanges
in the FEC meetings. 85 In addition to re-authorizing the Antarctic whaling
expeditions each year, MacArthur also acted unilaterally with respect to
defining the geographical limits of Japanese fishing in Pacific waters.
At first very restrictive, beginning in 1946 the authorized fishing area for
Japan, known popularly as the "MacArthur Zone," was progressively
enlarged, soon reaching close to China's coastal boundaries on the west
and extending from there well into the Western Pacific. The expanded
than eighty
zone embraced the waters from which Japan had taken more
1 86
percent of its marine fishery harvest in the pre-war years.
Canada and the other Commonwealth nations on the FEC joined at
first with the Soviet Union and all the other members except the United
States in criticism of the SCAP policies, and, perhaps equally important,
in objecting heatedly both to MacArthur's failing to consult them and to
the consistent defense by the U.S. government of the SCAP moves. In
defending SCAP policies, the Americans often resorted to a cynical
extension of assurances to the Allies that future decisions would involve
prior consultation, only to have SCAP act unilaterally again and again.
The result was a rising sense of betrayal and an atmosphere of8profound
7
mistrust of the United States in the ongoing debate in the FEC. 1
For the Canadian government, the intense Allied criticism of American
policy posed a difficult choice. Ottawa sought to give support to Australia
and New Zealand, hoping to maintain strong relations with its sister
Commonwealth members. Canada was reluctant, also, to part with the
British on major issues unless the reasons were compelling., 88 London
made it easier for the Canadians when, as the Cold War (and then the
Korean War crisis) developed and intensified, the influence of the
Anglo-American "special relationship" began to be felt in fishery policy.
Hence the British Foreign Office assumed in 1950 a position of reluctant
185. Id.; BLAKESLEE, supra note 156,passim (discussing fisheries and whaling).
186. For a map showing the successive Zone expansions, see SCHErBER, supra note 12,
at 59.
187. Id. at 42-47, 54-58, 101-74.
188. Letter from Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to SS for EA (June 9, 1950)
(on file with RG 23, Cypher, WA 1296, 721-21-4(8)). An example of how reasons
could be compelling in this way was, obviously, the issues involved in the terms of the
Truman Proclamation and more generally in the quest for affording protection to
Canada's Pacific salmon fisheries, as discussed in Section III of this Article.
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acceptance of SCAP policy. On that basis, the U.K. decided against
embarrassment of the United States, vis-A-vis the Soviet Union, that
would result from a forcing of votes in the FEC on the whaling and
fishery expansion questions, and so the Australian government, by then
lacking full support even from New Zealand, its staunchest ally, agreed
to follow suit.189
Throughout all these FEC debates of SCAP policies, Canadian fishery
and diplomatic officials alike were unhappy with the prospect of breaking
openly with the United States. Clearly the postwar fate of Japanese
ambitions to fish for salmon on the North American coast was not far
from the forefront of consideration. Ottawa thus decided that its best
strategy was to try to work through bilateral contacts with Washington to
assure their West Coast fisheries of protection against any renewed threat
of Japanese "invasion" such as had occurred in 1937-38. Consequently the
Canadians sought assurances from the State Department that the United
States Government instruct MacArthur not to permit the eastward
boundary of the SCAP zone for Japanese fishing to come anywhere near
North American coastal waters. 19
Meanwhile, the divisions among the Allies on Japanese fishing and
whaling, together with the nature of the demands being put forward by
Australia with regard to long-term or permanent limitations on Japanese
fishing in the peace settlement, led the Canadian government to engage
in some fresh thinking about the need to establish a sound scientific
basis for any claims that Canada might want to put on the table when the
treaty negotiations went into high gear. External Affairs planners thus
sought advice on this issue from the government's fishery experts.
Scientists in the Department of Fisheries seized the opportunity to call

189. Secret memorandum from U.K. Foreign Office to Embassy in Washington,
D.C. (No. 6325, June 25, 1947) (on file with PRO, MAF 41/1337); and Memorandum
from London Embassy to Sec'y of State (A 1084, August 15, 1947) (on file with RG 43,
Rec. Relating to Int'l Whaling Conf.). Australian readiness to force a vote in the FEC
had been cabled to London two weeks earlier. External Affairs, Canberra, Australia, to
Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations, London, England, and to Prime Minister,
New Zealand (July 30, 1947) (on file with Australian National Archives, A 1068, ER
47/31/22).
190. Letter from Stewart Bates to Under-Secretary for EA (Nov. 12, 1947) (on file
with RG, f. FEC-231/7). In early 1948, the Canadian representative on the Far Eastern
Commission reported to Ottawa that U.K. had instructed its representative to seek
assurances that Japanese fishing fleets would be kept 100 to 150 miles from the coast of
any British possession. Letter from Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. to SS for EA
(Feb. 7, 1948) (on file with RG 23, Cypher WA 519, f. 721-21-4).

for more funding that would underwrite an intensive program of
oceanographic fisheries research in Pacific waters.' 9' Declaring that
even the rich salmon fisheries had not received sufficient research
attention beyond coastal waters, A. J. Whitemore, the chief Canadian
government fisheries management officer, recommended that Japanese
vessels should be confined to the area west of the International Date
Line on the assumption that this was the approximate dividing line
between Asian and North American salmon migrations. Lamenting "a
great void in the fisheries knowledge of this vast area" in which the
salmon traveled, Whitemore reminded the diplomatic officers of what
was at stake: "The record of aggression by the Japanese in fisheries," he
wrote, "is well known" so that "as little opportunity as possible should
be left to the Japanese fishing industry to endanger or jeopardize fisheries
Nor did Whitemore think that new research
such as the salmon. ..
efforts should be confined to obtaining better data on the population
dynamics and condition of the salmon stocks. There were other potential
opportunities for Canadian fishing operators that ought to be kept in mind:
The Japanese before the war had secured fishing and oceanographical
knowledge sufficient to enable them to wrest food fishes from the deep Pacific
Ocean waters. Examples (exclusive of whales) are Bonita, tuna, mackerel,
yellowtail, sea bream, and to some extent herring. These potential Pacific deepwater fisheries have hardly been touched by Canada.
To sum up, Canada has not exerted itself to the same extent as Japan and
Russia.. .to ascertain the potentialities of its off-shore fisheries. This criticism
also applies to the Canadian Arctic waters. It is perhaps too late for Canada to
secure the necessary data before international decisions have to be made, but
Canada should be prepared to forward reasonable claims with a sincere
deep-sea oceanographical and fishery
intention of backing these up with
93
investigations as soon as possible.1

Stewart Bates, the Deputy Minister for Fisheries, not only endorsed
Whitemore's strong views on the need to keep Japanese vessels west of
the International Date Line pending the conclusion of a peace settlement,
191. Letter from A. J. Whitmore, Chief Supervisor of Fisheries, Vancouver, British
Columbia, Canada, to Deputy Minister, Dept of Fisheries (Oct 31, 1947) (on file with
RG 23, f. 721-21-4(2)).
192. Id.
193. Id. Other leading fishery scientists in the Canadian bureaucracy had been
thinking along the same lines. Thus Dr. R. E.Foerster, then Director of the Pacific
Biological Station at Nanaimo, British Columbia, wrote to Wilbert Chapman (who was
then campaigning for American tuna research projects in the Central Pacific) that the
coastal fisheries should not be ignored. "It is high time," Foerster wrote, "that some
concerted programme of oceanography and biological research was started for the west
coast of North America, for conditions off the three-mile limit are liable soon to become
intolerable and may require many years' close restriction and careful husbandry.... We
should not neglect our coastal fishery resources and let them go to ruin .. " Letter from
R. E. Foerster to Wilbert Chapman (July 29, 1946) (on file with UW Library, Wilbert
McLeod Chapman Papers).
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but he also argued for a peace treaty provision that would permanently
oblige Japan to keep its factory-ship fleets fifty miles or more from the
shores of any territory under Allied control. There is no doubt that Bates
salmon and halibut fisheries in mind when he
had the British Columbia
1 94
advanced this idea.
The diplomatic planners in the Department of External Affairs had
little sympathy for the assertive position advocated by Whitemore and
Bates. The dominant view in External Affairs was, instead, to be wary
of "precedents which may be established in discussions of the Far
Eastern Commission, if friendly countries are to claim vast ocean areas
as being of special interest to themselves."' 95 Hence, in late 1947, Canada
refrained from giving direct support to the Australian demands in FEC
debates that Japanese fishing in the Pacific be restricted by SCAP entirely
to the area north of the Equator.1 96 Similarly, Canada's voice was
conspicuously muted in the FEC on the issue of Japanese whaling revival,
despite concern that MacArthur's flouting of the Allies on the whaling
question threatened to destabilize the newly established International
Whaling Commission's regulatory regime. 97 Canadian officials were
irritated by the way MacArthur was ignoring the FEC majority views in
framing SCAP policy on Japan's fisheries expansion; and at one juncture
Canada's representative on the FEC urged External Affairs to take a
stronger position on the issue.1 98 But Ottawa immediately replied by
instructing him to lie low and let Australia take the lead in raising any
objections against SCAP actions. He was also instructed to base his
diplomatic efforts on the core premise that "Canadian and United States
194. Letter from Stewart Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, to Under-Secretary
for EA (Nov. 12, 1947) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-21-4(2)).
Letter from SS for EA to Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7,
195.
1947) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-21-4(2)).
196. Id. See also Letter from Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C., to SS for
EA (June 29, 1950) (on file with RG 23, Cypher WA 1355, f. 721-21-4(8)).
197. Letter from Stewart Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, to Lester B. Pearson,
Under-Secretary of External Affairs (May 12, 1948) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-21-4
(3)); Letter from G.R. Clark to Stewart Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries (May 12,
1948) (on file with RG 23, f. 721-21-4 (3)) (pointing out to Bates that the United States
was eager to see the 1946 IWC gain ratification by other states, so that there might be a
bargaining point in regard to reining in SCAP on control of the Japanese whaling

expeditions). Concern for the vitality of the IWC regime reflected also, I think,
Canada's commitment to maximizing the influence of multilateral and international
organizations in the postwar world.
198. Letter from Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C., to SS for EA (Nov. 9,
1950) (on file with RG 23, f. 271-21-4(9)).

interests are so closely allied on fishery matters that it is unlikely the
United States would permit any extension of Japanese fishing ' areas
99
which would be of great concern to the Canadian fishing industry."'
Canada's position on fishery-related issues was equivocal, however,
even on the central issue of whether or not SCAP was obliged to consult
with, let alone be instructed by, the FEC. Thus in 1949, amidst a controversy
in which SCAP (strongly opposed by Australia and other Pacific allies)
was preparing to expand the Japanese fishing area southward for tuna
expeditions to the Trust Territory waters, Canada straddled the issue. On
the one hand, the Canadians formally rejected the American's insistent view
that SCAP had final discretion on Occupation policy, under authority
approved by Washington, and that consultation was not a mandatory
requirement. On the other hand, Canada's diplomats were unable to come
up with a formula by which the interested Allied nations in the AsiaPacific region might be given a degree of protection for their security
and their coastal fishing interests. z 0
Withal, ambiguity and indecisiveness, verging into a pattern of continuous
wobbling, thus seemed to be the fate of the Canadians as they struggled
to balance Commonwealth concerns, their own national interests, their
commitment to a principled view of international law, and their desire to
avoid damaging tensions with the United States. The concern about a
re-entry of Japan's fishing fleets into offshore North American waters
was always a major factor in planning discussions. By mid-1949, the
delicate balance had tipped; and the bilateral relationship with the United
States prevailed. From that time forward, treating directly with the United
States in bilateral talks became the dominant mode in the Canadian
government's pursuit of oceans and fishery diplomacy. The bilateral
mode was a continuation, in essence, of the close relationship of Canada
and the United States in the response to Japan's Bristol Bay "incursions"
199.

Letter from Dept. of EA to Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. (No. EX 233,

Ref. WA 2895, Nov. 16, 1950) (on file with RG 23, f. 271-21-4(9)). On the sensitive

reparations issue as well, the Canadian government tried to exercise a moderating
influence against some of Australia's ardently pursued demands. JOHN W. HOLMES, 1
THE SHAPING OF THE PEACE: CANADA AND THE SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER,

1943-1957

1291 (1982).
200. SS for EA, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, to Ambassador to the U.S. (Jan. 26, 1949)
(on file with RG 23, Cypher No. 197, f. 721-21-4(4)). A few months later, External
Affairs informed its representative in the FEC that it was at a loss as to what position to
take on all this and suggested that, "as a way out" of the bind, each interested nation
might declare in advance its areas of special interest for fishing. In that way, at least ex
post facto claims could be avoided if SCAP did order additional expansions. (SS for EA,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, to Ambassador to the U.S. (May 12, 1949) (on file with f. 72121-4(4)). In other words, Ottawa was still trying to bolster the authority of the FEC, in
the multilateralist and functionalist mode to which it sought to give priority, but to figure
out how, exactly, Canada could structure the process effectively remained elusive for
them.
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of 1937-38 and in the formulation of the Truman Proclamation. 20 1 Now,
in 1949, the bilateral mode took on new importance as the two nations
confronted the question of Japan's future as a global fishing power, with
vitally important principles of ocean law central to the debate.
Ottawa and Washington thus initiated a series of bilateral talks regarding
a possible tripartite fisheries treaty with Japan, 2 talks that would culminate
in November and December 1951 with the negotiation and signature in
Tokyo of the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention.
VIII. NEGOTIATING THE "ABSTENTION" PRINCIPLE: OCEAN LAW,
FISHERIES SCIENCE, AND DIPLOMATIC COMPROMISE

Bilateral Canadian-U.S. talks commenced in July 1949 and went
forward entirely outside the ambits of either the FEC or the consultative
processes of the British Commonwealth. Progress of the talks was
watched closely-and with some apprehensiveness-by the other Allies,
and especially by the other members of the Commonwealth; but still,
there is no evidence in the archives of any direct consultation with the
British Foreign Office or other embassies until late in the progress of the
discussions.2z 3 To be sure, the Canadian government's representatives in
201. See supra § IV. This is not to say that the relations between the two nations'
West Coast fishery industries had been uniformly harmonious. On the contrary, there
had always been potential for serious conflict between their competing halibut and
salmon fleets operating in overlapping offshore waters; jealousies and occasional flareups were hardly unknown. See supra notes 59-61, on Canadian concern over "reduction"
plans by an American company for offshore British Columbia waters. Such issues
continued to surface periodically, and continue to our own day in flare-ups involving
Canadian and U.S. salmon fleet interests.
202. The July talks are reported in B. M. Meagher, Memorandum, "Canada-U.S.
Fisheries Discussions in Ottawa, July 7-8" [1949], July 13, 1949, in Documents, 15
(1949): 1620-23. The State Department reported to the Occupation command on the
Ottawa discussions, indicating that "Canadian officials [had] expressed agreement in
principle" to the draft treaty approach, which was designed to restrict the Japanese fleets
from fishing freely in the Bering Sea and other waters off the Canadian and U.S. western
coasts. Dispatch No. 213 to Acting U.S. Political Adviser for Japan, Sept. 1, 1949,
f. 711.948/9-1649, DOS Records, NA.
203. I use the term "Allies" here to refer to the Allied nations outside the Soviet
bloc. The Soviet Union was adamantly opposed to the U.S. initiative to press for a nonpunitive Japanese Peace Treaty-and in fact the Soviet delegates walked out of the
international meeting for signature of the Treaty in San Francisco in 1951, occurring in
the midst of the Korean War. The Soviets were left out entirely of the separate negotiations
that resulted in the Japanese-US-Canadian convention, and it was a subject of debate
whether Communist influence, at the direction of Moscow, was responsible for some of
the intense opposition to the fisheries treaty in 1951-52.
The earliest date of documents that I have located in the archival sources relating to

these talks did express worry that Australia might be alienated by the
results; they also expressed a concern that any fisheries treaty with Japan
should be based on principles "adapted to inclusion in treaties with any
other interested countries," 20 4 rather than being purely ad hoc. At the end of
the day, however, Ottawa would subordinate this expressed concern to
other objectives; advancing general principles of law gave way to the
imperatives of national self-interest. As will be shown in the pages that
follow, this happened in large part because the Canadian government
yielded to the thrust of U.S. policy-a policy which was consistent with
the position of the British Columbia and U.S. West Coast fishing industries
and, indeed, was also consistent with the views of the Department of
Fisheries scientists and bureaucrats in the Canadian government itself.
Beginning in 1950, the bilateral talks were expanded to include
regular consultation with SCAP headquarters officials and leaders of the
Japanese government. The inclusion of Japan as a party to the discussion
meant that the countries whose interests were directly at stake would
deal with the issue of Japan's future role in the northeastern Pacific's
fisheries. Including all parties directly involved was consistent with the
theory of "functionalism" that Canada, under the governments led by
Mackenzie King and St. Laurent, sought to advance in global international
relations. 20 5 The functionalist approach-which called for taking each
issue on its own merits and involving the directly interested parties in its
solution-could be in sharp conflict, however, with the pursuit of
universal principles of international law that were associated with true
multilateralism. That the inconsistency could be troublesome for fisheries
diplomacy and law would become evident at every turn in the history of
these Canadian-American talks on the Japanese fisheries issues.
There was a larger, more embracing issue at stake: The Canadian and
the U.S. governments had a strong common interest in bringing the talks
to a successful conclusion because this would advance the cause of the
general peace settlement with Japan. Getting the fishery issues out
of the Japan Peace Treaty (JPT) negotiations and into the separate
channel provided by these bilateral talks-expanded to include Japanese
Commonwealth relations on the issue is some correspondence in November 1951
between Ottawa and the Australian government, when Canberra first saw a draft of the
proposed fisheries treaty and became worried that Australian interests would be
insufficiently protected by the "abstention principle" if Japanese fleets were to claim the
right to commence fishing in waters close off the Australian coast. The British Foreign
Office soon joined in that conversation. See A. B. J[amieson], "For Mr. McIntyre"
(internal memorandum), Nov. 1951, Australian National Archives, Canberra.
204. Canadian view as reported in "Attitude of Canadian Government toward
Proposed Japanese Fishing Treaties, April 19, 1950: memorandum of conversation
(telephone)," f. 611.964/4-1950, DOS Records, NA.
205. See text supra, at notes 134-35.
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officials-would help to avoid a head-on clash over the fisheries
question that could involve Australia, China, and other Pacific area
nations in a coalition that by demanding strict limits of future Japanese
fishing expansion could force a stalemate in inter-Allied negotiation of
the general peace treaty.20 6 Indeed, John Foster Dulles, the special
ambassador appointed to negotiate the JPT for the United States, was
reported as saying in the midst of the talks with Canada that he was
determined "that his quick negotiation of a short general Treaty of Peace
down infisheries squabbles that would drag out
would not get bogged
20 7
the settlement.

The influence of domestic politics in both Canada and the United
States was no less a potential source of such "fisheries squabbles" than
were foreign-policy differences among the Allies. This political factor
was manifest at every turn, and pressures from domestic economic
interests were never lost from sight. Hence, during the diplomatic talks
there were ongoing dialogues in both Canada and the United States
involving industry leaders on the Pacific Coast, diplomatic planners,
government fisheries experts, and legislators.20 8 The decision to deal
separately with the Japanese fisheries question eventually served
effectively to blunt the force of the domestic opposition to the peace
treaty that came in each country from the Pacific Coast fisheries
interests-opposition that was strong enough on the U.S. side that it
206. There had already been dramatic clashes on this question in deliberations of
the FEC, so that there was a realistic possibility that the issue of Japan's future as a
fisheries power could indeed easily create an impasse in the peace treaty talks. SCAP
officials had long been motivated to classify documents relating to their own policies
regulating Japan's fishing operations by concern that these regulations under the
Occupation authority would, if publicized, "undoubtedly be seized upon as a precedent
by other members countries of the Far East[ern] Commission who have ... endeavored
to surround Japanese high seas fishing activities with prohibitions and restrictions which
would either deny them access to suitable areas or preclude economical operations."
Natural Resources Section to Diplomatic Section, Commentary on Aug. 4, 1950
Memorandum [on fisheries regulation], Aug. 18, 1950, Natural Resources Section files,
SCAP Records, NA.

207. Dulles' view, as reported in letter from Wilbert Chapman to Montgomery Phister,
Jan. 6, 1951 (on file with UW, Chapman Papers) (emphasis added). For Chapman's role
more generally in the early months of the bilateral negotiations, see Scheiber, supra note
93, at 60-74.
208. BERNARD COHEN, THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE MAKING
OF THE JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT 9-27, 253-79 (1953); William C. Herrington, In
the Realm of Diplomacy and Fish: Some Reflections on the International Convention on
High Seas Fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean and Law of the Sea Negotiations, 16
ECOLOGY L. QUAR. 101,104 (1989).

posed a real threat that it might block ratification of the general peace
settlement by the U.S. Senate. Thus, the State Department's chief
fisheries officer, Wilbert M. Chapman, warned in 1951 that the Truman
Administration "could expect the west coast Senators to take every step
to delay the ratification of the peace treaty until after they were satisfied
that their interest would be protected, i.e., until steps had been taken to
'20 9
exclude the Japanese from the west coast fisheries.
Events proved Chapman's warning to be well merited. Indeed, as the
time drew near for formal negotiation of the trilateral agreement in
Tokyo in mid-1951, Chapman's successor in the State Department had
to make an intensive effort (with Secretary of State Dulles's blessing) to
assure the West Coast fishing leaders that the proposed fisheries treaty
would adequately protect their salmon and halibut industries. Those
assurances were reinforced by explicit backing from Dulles and a
promise to appoint some leaders of the West Coast industry as members
of the U.S. delegation sent to Tokyo for the final negotiations.2 '0 Also in
the background, as an essential element in the policy debate's larger
context, was continuing pressure from MacArthur's headquarters in
Tokyo against any moves that would harm the pace of rebuilding and
expansion of Japan's fisheries.2 1 1
Another important contextual factor, as the talks progressed, was the
British government's steadfast devotion to protecting the principle of the
three-mile limit. At the very time that Ottawa and Washington were
busily working out a way to exclude the Japanese from their offshore
fishing grounds in the Northeast Pacific, the United Kingdom was in the
International Court of Justice challenging--on an argument based on the
three-mile rule-Norway's efforts to exclude British fishing vessels
from operating in ocean waters beyond the traditional limited territorial
2 12
waters.
What follows in this Section is a brief analysis of how all of the key
doctrinal ocean law issues in international contention during the postWorld War II years were raised and, at least for the parties to the INPF
209. Reported in Office Memorandum from Alice Dunning to U.A. Johnson,
"Discussion with Canadians Regarding Japanese Fishery Treaty (May 3, 1951),"
f. 611.946/5-351, DOS Records, NA.
210. Memorandum from William C. Herrington to Mr. Webb (Under Secretary of
State), Subj: Pacific Coast fishing industry and the proposed fisheries treaty, Aug. 30,
1951, f. 6711.946/8-3051, DOS Records, NA. See also, inter alia, COHEN, supra note
208; and Scheiber, supra note 11, at 70-72. Herrington, who had been the chief fisheries
administrator for MacArthur's SCAP command, succeeded Chapman in the State
Department in 1950. See Amy L. Toro, Transformation in Fisheries Management: A
Study of William C. Herrington, in OCEANOGRAPHIC HISTORY: THE PACIFIC AND BEYOND
453 (Keith Benson & Philip Rehbock, eds., 2002).
211. Scheiber, supra note 11, at 48-49.
212. Fisheries Case, supra note 117.
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Convention, were resolved as the result of the Canadian-U.S. talks and
the final negotiations with Japan in November and December of 1951.
A major concern in this analysis will be to identify the lines of historic
continuity and discontinuity that came down from the diplomacy of the
Bristol Bay crisis of 1937-38, from the Truman Proclamation and from
the inter-Allied controversies of the Occupation period. This was a legacy
of doctrine and international geopolitics that lent a profound significance,
in the history of modem ocean law, to the "abstention doctrine"
compromise that was fashioned in the tripartite agreement.
A. ParallelTensions: PoliticalPlannersvs. Fishery Experts
Once Canadian-U.S. diplomacy came to a focus upon Japan's future
as a marine fishing power, evidence of severe internal tensions quickly
surfaced within the policy officialdoms of both Ottawa and Washington.
There was a keen awareness among all who were involved in the talks
that this would be a treaty that almost certainly the Japanese government
must accept. Hence the specific doctrines to be incorporated into this
agreement would necessarily have sweeping implications for the
ongoing global debates on the limits of territorial waters, on the law of
coastal fisheries, and on the role of scientific research in the shaping of
oceans law.
This awareness intensified well-established differences of viewpoint
on key policy objectives that had become evident in the internal councils
of the Canadian and U.S. governments as early as 1937-38 and had
pervaded the Canadian-U.S. talks on the Truman Fisheries Proclamation.
The cleavages cut across national lines during the policy processes of the
two countries, pitting political and area specialists against the fisheries
experts and bureaucrats. The multilateralists (or "internationalists," as
they were more commonly known) in the diplomatic ranks of both
governments shared a commitment to altruistic global cooperation. 13
By contrast, the fisheries specialists had an equally strong commitment
to exclusionist and protectionist policies that reflected the demands of
the Canadian and U.S. Pacific coast fishing industries for a treaty that
would exclude Japanese vessels from fishing for salmon or other species
in "their" offshore waters.21 4 Finally, the Japanese government and
fisheries interests were equally concerned about longer-term implications of
213.
214.

See, e.g., text at notes 217, 241-43 infra.
See, e.g., text at note 219 infra.

any agreement for the traditional principle of "freedom of the seas" in
international law--quite apart from their worry that a fisheries agreement
with Canada and the United States would stymie their ambition to reenter the Northeast Pacific to fish for salmon, herring, crab, and other
species.2 15
A basic source of tension was the fact that scientifically based fishery
management objectives were not always easily distinguished from naked
self-interest. This conundrum was illustrated well by a policy paper
circulated in the Canadian Department of External Affairs in 1947 that
discussed the desirability of keeping the distinction in the forefront of
policy planning. The conservation zones contemplated in the Truman
Fisheries Proclamation, the 1947 External Affairs paper asserted, "are
supposed to be for strictly scientific purposes and are supposed to have
nothing to do with eliminating undesirable competition."'2 16 The External
Affairs political experts were committed to Canada's established basic
policy, as they represented it, which was to advance the cause of
multilateralism and international cooperation. They sought to attain this
general policy goal by work both through the agencies of the United
Nations and through multilateral agreements; and so, specifically as to
fisheries, they declared Canada's objective should be "to negotiate
agreements that would embody "wise ... measures for the conservation
of the fish resources ... [of] the high seas. 217 If Canada itself or other
states "endeavoured to use conservation as a cloak for the protection of
their fishing industries against legitimate foreign competition," they
asserted, it would diminish the chances of success in pursuit of this
objective and, in the long run, would be against the Canadian national
interest.1 8
The commitment to multilateralism clearly was not shared, however,
by the Canadian government's own Department of Fisheries. For that
department's scientists and bureaucrats, the primary objective in the
coming negotiations with Japan remained (as it had been for Whitemore
215. See, e.g., text at note 256 infra.
216. 1947 Memorandum, supra note 157.
217. Id.
218. Id. Interestingly, the External Affairs document also recommended that the
Canadian government should join with the United States to get the Japanese government
(presumably as an integral part of any fisheries treaty) "to introduce domestic legislation
requiring Japanese nationals to abide by all the conservation regulations in force in the
various fisheries zones [that might in future be] . . . established by multilateral
agreement, bilateral agreement, or domestic legislation of the littoral state." Id. This
idea actually was incorporated by Mr. Chapman into one of the drafts of the tripartite
treaty, but the notion of requiring Japan to adhere to the existing and future regulatory
laws of other nations was unable to gain any support in SCAP headquarters and soon
was shot down in the State Department by Chapman's critics in the multilateralist.
Scheiber, supra note 11.
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and Bates in 1947) the guaranteed exclusion of Japanese fishing vessels
from the salmon and halibut waters-whether by enforcing a specified
zonal boundary line at a specified distance from the coast or by some
other formula. 219 Both the Department of Fisheries and the leaders of the
British Columbia fishing industry kept up the pressure on Ottawa, never
permitting the government's continuing policy discussions to neglect the
objective of protecting the coastal fisheries from what was termed
' 220
bluntly in parliamentary debate "encroachment by Japanese fishermen.
Tensions on identical lines were evident within the State Department.
On the one side was Chapman, the Department's Chief Fisheries Officer
and author of the first draft of the tripartite convention that was presented to
the Canadian government in Ottawa in July 1949. Chapman was unstinting
in his devotion to advancing American fishing industry interests-but at
the same time, he sought to pursue that goal through initiation of new
multilateral agreements that would provide for cooperative research and
international management based on the unique needs of management for
each fishery stock or species involved. 22' Thus, the tripartite fisheries
convention project for Japan was consistent with Chapman's broad
strategy in this regard.
Chapman acted on the premise that the diversity of the American
fishing interests-with the coastal fishing industry, especially salmon
and halibut, having concerns distinctly opposed to those of the distantwater Pacific tuna fleet or many of the New England fishermen who
operated in waters close to Canada-required abandoning the radical
unilateralist implications of the Truman Proclamation. 222 He aimed
219. See infra, notes 191-94 (views of Whitemore and Bates in 1947).
220. Dominion of Canada, 21st Parliament, 4th Session, HOUSE OF COMMONS, DEBATES,
347, 422 (1951). An interesting further aspect of the talks, on this question of exclusion
of Japan, was the concern on both the Canadian and U.S. sides that Soviet intransigence
with regard to the general peace treaty and Moscow's persistent refusal to accommodate
restoration of Japanese fishing and shore operations on the peninsula area north of
Hokkaido would require Japan to employ its fishing labor and vessels more heavily on
operations in the Northeast Pacific-and thus make it all the more urgent that exclusion
of Japan from the North American salmon and halibut waters be worked out.
"Canadian-U.S. Fisheries Discussions, Ottawa, July 7-8, 1949: Memorandum for the
File, July 12, 1949" (on file with RG 25, f. 12386-8-40).
221. See Scheiber, supra note 93, op. cit., 457-69.
222. The New England and Pacific tuna fleets were alarmed, of course, by any
move toward U.S. abandonment of the three-mile rule, since it would encourage moves
by other coastal states (e.g., Canada, affecting the New England fishermen; and the Latin
American states, who already were announcing-and in many cases enforcing-offshore
jurisdictional claims as far out as 200 miles). As "distant-water" fleets, therefore, they

instead to fashion policy for each specific fishery "independently, one at
a time," and to pursue each policy through international agreements.223
His role in tirelessly promoting within the State Department what would
become the tripartite agreement was entirely consistent with this "species
approach. ' 224 Chapman also championed the concept of "maximum
sustainable yield" (MSY) as a matter to be determined for each species
by cooperative scientific research and then used as the basis of regulatory
and conservationist decision-making by experts in international
management regimes. Indeed, getting the MSY concept into international
fishery agreements was an integral part of Chapman's larger strategy.225
Nonetheless, with regard to Japan in particular, Chapman was quite
prepared to fall back on the idea of a tripartite agreement by which Japan
would simply waive its rights under international law to fish within a
specific distance-in the first draft if the treaty, it was 150 miles-of the
U.S. and Canadian coastlines.226 The draft's preamble stated the broad
objective of protecting coastal fisheries and included the following
specific reference to the MSY concept:
The Governments of Canada, Japan, and the United States of America, sharing a
concern for the perpetuation of the coastal fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
and adjacent seas; recognizing the possible destructive effect upon coastal
fisheries of new long-range fishing methods and facilities; and desiring to
provide for the conservation of those fisheries to the end that each may continue
to yield the maximum sustained catch year after year; have agreed to the
following ....227
were fully as devoted to the three-mile rule as the salmon and halibut industries of the
U.S. and British Columbia were devoted to overturning it and establishing extended
jurisdiction-or, as the tripartite treaty with Japan promised, at least a multilateral
agreement that would keep Japanese vessels out.
223. Letter from Chapman to Montgomery Phister, Nov. 24, 1947 (on file with UW,
Chapman Papers). The same ideas were expressed by him somewhat differently in Chapman
to William Arnold, Jan. 3, 1949. Id. The term "species approach" was later given to
Chapman's conception of "species-by-species" agreements; and it later became the
standard nomenclature for the U.S. position in U.N. Law of the Sea talks in the 1970s to
describe the U.S. commitment to differentiation in law of highly migratory species on
the high seas (which the United States sought to exempt from national control within the
EEZs) and other species that it regarded as properly subject to coastal-state regulation
within the EEZs. See Scheiber, supra note 132, ch. 3. The controversy over the American
position championing the "species approach" and its abandonment, finally, by the U.S.
government in the 1990s are the subject of a comprehensive study by Christopher J.
Carr. Id. at ch. 4.
224. Chapman's presented this view in a detailed policy memorandum of Feb. 27,
1950, "Justification for Japanese Fishery Discussions," f.611.00 NP/2-2850, Office of
Northeast Asia Affairs, Records Relating to Foreign Policy Decisions, 1950, DOS
Records, NA.
225. See Scheiber, supra note 93, op. cit., 457-69.
226. Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Collings of the Canadian Embassy
and U. Alexis Johnson of the Northeast Asia desk, U.S. DOS, Japanese Fishery Treaty
(Mar. 23, 1950), f. 611.946/3, DOS Records, NA.
227. Id. (Draft), Preamble.
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The mechanism for achieving these high aims, in the Chapman draft,
came down to drawing lines across ocean areas-that is, a "zonal"
approach, not requiring any scientific determination of species status as
to MSY levels or anything else. In the zonal approach, Japan would
simply waive its rights to fish within 150 nautical miles of the U.S. and
Canadian western coasts, while Canada and the United States would
similarly keep their vessels and fishermen from operating within 150
natural miles of Japan's Pacific coast.228
The Canadian government's External Affairs Department was unhappy
with the 150-mile limit idea, both because it appeared to be "aimed more
at protection against competition than at conservation. '229 Also worrisome
to External Affairs was that both Australia and New Zealand hoped to
get Japan to accept such zones of offshore protection for themselves
against Japanese fishing-but these two Commonwealth member states
were in no position to obtain that objective, thus potentially a source of
embarrassment to Canada within Commonwealth councils. 230 Still, while
remaining wary of offending their Commonwealth friends in the AsiaPacific region, the Canadian diplomatic hierarchs had to attempt to
"'educate' the Australians on the subject of giving equality of treatment
to the Japanese." 231
It fell to the Japanese government, in any event, to shift the focus back
to a species approach for management-an approach that would require
significant input from scientific research conducted through an intemational
agency. When Chapman's initial proposal was first shown to the Japanese
(who of course remained under the benign guidance of SCAP headquarters
in such matters), their immediate response to the 150-mile zone idea was
entirely negative. Their response was no doubt encouraged by SCAP's
top fisheries officer, William C. Herrington, who had recommended in
228. Id. (Draft), Articles 1-II. The waiver would also apply to territories of both
the United States and Japan north of the Equator.
229. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Richard W. Byrd (Embassy
of Canada) and Southworth (British North American desk, U.S. Dept. of State), April 19,
1950, quoted in Scheiber, supra note 11, at 52. The question of Canadian-Australian relations
was particularly sensitive, since Canberra had been pressing for inclusion of a peace
treaty provision that would strictly limit Japanese fishing in the Pacific. Indeed, the
Australians' policy at the time was to obtain a provision in the peace treaty that would forbid
Japan's fleets from fishing in the area south of the Equator for a long period of years.
230. Id.
231. Memorandum of conversation, Subj: Japanese Fishery Treaty, between Mr.
Collins of Canadian Embassy and Mr. Johnson of Northeast Asian Office, March 23,
1950, dated March 24, 1950, f. 611.946/3-2450, DOS Records, NA.

confidence to Chapman that he drop the 150-mile idea, terming it "an
arbitrary determination" that would be indefensible as a general principle of
oceans law. Instead, Herrington advocated that the proposed treaty provide
for "mutual agreement to avoid intervention in fully matured fisheries
that are already under heavy conservation restictions"--the very concept
later adopted as the "abstention principle. 2 32
The Japanese government countered Chapman's 150-mile zonal
concept with an alternative formula, specifically declaring that Japan
was willing to continue the "voluntary suspension of [salmon] fishing in
Bristol Bay," consistent with terms of its March 1938 note to the United
States. The Japanese proposed that meanwhile they would be committed
to seek "a formula satisfactory to both sides" for sustaining conserved
fisheries in the Pacific, so long as it did not establish any precedents
prejudicial to Japanese ambitions for expansion of fishery activities in its
diplomatic relations with other nations. The Japanese proposal was for an
agreement that would run for only five years (in contrast to Chapman's
draft, which contemplated a fifteen year period of waiver of rights); and
it also declared forthrightly that "the Japanese Government hopes and
expects that once the peace treaty is concluded, Japan will not be
subjected to any special restrictions on high-seas fishery, such as are not
'
ordinarily applicable to sovereign states."233
of
position
did not explicitly refer
Although Japan's official statement
to MSY or a species approach, further moves from the Japanese
government did serve to introduce those questions into the discussion.
First, the Japanese Diet's upper house proposed in May 1950 a draft
agreement that would create by tripartite treaty an International Pacific
Fisheries Committee that would conduct scientific research on the
condition of fishery stocks in the Pacific north of thirty degrees south
latitude. The commission would recommend such restrictions on number of
boats, type of gear, closed areas, and catch quantities as its research
indicated was necessary to conserve the stocks under study.234 This proposal
did not call for Japan to abstain or waive rights except on the same basis
as any other nations involved in a fishery. Its thrust was that if restrictions
were to be imposed, they should fall on a non-discriminatory basis on
232. William C. Herrington to Chapman, April 26, 1950 (on file with UW, Chapman
Papers) (further stating: "That formula can be defended on the basis of logic, good use of
resources, and the general conception of 'reduced to possession'). Herrington later
succeeded Chapman in the State Department and became the author, on exactly this
basis, of the abstention concept that eventually was incorporated into the International
North Pacific Fisheries Convention, on which see infra, text at notes 240, 250.
233. Memorandum on High-Seas Fishery (March 20, 1950), f. 611.946/3-2350,
DOS Records. See also Scheiber, supra note 11, at 24, 46, 52-54.
234. House of Councillors, The Pacific Fishery Agreement (tentative plan), May 11,
1950, reproducedin SCHEMER, supra note 12, at 216-20.
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all the nations engaged in the fishery. 235 This theme-that whatever
formula was eventually adopted if a tripartite treaty were to be accepted
by Japan must be non-discriminatory-would be voiced strenuously by
was finally hammered
the Japanese negotiators when the treaty language
236
out the following year in the final Tokyo talks.
A definitive turn came when Secretary of State Dulles met with
Premier Shigeru Yoshida in February and March 1951 to establish the
basic groundwork for the general peace treaty, with restoration of
Japanese sovereignty. Fisheries were discussed at the outset of the talks.
From this meeting came a public commitment by Yoshida that Japan
would refrain from allowing its fishing vessels to operate in "presently
237
A few
conserved fisheries" that were under active management.
months later, Yoshida issued a public statement on fisheries in which he
committed Japan to enter into negotiations with other countries "with a
view to establishing equitable arrangements for the development and
conservation of fisheries," asserting the "special importance [of]... the
protection and scientific investigations of fishery resources. ' 238 In all
the Japanese policy documents of this period on the subject of
fisheries, however, the Yoshida government and the Diet leaders
insisted that Japan wished to reserve all its rights under the principle of
freedom of fishing on the high seas; indeed Yoshida specifically
reiterated that "once a peace treaty is concluded, Japan [should] not be
subjected to any special restrictions on high-seas fishery....,,239
235. Id.
236. In those talks in November 1951, the opening Japanese position, stated in a
proposed text, asserted: "[I]n the application of this Convention, no country concerned
under this Convention is to be subject to discriminatory exclusion from the exploitation
of any high seas fishery resource, or to any discriminatory restrictions or rules with
respect thereto."

Japanese Proposed Treaty Text, Nov. 15, 1951, in MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, JAPAN, TRIPARTITE FISHERIES CONFERENCE: CANADA-JAPAN-UNITED
NOVEMBER 5-DECEMBER 14, 1951, at 175 (1951).

STATES,

237. 24 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 351 (1951). Yoshida specified that such fisheries
included salmon, halibut, herring, sardine, and tuna in the eastern Pacific and the Bering
Sea. He also restricted his commitment to those fisheries in which Japanese fishing
vessels had been actively engaged in 1940. Id. For a full discussion of the DullesYoshida talks and the Japanese commitment-which was a nearly verbatim version of a
draft that Chapman himself wrote for the occasion, with Dulles approving its text and
passing it on to Yoshida in Tokyo prior to the formal publication of the letter, see
Scheiber, supra note 11, at 63-68.
238. Statement of the Japanese Government on High Seas Fisheries, July 13, 1951,
reprinted in Scheiber, supra note 11, at 98-99, and also in K. KAwAKAME, INTERNATIONAL

CONVENTIONS INPOST WAR JAPAN ch. 1, Sec. 2 (1972).
239. Statement of the Japanese Government, supra note 238. This language was

Within a short time, both Chapman and his successor as chief fisheries
officer in the State Department, Herrington, had abandoned the specificdistance zonal approach that had proven unacceptable both to Canada
and Japan. They concentrated instead on a formula (one that was finally
incorporated in the agreement) that would involve MSY findings by a
scientific commission, to be determined by an international commission
and its scientists and to be used as the trigger for "abstention" by Japan
from fishing the stocks in question.24 °
The Japanese position on non-discrimination was echoed by the U.S.
officials who staffed the economics, trade, and Northeast Asia desks at
the State Department. Leading the opposition to any treaty that would
exclude Japanese fishing from offshore waters beyond three miles was
Willard Thorp, the chief economics and trade officer. This was no surprise,
for Thorp similarly had been an unyielding critic of the Fisheries
Proclamation project during the policy process of 1944-45. Like the
Japanese government officials, Thorp and his allies in the Department's
Northeast Asia bureau believed that the proposed agreement advanced a
blatantly protectionist policy, favoring North American salmon interests.
As such, they argued, the agreement would set a precedent that other
nations might invoke to restrict access by Japan (or indeed any other
nation) to fishery resources in their respective coastal waters beyond
three miles.241 Chapman charged that Thorp seemed intent on building
up the economies of other countries "regardless of what it does to
ours," 242 and he continued to press for the tripartite fisheries agreement
on lines that would satisfy the salmon and halibut fishing industry. "My
position," Chapman told industry leaders, "is simply this: ... [The
Japanese] will not be let back into our coastal fisheries," whereas Thorp
and his allies in the State Department and at SCAP believed that the
Japanese "[had] every right to come into those fisheries and should be
helped to do so. ' 243 Ironically, it was not until June 1950, almost a year
after Chapman initiated the talks, that the Canadian government was
taken directly from the earlier paper from the House of Councillors, Pacific Fisheries
Agreement, supra note 234.
240. See text at note 249 infra.
241. Letter of Wilbert M. Chapman to Miller Freeman, n.d. but October 1948
(reporting Thorp's views and the debate in the DOS) (on file with UW, Chapman Papers).
242. Id.
243. Letter from Chapman to Montgomery Phister, April 16, 1950, (on file with UW,
Chapman Papers); see also Scheiber, supra note 11, at 62-63. One of the international
trade desk officers wrote of Chapman's draft agreement: "The sharp [150-milel
demarcation lines in the [draft] conventions, with complete exclusion from certain areas,
would appear to be in the direction of intensifying isolationism and may provide new
sources of friction" as well as appearing to be contrary to the basic U.S. policy of
maintaining rights of access to natural resources. Mr. Martin (ITP) to Chapman, Aug. 3,
1949, f. 611.946/8-1050, DOS Records, NA.
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finally made fully aware of the degree to which Chapman's views were
being seriously challenged within the State Department. 2 "
Chapman left the State Department in June 1951 to pursue a career in
the private fisheries sector. Herrington, his successor, had just returned
from more than three years service in Tokyo as chief of the fisheries
branch of General MacArthur's occupation bureaucracy. In that capacity,
Herrington, a respected scientist and able administrator, had won the
confidence of the Japanese fisheries industry and government leaders.
Inheriting responsibility for the tripartite fisheries treaty project, Herrington
cast about for a way of revising the treaty in a way so as to avoid the
potential for harmful legal precedent that could restrict Japanese fishing
interests globally that Chapman's 150-mile zonal concept represented.245
An intradepartmental coordinating committee was appointed in the
State Department to hammer out the issues, and by early July, this group
had reached consensus that the idea of seeking "complete exclusion from
the eastern Pacific waters" of the Japanese fleets had to be abandoned.24 6
The way out of the resultant impasse, as Herrington conceived it, was
the principle of "abstention." Seizing upon the opening given to him by
the Japanese diplomatic statements (by Yoshida and the Diet committee,
quoted earlier), with their emphasis on conservation goals,24 7 Herrington
now proposed that the tripartite agreement should rest on a formula that
would involve Japan voluntarily "abstaining" from the fishing of specified
244. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Japanese Fishery Treaty, March 23,
1950, March 24, 1950 (reporting conversation between Canadian Embassy and U. Alexis
Johnson of Northeast Asian Office, Dept. of State), f. 611.946/3-2450, DOS Records,
NA (stating that the Canadian representative, when informed the State Department had
not yet taken a final position on the proposed 150-mile zone concept for the treaty with
Japan, "expressed some surprise, stating that it was his understanding that the
agreements had already been drafted and approved by the Department and had been sent
to Tokyo for preliminary discussions").
245. Scheiber, supra note 11, at 73-77.
246. Id. at 75 (quoting Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Dean Rusk, July
10, 1951). See also Herrington, Problems Affecting North Pacific Fisheries: Tripartite
Fisheries Conference at Tokyo, November 4-December 14, 1951, 26 DEP'T OF STATE
BULL. 340 at 341 (1952) (stating that the Chapman proposals, in the view of many
American officials, "went beyond what was required to meet the conditions necessary
for encouraging the continued conservation of our fully utilized and conserved fisheries
and would provide a dangerous precedent for fencing off areas of the high seas").
247. It seems a fair inference, and an irony of the process, that Herrington had had a
great deal of influence in the formulation of the Japanese government's position, since he
was the virtual czar of Japan's fisheries industry during the Occupation and had been a
strong proponent of Japanese fisheries and whaling expansion in the face of opposition
from the Pacific Allies. See generally SCHEMER, supra note 12, at 51-99.

stocks that were under management and were found by scientific study
to be at the MSY level of exploitation. This was precisely what Herrington
had proposed from his Tokyo post to Chapman and the State Department
a year earlier.248 A memorandum that he penned in April 1951 set forth
this view in detail, expounding on the MSY concept as well as the
principles of international law that were at stake. The memorandum was
of great importance as a turning-point in the State Department's policy
process and indeed in the subsequent history of Law of the Sea debates,
as it set out in fully developed form what became known as the
abstention principle in later global oceans diplomacy.24 9
The concept of abstention, as Herrington proposed it in his April
memorandum, was cast in language that would later be substantially
incorporated into the INPFC. His proposed formula for protection of
conserved fisheries, encouragement of new investments in scientific
management, and multilateral cooperation provided that all parties to the
agreement would recognize traditional freedom of high seas fishing,
except for fisheries which fulfill all of the following conditions: (1) Fisheries
which are full approaching (sic] exploitation: scientific evidence indicates that
more intensive exploitation will not produce a substantially sustained increase
in yield. (2) Fisheries under extensive scientific study: concerned countries
have been and are expending substantial sums of money and effort to discover
the conditions necessary for maintaining the maximum productivity of the
resource. (3) Fisheries under scientific management: management measures are
in effect which limit and/or control the activities of the fishermen of the
concerned countries for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the productivity
of the resource. (4) Fisheries in which its nationals have no current or recent
substantial interest: the citizens of the concerned country have not participated
in the fishery on a substantial scale for the past ten (?) years." (5) Fisheries
non-contiguous with territorial waters: the territorial waters of the concerned
country are not contiguous
with the immediate waters in which the fishery is
250
being prosecuted.

The last (fifth) condition was specifically aimed at the U.S.-Canadian
relationship, to make clear that where salmon, halibut, and conceivably
other species declared eligible for triggering abstention were concerned,
the fact that they were in contiguous territorial waters of Canada and the
United States meant that neither of the two nations could be asked to
keep its nationals out of that fishery. In this respect, Herrington anticipated
a demand by the Canadian government a few months later for a
provision such as this that would prevent the Canadian fishing fleet from
248. See text supra at note 232.
249. W. C. Herrington, Some Tentative Ideas for U.S High Seas Fishery Policy
(proposed for purposes of discussion), [April 195 1 ], manuscript copy (on file with UW,
Chapman Papers).
250. Id. The question mark in parentheses is in the original. (Emphasis added.)
See discussion of the final treaty draft of the United States in Scheiber, supra note 11, at
79-81.
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being "'frozen in' to their past areas of fishing., 25 1 This demand was
satisfied with a provision of the treaty on intermingling of stocks in
contiguous waters that specified that "no recommendation shall be made
for abstention by either the United States of America or Canada in such
waters. 252 When British Columbia fishing leaders later questioned
whether that provision, in the version finally written into the INFPC,
was disadvantageous to them, the Fisheries Minister could respond
persuasively that in that respect the INPFC "is not an agreement with the
United States at all. It has not changed our relationship with the United
all the rights and privileges that we have ever had
States and we enjoy
253
with that country.
B. Adoption of the Abstention Concept
Herrington's most important task, if the abstention concept were to
prevail, was to win Mr. Dulles's support for it. Herrington was convinced,
first, that there was no chance Japan would willingly accept any other
basis for exclusion of their fishing fleets from North American waters.2 54
251. Memorandum for the Files, U.S.-Canadian-Japanese Fishing Treaty, Sept 4,
1951, f. 611.426/9-451, DOS Records, NA.
252. Canada also agreed at the November-December 1951 Tokyo conference to a
provision agreeing they would abstain from Bering Sea salmon fishing.

253.

Dominion of Canada, I

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES: OFFICIAL REPORT,

Sixth Session, 21st Parliament (1 Eliz. II, 1952) 512-13 (Fisheries Minister R. W.
Mayhew). The minister did acknowledge that Canada had agreed to stipulate that Bristol
Bay salmon did not intermingle with salmon from Canadian streams, but he pointed out
to his critics that under terms of the convention, if scientific studies proved they did
intermingle, the Canadian fleet would thereby gain access to the Bristol Bay salmon
fishery. Id. at 314.
254. Forcing Japan to accept a more arbitrary basis for limiting its fishing was a
possibility, of course, given that nation's status as a defeated and occupied power;
but all of American diplomacy after 1950 was geared to achieving the quickest
possible general peace treaty on non-punitive grounds. Herrington told the West
Coast fishing leadership in October 1951 that so long as Dulles was steering the
diplomatic course, there was no chance of imposing more stringent restrictions on
Japan's fishing activity. Letter from Herrington to Miller, Freeman, Oct. 3, 1951
(on file with UW, Chapman Papers) (also cited in Scheiber, supra note 11, at 75).
As early as December 1949, Chapman complained that with the day for a general
peace treaty still obviously quite distant, "it seems to be the case" that he would be
required "to discuss these [fishery agreement] matters with Japan as an equally
sovereign power." Letter from Chapman to Herrington, Dec. 5, 1949, (on file with
UW, Chapman Papers). (N.B. Herrington was then in SCAP headquarters and
overseeing Japanese fishery and whaling policies-and was personally involved in
the meetings with Japanese government officials called to discuss the early drafts of
the proposed tripartite agreement).

Second, he believed that because the requirements set out to trigger
abstention were fully met by the salmon and halibut research and
conservationist-management regimes on the West Coast, the abstention
idea was a crucial lever for winning support of the fishing leaders there,
despite the pervasiveness of racist animosity toward the Japanese that
reinforced the economic reasons for trying to keep Japanese competition
out of their waters. Finally, Herrington was convinced that if the tripartite
agreement required systematic MSY analysis, to be conducted by an
international scientific advisory body, it would serve to advance the
crucial U.S. policy objective of encouraging scientific management for
sustainability of marine fisheries not only in North American waters, but
throughout the world.25 5
Determined to avoid having the fisheries question involved in the
general peace treaty settlement, Dulles fended off West Coast industry
pressures. Thus, he responded with a strong rebuttal to the industry's call
for writing a provision into the general treaty that would categorically
keep Japan out of U.S. offshore waters. Dulles declared: "If we write
that kind of a peace treaty, every one of the other forty-seven countries
at war with Japan will want to write in provisions dealing with their
special problems, and the result will be a confusion and long delay
which is incompatible with the necessity of moving forward as rapidly
as possible to quick peace with Japan. I think, however, there is more
than one way to skin a cat, and I hope we can find one of the others. ' 256
Once Herrington could report to him that the West Coast industry was
mollified and would refrain from opposing ratification of the INFPC if it
conformed to the American draft's key concepts, Dulles found his
alternative: to incorporate into the general treaty a special provision in
which Japan committed itself to negotiation of fishery issues in the
interest of advancing conservationist management.2 57 It was a vague and
open-ended commitment, but it was finally reluctantly supported by
Australia and the other Allies who were unhappy with what they regarded
as an unleashing of Japan to expand fishing throughout the western and
southern Pacific-which, as events proved, was exactly what occurred,
since Japan insisted that it would place limits on its fishing industry's
expansion only with respect to "conserved" fisheries already under full
scientific management regimes. There were no such regimes in place in the
entire Pacific rim in 1951, except for the halibut and salmon regimes that
gained unique protection by dint of the abstention doctrine in the INPFC.
255. Herrington, supra note 249; Herrington, supra note 208.
256. John Foster Dulles to Edward Allen, Jan. 19, 1951, marked personal and
confidential, in Dulles "Fish" file, Japan Peace Treaty records, DOS Records, NA.
257. This paragraph is based upon documentation provided in SCHEIBER, supra note
12, ch. 4 at 175-96.
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In 1951, however, the central U.S. policy objective of achieving swift
conclusion of a non-punitive general peace treaty (seen as critical in
order to align Japan with the United States and against the Soviet Union)
drove all other decisions in the State Department relating to Japan. Thus
a veteran American diplomatic officer concerned with fisheries, Warren
Looney, urged in September 1951 that "promptness is essential, both on
domestic and international grounds," in moving toward formal negotiation
the West Coast industry finally in
of the fisheries agreement. 258 With th
line, he continued, the international dimension had become foremost:
Indonesia and Korea are pressing, and other far Eastern States will press, for
immediate bilateral fisheries agreements with Japan in accordance with Article
9 of the Peace Treaty. The general tendency of these States is to seek a flat
prohibition of the Japanese from certain areas of the high seas, .. . [and thus]
establish precedents harmful to the concept of the free seas.... It is imperative,
therefore, that the proposed US-Canadian-Japanese convention, with its
temperate treatment of Japan, be first negotiated in order to set a pattern for
these other conventions.259

It remained to bring the Far Eastern and economics desks into agreement
that the fisheries negotiations should be given the go-ahead, and once
Dulles had heard the conflicting viewpoints and made his decision, these
segments of the State Department's bureaucracy capitulated. It was not
on "the justice of the case" that they finally agreed to accept the fisheries
agreement, the top Far Eastern experts explained. Rather, they did so on
the exclusively pragmatic grounds that without it there would be endless
turmoil in moving forward with the general peace treaty-due to be
considered for final signature in San Francisco in October 1951. 260
Thorp felt the heat, too, as Dulles and Herrington pushed the fisheries
agreement planning at an urgent pace. At a July 27, 1951, meeting with
Herrington, Thorp "expatiated on the theme that a more multilateral type
arrangement envisaging true international controls" would be far preferable
to what Herrington was proposing for the tripartite scientific commission
under terms of his concept for the fisheries treaty.261 It was reported that
258. Mr. Looney to IC, Office memorandum, Tripartite Negotiations in Tokyo for
North Pacific Fisheries Convention (Sept. 24, 1951), Records of the Bureau of Far East
Affairs, DOS records, NA.
259. Id.
260. Memorandum "Fishery Relationship between Japan and U.S." Jan. 17, 1951
(report of meeting submitted by U. Alexis Johnson of the Far East desk) (on file with
UW, Chapman Papers).
261. Office Memorandum Mr. Gay to Rusk, Merchant, and Johnson, July 27, 1951,
f. 611.946/7-2751, DOS Records, NA.

although Thorp "continues to feel that a[n] exclusion is too clearly the
central objective of the present proposal," he was in nearly full retreat:
"He did not want ...at this late date to interfere with the present plans
of action, but hoped that the fullest consideration would be given to
means of bringing the treaty closer ' to
262 his conception of desirable
international procedure on the problem.
One can presume, moreover, that because the results of two years of
continuous negotiating with the Canadians were also at stake, this would
have been an additional factor impelling Dulles to push the policy
process in the direction he and Herrington wanted. Meanwhile, the third
partner in the traditional North Atlantic Triangle, the United Kingdom,
had been pushed entirely to the sidelines. The British government was
still trying to defend the three-mile rule and freedom of the seas, but
insofar as it was given a voice on the key fisheries issues that worried
Dulles, it was only with regard to Article 9 of the general peace treaty;
Whitehall was given no voice in the development of the tripartite
convention drafts. The British did give reluctant support to Article 9,
hoping that under its terms Australia, New Zealand, and other nations
to the
and colonies in the Pacific area would be able to bring Japan
263
effect.
into
gone
had
treaty
general
the
once
table
negotiating
Once the opposition to Herrington had been quelled in the State
Department, with Canadian support for the agreement now firmly
assured, the United States government moved quickly to inaugurate the
formal negotiations with Japan.2 64 The general peace treaty was signed
in San Francisco in September 1951. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
decided that the fisheries agreement conference should be formally
called by Japan and convened soon as possible in Tokyo. The conference
opened in November 1951, and within a short time the final agreement
was hammered out. The Japanese delegation sought initially to press for
the "non-discrimination" idea, offering to accept conservationist measures
but only so long as they were permitted to fish under whatever
restrictions the other two powers had accepted for their own fleets. By
contrast, the United States and Canadian position-which of course
prevailed-was for entire exclusion of the Japanese from fishing for
stocks on a specific list of species (salmon and halibut being the most
important) that were found by a tripartite commission to be at MSY
262. Id.
263. Letter from British Embassy to Mr. Fearey, no date, attached to memorandum
from Fearey to Allison, May 11, 1951, Records of the Bureau of Far East Affairs, DOS
Records, NA.

264. For a detailed account of the instructions given Herrington, the course of the
negotiations in Tokyo, and the 1NPF Convention's terms, see Scheiber, supra note 11, at
83-94; and Herrington, supra note 208, at 104-11.
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levels. It was not smooth going for the U.S. and Canadian diplomats,
since the Japanese delegation took a hard line at first on "nondiscrimination," finally yielding; and then, near the conclusion of the
talks, it required a dramatic personal intervention by Premier Yoshida to
bring the Japanese to agree on the specific distance from the North
American coast that would demarcate the waters governed by the treaty.
The final agreement was initialed in Tokyo in December and went into
force after ratification in 1953. The State Department's basic goal of
keeping fisheries disputes out of the inter-Allied preparations for a
general peace treaty had been achieved; and the West Coast fishing
interests, though distressed that the agreement did not give them air-tight
protection from Japanese competition in the salmon and other offshore
fisheries, won their main objective of exclusion, at least for a number of
years.265 For the Japanese, the agreement was a hard blow in that it was
the first major step in international ocean law diplomacy to establish
legitimacy of the principle that "freedom of the seas" for fishing was
subject to some qualification and abridgment in order to provide for
conservation of the stocks. As a U.S. official would later contend, invoking
precisely the argument that Herrington had deployed in his confrontation
with critics in the State Department, that the agreement
resolutely accepts the thesis that competition in the harvesting of a resource, the
economic limits of which are fimite, can result in the impairment of the resource
to the point where effort and yield lose their normal relationship. The treaty,
with complete reliance upon scientific evidence, seeks to provide a systematic,
of responsibility in the husbandry of
orderly and fair system for the sharing 266
renewable, manageable marine resources.

265. On the U.S. side of the border, the industry and labor leadership were more
readily reconciled to the need for some compromise than were their British Columbia
counterparts, especially so with respect to the British Columbia fishermen's unions.
William Herrington reported to the State Department that Ottawa had informed him that
"some of this opposition may be basically sincere, but the Canadians report that most of
it stems from communist-line organizations which seek any pretext for stirring up
opposition to the United States and to the Peace Treaty. [Ed note: The Soviet Union
opposed the Japan Peace Treaty, which like the fishery agreement was then awaiting
ratification.] An attempt is being made by them to make the case that this treaty is
directed by the United States against Canadian interests." The opposition in British
Columbia was strong enough that Canada asked that the initiative for final ratification be
taken by Japan and that the United States not appear to be putting the Canadian
government under any pressure to speed ratification. Herrington, "Confidential Security
Information: Memorandum for the Files, Subj: North Pacific Fisheries Convention,"
March 5, 1952 (on file with UW, Chapman Papers).
266. Milton C. James (then chair of the international commission acting under the

Nonetheless, because no other coastal nation in the entire Pacific Rim
area could claim to have a scientific management regime in place, Japan
was left free to operate without significant limitations in nearly all other
areas of the global oceans; and indeed Japanese fishing expanded rapidly
in its geographic reach and phenomenally in the volume of its high-seas
catch during the decade that followed. The agreement gained Japan a
great deal more than it could possibly have hoped for, had Australia,
China, Indonesia, and the Philippines had their way in their campaign to
restrict Japanese freedom to fish by inclusion of a harsh provision for
that purpose in the general peace treaty.267
For the British government, the agreement was a double blow. Not
only did it depart from the three-mile principle at the very time the
United Kingdom was fighting Norway over offshore fishing rights, but it
also indicated the geopolitical reality that Canada was moving ever more
closely to the United States in foreign policy coordination generally and
in the realm of fisheries diplomacy in particular.
The Canadians had waffled and been nearly paralyzed at many key
junctures in this history--during the Truman Proclamation discussions,
in the Occupation period, and at certain points in the development of the
INPFC agreement-finding it difficult to part with the British and, even
more, difficult to reconcile the protectionist goals of emerging bilateral
policy with the persistent ideal of multilateralism and "functionalism"
that Canada's leaders were articulating. Dedicated to advancing general
principles of law, rather than only short-term objectives in fisheries
diplomacy, the Canadian government portrayed the agreement in the
ratification debates as having been a success for Canada. With abstention
based on scientific study and the MSY idea, Fisheries Minister Mayhew
told the House of Commons,
[the INPFC] established a principle that can easily be applied to a fourth, fifth
or any other number of nations that want to accept it. ...All three countries are
firmly convinced that the conservation of the fisheries on the high seas is a
necessity, and that more and more the nations of the world will come to depend
on the sea for more of their food. This agreement will allow
268 the maximum of
exploitation and at the same time a sustained yield of fish.

At the same time, Mayhew insisted, "Canada has received the maximum
protection without injuring the welfare of any other country ....and has
obtained something that we did not have before, security for the
INPC), "Draft of a Paper for Presentation at International Technical Conference on the
Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea (for review by National Sections)"
(undated, but 1955) (on file with RG 25 f. 84/85/150, vol. 173, f. 10,600).
267. Scheiber, supra note 11, at 84-85.
268. Dominion of Canada, 1 HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, 6th Session, 21st
Parliament (1952), at 314 (speech of Mr. Mayhew).
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principal fisheries of British Columbia. 269
The Japanese certainly did not share Mayhew's point of view.
Yoshida drew heated criticism from the opposition party, from the
industry, and from many of his own party's Diet members, who
disdained the fisheries agreement as the product of simple naked
duress.27 °
For the United States, the INPFC agreement's incorporation of the
MSY principle as part of the abstention process was not the end of the
ocean-law reform effort, but rather only the first step in an ongoing
diplomatic campaign. Thus, in 1955, Herrington led an American delegation
to the first U.N. preparatory talks on the Law of the Sea. There they
sought to win international support to place the abstention principle at
the core of legal reform for ocean resources. Their effort failed in the
face of opposition from a coalition of other nations. 271 A significant
victory was won, however, when in the negotiations for the 1958 U.N.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas,2 72 the first of a series of U.N. ocean law treaties, introduced
269. Id. at 315. The Yoshida government's acceptance of new limitations on
freedom of fishing on the high seas was accepted in Japan only reluctantly as being a
tactically necessary surrender of rights in a situation of duress. Author's interviews with
fisheries officials and trade newspaper editors in Japan confirmed that this was the case;
on duress, see, e.g., the harsh comments on the treaty's terms in Oda, supra note 12, at
68-72, 87-90; Shigeru Oda, Japan and International Conventions Relating to North
Pacific Fisheries, 43 WASH. L. REv. 67 (1967); and Soji Yamamoto, The Abstention
Principleand Its Relation to the Evolving Law of the Sea, 43 WASH. L. REV. 45 (1967).
270. The Yoshida government explicitly justified its acceptance of new limitations
on freedom of fishing on the high seas as being a tactically necessary surrender of rights
in a situation of duress. (Author's interviews with fisheries officials and trade newspaper
editors in Japan.) On duress, see generally, the harsh comments on the treaty's terms in
Oda, supra note 12, at 68-72, 87-90; Oda, supra note 269; and Yamamoto, supra
note 269. Ironically, the U.S. State Department was deeply concerned that even
before ratification of the general peace treaty, the Japanese government and its
fisheries diplomats should be treated as though they were representing a sovereign
power-and it insisted that U.S. negotiators of the tripartite agreement in Tokyo,
November-December 1951, conduct themselves in accord with that view of Japan's
status. Scheiber, supra note 11, at 83-84.
271. HOLLICK, supra note 10. The U.S. diplomats believed that if they could obtain
agreement on the abstention concept (or, as they termed it, "abstention principle"), then
the divergent interests of the U.S. fisheries, distant-water on the one hand and coastal on
the other, could be served equally well. Id. Scheiber, supra note 93. See also Yasuko
Tsuru, Rethinking the Principle of Abstention: The North Pacific and Beyond, 28
MARINE POLICY 541, 544-46 (2004) (on the Japanese position on abstention and post1952 developments).
272. Done in Geneva, 29 April 1958, in force 20 March 1966, 559 U.N.T.S.
285. This convention was mainly of symbolic and precedential importance; it did

into general international law the notion of the positive duty of states to
cooperate in achieving "the conservation of the living resources of the
high seas"-with conservation being specifically defined as "the aggregate
of measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those
a maximum supply of food and other marine
resources so
273 as to secure
products. ,
Carried forward from the trilateral context of the INPFC, the
sustainability ideal thus was now placed front and center in the ongoing
debate on ocean law. The sustainability idea served in the years
immediately following as the counterweight against the movement, led
by the Latin American countries, for coastal states' unilateral claims of
extended offshore control-that is to say, it served as a counterweight
against the rising (and ultimately triumphant) movement for "ocean
enclosure" which would reduce by an enormous percentage the area
legally designated as the high seas. The winners in this contest were those
who successfully created the ocean regime we have today, in which the
power of decision whether to pursue conservationist sustainability goals
realistically is within the exclusive discretion of the coastal states. And
because the vast bulk of biomass of commercially exploitable global
marine fish stocks lie within 200 miles of the coasts globally, the new
regime would come to represent a full-scale274transformation of traditional
ocean law as known prior to World War II.
IX. CONCLUSION
Lying ahead, in the course of ocean law development after the 1958
Convention was signed, were two decades of profound change in the
order of the oceans. Although the sustainability idea was not lost from
the core of ocean law doctrine, and although it would re-emerge in robust
form in the 1990s, 275 the reality meanwhile was that ocean enclosure was
not gain ratification from a sufficient number of nations to be effectively
enforced.
273. High Seas Fisheries Convention, Articles 1 & 2. One commentator has
pointed out that by explicating that maximum supply of food and other marine products
is the objective, in fact the reference to "optimum" yield is misleading; and that "since
the greatest volume of return is by necessity the maximum sustainable yield, this
measure (MSY) is clearly what is the objective of management." STUART M. KAYE,
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 69 (2001).
274. See generally VICUf4A, supra note 26; BURKE, op. cit, supra note 2; Harry
Scheiber, Ocean Governance and the Marine Fisheries Crisis: Two Decades of
Innovation-andFrustration,20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 119 (2001).
275. Especially in the Rio Convention, the Convention on Biodiversity, and the
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. See, inter alia, Christopher J. Carr and Harry N. Scheiber,
Dealing with a Resource Crisis: Globalization and the Management of the Marine
Fisheries,21 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 45 (2002); Van Dyke, supra note 17.
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ineluctably on the ascendant. By the late 1970s, the 200-mile exclusive
zone had been claimed by so many coastal nations that its legitimization
in the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 had become a foregone
conclusion. Indeed, by then the U.S. Government, under terms of the
famous "Magnuson Act",276 had itself definitively discarded both the
three-mile rule and the abstention idea, declaring unilaterally an Exclusive
Economic Zone of 200 miles.277
The global debates of ocean law from 1952 to 1982, and in some
respects to the present day, were marked by the tension between
advocacy of legal rules that would favor distant-water fishing interests
such as the U.S. tuna fleet, the British trawling interests, and the
Japanese tuna and salmon industries, posed against the coastal states'
interest in excluding foreign-flag fishing from fishing grounds well off
their coasts. The debates were complicated by the fact that in some
countries, including Canada and the United States, their fishing industries
included both distant-water and coastal fishing interests of great
economic significance and with great political clout. The twists and
turns of diplomacy that sought to advance these competing interests have
been the subject of many studies, and so that fascinating story in the
history of ocean law need not be revisited here. What has not been
sufficiently noticed in the standard literature is the extent to which the
destabilization of ocean law-a development usually analyzed with
attention almost exclusively to the ICJ decision in the fisheries case of
1951 and its convergence with the reports of the International Law
Commission soon afterward, introducing the volatile question of how
baselines should be drawn to define offshore territorial waters-was
significantly affected by the way in which the major fishing powers, as
described in this Article, were addressing the question of Japan's future
as a fishing power. The relations of the North Atlantic Triangle nations
276.

See Harry N. Scheiber and Christopher J. Car, Constitutionalism and the

TerritorialSea: An HistoricalStudy, 22 TERRITORIAL SEA J. 67-90 (1992).

277. Even earlier, the United States Congress had enacted legislation extending
fisheries zones out to six miles (78 Stat. 194-196 [1964] and then to twelve miles (80
Stat. 908 [1966]). In the U.N. Law of the Sea debates of the 1970s, U.S. diplomats
sought to head off the 200-mile movement with proposals first for a six plus six zone (six
miles of territorial waters and six additional for fisheries control) and then for a twelve
mile exclusive zone. Finally the U.S. delegation settled on the "species approach" for
the U.N. Law of the Sea, arguing for a separate regime for highly migratory species
(principally tuna) on the high seas, with coastal state jurisdiction only within the 200
mile zone for species not specifically designated "highly migratory." See generally Carr,
ch. 4, in BRINGING NEW LAW, supra note 18.

in this development vividly illustrate the clash of principles and policies
that complicated the contemporary response to Japanese fishing
ambitions-and that presaged the conflicts of interest and legal
innovations that lay ahead.
The deputy minister of fisheries for Canada, Stewart Bates, provided
in 1953 a remarkable summary view of where things then stood in ocean
law, just as the INFPC was in its initial stage of implementation.
Shrewdly pointing out the emergent dilemma for both Canada and the
United States of reconciling the competing interests of distant-water and
coastal fisheries, Bates suggested that Canada would probably take a
place eventually alongside Iceland, Australia, and Norway in a coalition
championing extended coastal jurisdiction so as to further exclude
foreign vessels from Canada's offshore waters.2 78 With the situation as
to baselines and other questions in international ocean law now "highly
fluid," Bates wrote, the Canadians should be careful not to commit too
quickly to a fixed position on grounds that Canada had "possible longrun (not necessarily immediate) interests in declaring new territorial
areas for Canada and perhaps in redrawing base lines for territorial water
purposes." 27 9 The tripartite agreement had successfully achieved the "standoff' of Japan's fishing fleet from Canadian and U.S. shores without
involving the perplexing issue of how to define maritime territorial
boundaries, he wrote, because the agreement had instead introduced
"new principles of conservation and exclusion"-which is to say, the
abstention doctrine. 280 Nonetheless, the agreement should be seen, Bates
argued, as having driven "a deep wedge into the unrestricted fishing
concept." The Canadians had taken "two opposite positions simultaneously,"
he continued,
subscribing to the exclusion principle for all foreign nations but insisting that
we retain the right of unrestricted fishing both in Alaska and off the United
States proper-a position that caused much embarrassment to the United States
and almost disrupted negotiations both before and during the official

278. Stewart Bates to Under Secretary EA, Nov. 4, 1953: re Dispatch 1003 from
Tokyo Embassy, f. 2622-40 (on file with RG 25). All the following quotations in this
paragraph in the text are from this document. Id. Bates's observations proved prescient.
By the 1980s, a leading commentator remarked: "Canada's fishing interests are those of
a 'coastal state' par excellence." Parzival Copes, Canadian FisheriesManagement Policy:
International Dimensions, CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY: NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE
NEW LAW OF THE SEA (Donald McRae and Gordon Munro, eds, 1989). See also Wendell
Sanford, "The Sea Where International Law is Made," Law of the Sea Institute Occasional
Paper, 2003, available at www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/ earlwarren/ losipublications/
sanfordtalk.pdf.
279. The possibility of vastly expanding the offshore claims of Canada if straight
baselines were to be adopted was opened up to the Canadian Government when
Newfoundland joined the Confederation in 1949.
280. See supra note 278 (emphasis added).
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much as the oyster
conference. We achieved the two opposing principles
81
changes its sex-by a special biological formula!

As events proved, even the "special biological formula" that had come
out of the Canadian-U.S.-Japanese deliberations-while the British were
pushed aside, shattering the Atlantic orientation of the North Atlantic
Triangle and fracturing the unity of earlier days over the three-mile
rule-could not serve to resolve the complex conflicts that remained
outstanding in postwar ocean law. In a sense, the key terms of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea exemplified and perpetuated the
ambivalent contribution of the INPFC to ocean law, with what Mayhew
had termed its "two opposing principles." The exclusionary aspect of
the tripartite agreement was reflected in the successful movement for the
200-mile EEZ by which the coastal states realized their exclusionist
objective-without the need for any special "biological formula" or
magical changing of sex. But the conservationist-management aspect of
the INPFC was also reflected in the several provisions of the 1982
Convention and other ocean law instruments adopted since then,
accepting and elaborating significantly the MSY concept and its more
embracing scientific descendent, the ecosystem principle-today so
dominant a consideration in the law of living resources of the sea.

281.

Supra note 278.
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